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Abstract 
Post Disaster Tourism Crisis Recovery in SIDS:  Development and Testing of an 
Integrated Approach 
 
by 
Abdulla Niyaz 
 
The tourism industry is especially vulnerable to crises and disasters. Its vulnerabilities include 
both physical infrastructure and more intangible elements such as destination image and 
reputation. Being a fragmented industry, its response is typically difficult to initiate and 
coordinate during a disaster. Natural disasters and environmental vulnerabilities are of special 
concern for Small Island Developing States (SIDS). If a disaster occurs in a small country 
which is economically based on tourism, it will usually entail a second disaster including; 
reduced tourist arrivals, loss of employment, declines in private sector profits, a reduction in 
government revenues, increased imports and rising insurance costs.  
In the last decade, there has been a growing interest in the tourism research field of crises and 
disasters. This is partly due to security incidents and natural disasters that appear to have 
increased in frequency and significance during this period. Various models and disaster 
management frameworks have been developed. Most of the literature focuses on the effects of 
risks, crises and disasters in the short-term rather than on long-term impacts and lessons 
learned from this aspect of a tourism industry following a major disaster. Furthermore, most 
of these studies are focused on larger and developed nations. A thorough review of crisis and 
disaster management literature and models revealed that an integrated framework and 
approach are lacking, and require development and testing for tourism disaster planning and 
management.  
This thesis  has investigated how tourism destinations that have suffered from natural 
disasters recover and plan for future disasters. A framework for tourism area disaster planning 
and management has been developed through a critical literature review. In terms of testing 
this integrated framework, the research adopted a case study design using mixed methods of 
data collection. The exemplar used was the Maldives (afflicted by the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
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2004). Qualitative interviews were conducted in the field in the case study destination with  
individual tourism operators, the government and private sector agencies responsible for 
destination marketing and emergency services.  
Findings show that the proposed integrated framework for tourism disaster planning and 
management is a practical framework that could be applied by National Tourism 
Organizations (NTOs) in a Small Island Developing State to proactively prepare for a tourism 
crisis or a disaster and to even revitalize their tourism industry following a crises or a disaster. 
The NTOs actions and strategies in the Maldives can be used as a reference when dealing 
with adverse events to the tourism industry. Based on a comparison between the conceptual 
framework and the case study results, the integrated framework for tourism disaster planning 
and management was redeveloped. The new framework integrated several components from 
the existing Tourism Disaster Management Framework (TDMF). The framework provided 
details on required emergency actions from the governmental and private sectors, whilst 
focusing on tourism industry responsibilities. The new framework focused on activities and 
strategies that the NTOs should be pursuing in a proactive approach to manage disasters that 
can affect tourism.  
This research indicates the need to be prepared for crisis and disaster management in the 
tourism industry. A tourism destination that has a realistic assessment of the risks and 
required disaster management strategies and disaster management planning is likely to 
respond and recover quickly should a crisis or disaster occur. Investigation of previous 
disasters and crises is required for developing comprehensive scenarios based crises or 
disaster management plans. NTOs could undertake research on adverse events which have 
had an impact on  the tourism industry in the past and base their tourism disaster management 
plans on these findings. 
Effective institutional arrangements are also crucial  for implementing the integrated 
approach. Respective governments need to ensure that there is one overall disaster 
management agency with a clear line of authority and decision making process, particularly 
for emergency relief and response. In the tourism context, the NTOs or the relevant 
government departments must develop clear strategies and should be delegated with the 
decision making authority at a national level. 
Future research is suggested for any component/s in the proposed Integrated Framework for 
Tourism Disaster Planning and Management. Similarly, the whole framework could be tested 
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by using a case study of another type of crisis or  disaster. Another area of future research 
could focus on the effects of disasters on destination image and the effectiveness of 
government strategies in  restoring market confidence. More research is also required to 
understand disaster preparedness and organizational learning within the tourism industry in 
Small Island Developing States. 
. 
 
Keywords: tourism, crises and disasters, intergrated approach for tourism crisis planning and 
management, small islands.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this research is to build an integrated theoretical model of tourism disaster 
management. It is believed that understanding tourism crises and disasters and how 
destinations have responded and recovered from them, will enable more effective 
planning for future disasters. This chapter will  provide introductory material on the 
research work presented in this thesis. The background and motivation behind the 
research are described in section 1.1; the rationale for the research topic and 
objectives are detailed in sections 1.2 and 1.3, respectively; finally, in sections 1.4 and 
1.5, potential research outcomes and thesis organization are discussed. 
1.1 Personal Background and Motivation for the Research 
Early in the morning on the 26th December 2004, my phone rang and I woke up to 
hear of the tragic and sad news of an employee’s death while at work. Being the 
Director of Human Resources in the company, I arranged to bring the body from the 
resort island to the capital city Male’ where I worked. The morning was approaching 
and so I went to the mosque for the prayers, as was my custom. I thought about how I 
would tell the family this dreadful news. This was but a slice of my everyday 
responsibilty in a 5000 employee company.  
The earthquake that originated in Sumatra, Indonesia on the 26th of December 2004 
was felt in the Maldives at about 6.25 am. The country was about to wake up, while 
the hospitality industry in the country was fast asleep after Christmas celebrations. I 
met some people who complained of minor tremors but life went as usual. I went to 
the harbour to receive the speed boat which brought my employee’s body. The time 
was 09.20 am and the ambulance personnel closed the door. I saw the massive waves 
coming towards me.  
Male’, where I was born, is just under six square kilometers and was the first among 
the islands to be hit. There was no news, no warning that such an event may take 
place. I ran for my life behind the ambulance and just reached the hospital which was 
a few hundred meters away from the jetty. As I turned to see the waves following us, 
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the boats were raised from their moorings. The waves, reaching seven metres, were 
largely controlled by the sea walls that surrounded the capital city, but some crossed 
the outer roads and seawater found its way into the city. 
The hospital was in chaos, there were no functioning telephone connections, the 
streets were flooded with water and debris, and reports of deaths and causalities were 
growing by the hour. The tsunami destroyed several islands in the Maldives and many 
were evacuated, incuding those full of  tourists. I watched as all of these events 
unfolded in front of me. An inner voice told me this is it, while another urged me to 
do something about the chaos I saw around me.  
I worked fifteen years in the tourism and hospitality industry, moving from an entry 
level position to a strategic level. During my time in this industry, I also gained my 
Masters degree, in the same field.  In my fifteen year stint, I worked in five star hotels 
and other industrial projects in construction, pre-opening and operation stages. I had 
the opportunity to work on a number of tasks, including environmental projects, 
health and safety monitoring and reporting for projects funded by international 
financial institutions. I was always concerned that the tourism industry, as well as the 
government agencies, were not adequately prepared for a major emergency and 
disaster.  
Hence, my interest in the current research developed. I developed a firm belief that I 
needed to pursue knowledge in this field of tourism crisis and disaster management so 
that  one day I would be able to contribute to my country in this important area. My 
history teacher once told me that the ultimate  theme in social sciences is humanity 
and that is where I was heading. I embarked on a long journey to seek answers  in the 
quest for knowledge. 
By the time I began this research, in 2009, five years had passed since the tsunami. . 
Much had happened in the Maldives, or had it, at least in terms of learning from the 
past to inform the future?  What follows is my journey to understand tourism and 
disaster risk management in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). 
 
   
3 
 
1.2 Rationale 
Faulkner (2001) notes an ever-increasing number of disasters and crises which affect 
the tourism industry, ranging from natural to human induced disasters. This has been 
most evident since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, which severely 
impacted upon the tourism industry, illustrating the need to understand and effectively 
manage  the implications of such incidents. The tourism industry is highly vulnerable 
to disaster and its vulnerabilities including both damage to the physical infrastructure 
and more intangible elements such as destination image and reputation (Méheux & 
Parker, 2006). Several major crises have adversely effected the tourism industry 
worldwide (for example, the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in the United 
Kingdom, the 2001 terrorist hijackings in the USA, the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, 
the 2003 SARS epidemic in Southeast Asia and Canada, the Influenza A (H5N1) in 
2003-2004, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and Ha, the H1N1 virus in 2009).  
Tsunamis, volcanoes and floods have affected many tourism destinations during the 
past five years. In 2010, the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, a major volcano, in Iceland 
disrupted air travel to and from the United Kingdom, Ireland and Western Europe. In 
2011, the eruption of the Chilean volcano and its ash disrupted air travel throughout 
much of the southern hemisphere. Similarly, other major disasters of 2011 (the 
Queensland floods, the Japan earthquake and tsunami and the Christchurch 
earthquake) caused significant destruction and loss of life in the affected regions, 
resulting in  damage to the tourism industries in each of these destinations. These 
events indicate that all destinations are susceptible to the possibility of a disaster or a 
crisis. Moreover, each of these examples suggest that all tourism destinations are 
likely to experience some kind of disaster at some point in their evolution (Faulkner, 
2001). 
Due to these incidents, greater academic and administrative attention has been 
focused on managing risks in this field. Despite an increase in research   on this issue, 
there is a considerable lack of clarity on the impact of crises on the tourism and 
hospitality industry. There is also limited scholarly activity and documentation on the 
development of models and frameworks for crisis management to prepare 
stakeholders for negative events that could also guide their response when a crisis 
arises (Pforr & Hosie, 2008). Faulkner (2001, p. 136) highlights that more efficient 
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research on tourism disaster “is an essential foundation for assisting the tourism 
industry and the relevant government agencies to learn from past experiences and 
develop strategies and for avoiding and coping with similar events in the future.” He 
argues that by analysing “past events, the response of those affected and the recovery 
measures adopted, and retrospectively evaluating the effectiveness of those responses, 
we can develop strategies” for the future. 
Prideaux and Laws (2007) argue that the role of academics in tourism crisis 
management is to record crisis events, demonstrate best practice planning,  develop 
better analytical tools, and build theoretical models. Peters and Pikkemaat (2006, p. 
18) argue that the development of effective crisis management tools requires 
“systematic and complete documentations about crisis management processes to 
benchmark or learn from comparable tourism destinations.” Ritchie (2004) 
recommends further research on theoretical and conceptual frameworks focusing on 
the tourism industry. He notes a shift from simple prescriptive models of what 
managers should do before, during and after disasters, towards the development and 
testing of existing frameworks or theories using descriptive and analytical case studies 
to determine how management occurred in reality and why the crises or disasters were 
managed in the way that they were. 
Many tourism crisis and disaster management researchers have identified gaps in the 
research and have made recommendations for productive areas of tourism crisis and 
disaster management research. Such gaps are identified in Chapter 2, section 2.7, to 
establish a research direction for this thesis. There is no evidence of long-term 
research being done in a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) to determine industry 
experiences  after a disaster, what recovery strategies were initiated, the ongoing 
effects and how tourism crisis and disaster management has changed. Based on the 
research gaps identified, this thesis will provide  an analytical case study of short, 
medium and long term actions used  by  stakeholders in the recovery of the tourism 
industry in the Maldives following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. Maldives was 
chosen primarily because the country is a SIDS, and is highly dependent on tourism 
for economic growth. These reasons are discussed further  in Chapter 4, section 4.5.4. 
Moreover, the Maldives is familiar to the researcher, as has been noted in section 1.1 
The research proposes an integrated framework for tourism disaster planning and 
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management, which is based on constructs used in disaster management theory and 
frameworks (Faulkner, 2001; Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001; Hystad & Keller, 2008; 
Miller & Ritchie, 2003; Ritchie, 2004). This research  tests and redevelops the 
conceptual framework using the real life case study mentioned above. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The main purpose of the research presented in this thesis is to propose an integrated 
framework for tourism disaster planning and management in SIDS, with a focus on 
natural disasters. The proposition was that from understanding tourism crises and 
disasters and how destinations have responded and recovered, will enable more 
effective planning for future disasters. The central research questions were: 
  What can be learnt from past tourism crises and disasters in terms of planning 
for future disasters?  
 What have the Maldives learnt following their disaster experiences and how is 
this currently being incorporated into their future preparedness plans? 
The framework adopted in this research is supported by the literature review in 
Chapter 2. The research presented herein sought to meet the following objectives: 
 Review previous studies on tourism disaster management and propose an 
integrated framework for tourism disaster management. 
 Analyze the unique characteristics of disaster recovery for the tourism industry 
in SIDS, both  short and long-term recovery requirements, through  examining 
the impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 (Maldives). 
 Explain the roles and importance of key stakeholders in disaster recovery for 
the tourism industry. 
 Examine whether the lessons learned from previous disasters have been 
incorporated into future plans within the tourism disaster management 
practices in SIDS. 
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1.4 Potential Research Outcomes 
The main contribution of this research is an integrated approach that could be used as 
a crisis and disaster management framework for managing tourism crises or disasters 
in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). This research makes an academic 
contribution to the field of tourism crisis and disaster management where it addresses 
the lack of research on destination response and recovery in SIDS with tourism based 
economies. This research builds upon existing studies; namely, Faulkner (2001), 
Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) and (Ritchie, 2004). It also responds to Carlsen and 
Liburd’s (2008), research agenda which examines research on managing recovery and 
restoration, marketing and promotion during and after the crisis, and rebuilding the 
destination (see section 9.7). It also responds to Ritchie (2009)’s research 
recommendations to examine the lack of studies on the long-term impact to assist 
Destination Management Organizations (DMOs), National Tourism Organizations 
(NTOs) and industry associations who have an important role to play in educating the 
industry and facilitating readiness, response and recovery actions and strategies (see 
section 2.7). Further, the research expands Ritchie’s work (2004) on understanding 
stakeholder collaboration and planning in the tourism industry. 
All SIDS are vulnerable to economic shocks and natural hazards. They share common 
challenges due to their small size, remoteness from large markets, and vulnerability to 
economic and environmental shocks. In most SIDS, tourism is the main economic 
activity (Neto, 2003), bringing in most of their foreign currency earnings (Ashe, 
2005), in addition to being the largest source of employment generation (Scheyvens & 
Momsen, 2008). A disaster can have a significant impact on the tourism industry and 
economy of a small country. The recovery of the destinations’ economy therefore 
would be vital for overall recovery of the government and the community.  
The analytical case study of stakeholder strategies (short, medium and long term 
actions) in the recovery of the tourism industry in Maldives, following the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami of 2004, is an opportunity to test the conceptual framework 
developed for the study and is a practical outcome for the tourism industry in SIDS. 
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1.5 Thesis Organization 
This thesis has been organized into nine chapters. The present chapter introduces the 
thesis, outlining the rationale, objectives and organization of the research. A brief 
description of the chapters that follow is provided below: 
 Chapter 2: Reviews and discusses the significant literature which forms the 
theoretical and methodological basis for this study. 
 Chapter 3: Outlines the framework for tourism disaster planning and 
management that has been developed based on constructs used in disaster 
management theory and frameworks. 
 Chapter 4: Reviews and discusses vulnerabilities, challenges and constraints 
faced by the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in their cause for 
development. 
 Chapter 5: Outlines the epistemology, theoretical perspectives and the 
methods used in this research. 
 Chapter 6: Presents the empirical results obtained from government agencies 
that were interviewed for the thesis. 
 Chapter 7: Presents the empirical results that were obtained from interviews 
with  private-sector establishments. 
 Chapter 8: Discusses the findings from Chapters 6 and 7 in relation to the 
framework that has been proposed for this study (Chapter 3). It  presents a 
redeveloped framework based on comparison between the proposed 
conceptual framework and the case study findings. 
 Chapter 9: Concludes the thesis by summarizing the research implications 
and limitations before making recommendations and suggestions for further 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
CRISIS AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN TOURISM 
2.1 Introduction 
The goal of this research is to build a broadly integrated theoretical model of tourism 
disaster management. It aim is to examine and analyze how tourism destinations that 
have suffered from natural disasters recover and plan for future disasters. This 
research uses the context of a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) as an exemplar. 
Understanding tourism crises and disasters and how destinations have responded and 
recovered them will allow for more effective planning for future disasters. This 
literature review refines the purpose and contribution of this research by examining 
academic literature, government and industry documents as the basis for proposing an 
initial theoretical model for testing and later refinement based on an empirical study 
of a major natural disaster. 
The chapter consists of four main sections. The review begins with an examination of 
definitions, concepts and typologies of crises and disasters in tourism, tracing the 
growth in tourism research and literature in this field with a brief look at the 
vulnerability of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to crises and disasters. The 
second section focuses on three tourism crisis and disaster management frameworks 
based on crisis/disaster life-cycle approaches. The third section more closely 
examines key themes in tourism literature related to response and recovery stages of 
crises and disasters in a tourism destination. Finally, a series of gaps in the research is 
identified, relevant to the purpose of this thesis, for further exploration. 
2.1.1  Understanding Crises and Disasters 
According to Pforr and Hosie (2008) a clear, accessible and agreed upon, definition of 
crisis is lacking in the literature. Definitions of tourism crisis are extremely rare and 
those that do appear in the literature are contextualized and reflect one single purpose, 
usually explaining a particular crisis phenomenon (Santana, 2004). Pauchant and 
Mitroff (1992, p. 12) define a crisis as a “disruption that physically affects a system 
as a whole and threatens its basic assumptions, its subjective sense of self, its 
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existential core.” Selbst (1978, p. 136) defines a crisis as “any action or failure to act 
that interferes with an organization’s ongoing functions, the acceptable attainment of 
its objectives, its viability or survival, or that has a detrimental personal effect as 
perceived by the majority of its employees, clients or constituents.” Selbst seems to 
imply that if stakeholders perceive a crisis, that perception could manifest itself as  a 
real crisis.  
As per Glaesser (2006), crisis management is understood as the strategies, processes 
and measures which are planned and implemented to prevent and cope with a crisis. 
Crisis management is the planning for, responding to, and recovering from a crisis 
(Huang, Tseng, & Petrick, 2008). Keown‐McMullan (1997) proposed a model for the 
situation to develop into a crisis. There must be three elements: (i) a triggering event 
causing significant change or having the potential to cause significant change. Once 
this trigger is perceived by those in the organization there will be a crisis if; (ii) 
management feel they are unable to cope with change that has taken place, and (iii) 
the trigger is so significant as to pose a threat to the survival of the organization 
(Shaluf, Fakharu'l-razi, & Aini Mat, 2003, pp. 28-29). Santana (1999) defined crisis 
management as an ongoing integrated and comprehensive effort that organizations 
effectively put into practice in an attempt to first and foremost understand and prevent 
the crisis, and to effectively manage those that occur, taking into account, in each and 
every step of their planning, and training activities, the interest of their stakeholders 
(Santana, 2004, p. 308). Crisis management is still a relatively challenging concept 
within tourism, although it already has an established presence in other business 
environments. 
Many researchers differentiate  between a disaster and a crisis, which could be an 
important factor for researchers and managers to consider in studying and preparing 
for these situations. Faulkner (2001, p. 136) distinguishes between the two terms, 
arguing that a crisis is a situation where “the root cause of an event is, to some extent, 
self-inflicted through such problems as inept management structures and practices or 
a failure to adapt to change” while a disaster is a situation where “an enterprise…is 
confronted with sudden unpredictable catastrophic changes over which it has little 
control.” Key characteristics of disasters (Faulkner, 2001, p. 138) include: “(1) a 
triggering event; (2) a high threat environment with short response times; (3) a 
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perception of an inability to cope by those directly affected, at least in the short term; 
(4) a turning point where the situation is responded to; and (5) characterized by 
“fluid, unstable, dynamic” situations.” Parker (1992) suggested that the preferred 
definition of a disaster is “an unusual natural or man-made event, including an event 
caused by failure of technological systems, which temporarily overwhelms the 
response capacity of human communities, groups of individuals or natural 
environments and which cause massive damage, economic loss, disruption, injury, 
and or/loss of life” (Shaluf et al., 2003, pp. 28-29). Carter (1991, p. xxiii) defines a 
disaster as “an event, natural or man-made, sudden or progressive, which impacts 
with such severity that the affected community has to respond by taking exceptional 
measures” (Faulkner, 2001, p. 138).  
Hence, disasters are sudden and unforeseen shocks to the socio-economic and 
environmental system, involving loss of life and property that often exceeds the local 
capacity of the affected community to cope. Similarly, a crisis event can lead to a 
dangerous situation, like an emergency or a disaster. Crisis is a time of extreme 
difficulty, trouble, or danger and can affect a small population, or a company dealing 
with a very serious problem. 
This research  focuses on natural disasters. The purpose of the study is to examine 
how the tourism industry is affected by natural events in general and how prepared are 
they for future occurrences. To be clear, I  use ‘disaster’ as a term to signify a major 
natural disaster that has the potential to turn into a tourism crisis. Thus, both terms are 
used, but are consistent with the above definitions. 
2.1.2 Typologies of Disasters and Crisis 
A number of authors have sought to develop typologies of crisis, which can be useful 
in developing an understanding of crisis and implementing appropriate managerial 
responses (Evans & Elphick, 2005). It is helpful for some managers, especially in the 
planning stage, to classify crises. Parsons (1996) suggests three types of crises: “1. 
immediate crises: where little or no warning exists therefore organizations are unable 
to research the problem or prepare a plan before the crisis hits. 2. Emerging crises: 
these are slower in developing and may be able to be stopped or limited by 
organizational action. 3. Sustained crises: that may last for weeks, months or even 
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years” (Ritchie, 2004, p. 671). In line with Parson’s classification, Seymour and 
Moore (2000), argue  that there are two types of crises: the “cobra” type, which 
strikes suddenly and the “python” type which occurs gradually (Evans & Elphick, 
2005, p. 140). In classifying crises, de Sausmarez (2007) contends that crises are 
traditionally classified as either natural (hurricanes and earthquakes) or man-made 
(industrial accidents, plane crashes or terrorist events). In addition, although crises 
may occur in a single country or region, the repercussions may be global (de 
Sausmarez, 2007, p. 701). Maditinos and Vassiliadis (2008) note the main kinds of 
crises which occur on the local level and can be magnified over a considerable area, 
sometimes affecting the global tourism industry. These include terrorist attacks, 
natural disasters, political instability and war, and epidemics or diseases. Table 1 
presents some of the types of crises using the classifications discussed above. 
Table 1: Features of “Happen Locally – Affect Globally” Tourism Crises 
Types of Crisis Gestation 
Period 
Cobra /Python Human 
Involvement 
Manmade/
Natural 
Terrorism Immediate Cobra Direct Man-made 
Natural disasters Immediate Cobra Indirect and no 
involvement 
Man-made 
and Natural 
Political instability 
and war 
Sustained Python Direct Man made 
Epidemics and 
diseases 
Emerging Python No 
involvement 
Natural 
Source: Adapted from Maditinos and Vassiliadis (2008) 
Table 2 presents some of the types of crises and disasters, their characteristics and 
examples as given by Ritchie (2009). The table includes incidents that meet the core 
requirements of either being a crisis or a disaster, in the sense that they all include 
sudden change, severe socio-economic impact and they require quick action. Some 
are self-inflicted (such as organizational misdeeds), and some are not self-inflicted 
(such as natural disasters). 
Table 2 : Typology of Disasters and Crises, their Characteristics and some 
Examples 
Types of 
Crises/disasters 
Specific 
Environment 
Characteristics Examples 
Natural or 
physical 
disasters/Human 
disasters 
Physical 
environment/ 
Human or 
social 
environment 
When an organization or 
destination is damaged as a 
result of the weather, ‘acts 
of God’, human influences 
or a combination of the 
 UK Foot and Mouth 
Outbreak in 2001 
 SARS epidemic 
 Hurricane Hugo 
 Asian fires and smog 
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above. Examples include 
earthquakes, tornadoes, 
floods, hurricanes, 
avalanches, fires, bad 
storms, tsunamis, health 
crises or biosecurity threats 
or technological hazards 
May be as a result of 
natural processes such as 
climate change or the result 
of human processes or 
action such as deforestation, 
forest burning, pollution 
haze in 1997 
 Kobe earthquake 1995 
 European floods 2002 
 Katherine flood 
(Australia) 
 Forest fires in southern 
France 2003 
 Austrian Alps 
avalanche 
 Indian Ocean Tsunami  
2004 
 Tohuku 2011 
Earthquake and 
tsunami - Fukushima 
nuclear disasters 
 
Political 
crises/disasters 
Human or 
social 
environment 
The tourist industry and 
tourists are often  indirect 
victims, but can be 
specifically targeted in 
some cases. Examples can 
range from within 
international tourism such 
as international wars, civil 
war, coups, terrorism, riots 
and political and social 
unrest. 
 Gulf War 1991 and 
Iraq War 2003 
 Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia 
 Fiji Coups 
 British handover of 
Hong Kong to China in 
1997 
 Opposition by locals 
towards tourism 
development 
Economic crisis Human or 
social 
environment 
Ranging from international 
recessions, regional 
currency crisis to national 
recession or monetary crises 
 Stock market crash 
1987 and slow down 
after September 11, 
2001 
 Asian economic crisis 
1997-1998 
Malevolence Human or 
social 
environment 
When some outside actor or 
opponent employs extreme 
tactics to express anger 
toward the organization or 
destination to force the 
organization or destination 
to change. Examples 
include product tampering, 
kidnapping, terrorism, and 
espionage 
 Basque separatist 
group ETA bombing 
campaigns in Spanish 
resorts 
 Muslim extremist 
attacks in Egypt in the 
1990’s to force change 
in government 
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Challenges Human or 
social 
environment 
When the organization or 
destination is confronted by 
discontented stakeholders. 
The stakeholders challenge 
the organization because 
they believe it is not 
operating in an appropriate 
manner and does not  meet 
their expectations. 
Examples include boycotts, 
strikes, lawsuits, 
government penalties and 
protests. 
 Unofficial strike by 
British Airway check-
in staff in July 2003 
 Domestic air pilot 
strike in Australia in 
1989 
Megadamage Human or 
social 
environment 
When an accident causes 
significant environmental 
damage. Examples include 
oil spills and radioactive 
contamination. 
 Chernobyl 
 Exxon Valdez 
Organizational 
misdeeds 
Management 
Failure 
When management takes 
actions, it knows will harm 
or serve to discredit or 
disgrace the organization in 
some way. Examples 
include favoring short-term 
economic gain over social 
values, deliberate deception 
of stakeholders and illegal 
acts by management 
 Bribery or price fixing 
 Enron,Wordcom 
Workplace 
violence 
Management 
Failure 
When an employee or a 
former employee commits 
violence against other 
employees on 
organizational grounds. 
Examples include killing or 
injuring co-workers 
 Sexual harassment by 
staff 
 Rape or violence 
against hotel guests 
Rumours Management 
Failure 
When false information is 
spread about an 
organization or its products. 
The false information hurts 
the organization’s 
reputation by putting the 
organization in an 
unfavourable light. 
Examples include rumours 
linking the organization to 
radical groups or stories 
that their products are 
contaminated. 
 Rumors of second 
terrorist attack after 
American Airlines 
plane crashes after 
September 11, 2001 
Source: Adapted from Ritchie (2009, p. 28-29), Modified after Coombs (1999:61-62) and 
Hall and O’Sullivan (1996) 
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2.1.3 Importance of Crisis and Disaster Management for SIDS 
Crises and disasters have become more frequent in the last decade. According to 
Hystad and Keller (2008) this may be partly due to the more complex and 
interconnected world we live in today, and the modern communications bringing even 
the most distant disasters to our attention. As per Ritchie (2004) globalization has also 
led to the expansion of tourism investments at an international scale, in pursuit of a 
greater share and profitability. Managers in these companies, which are exposed to 
greater political, economic, social and technological changes in these countries, are 
required to effectively deal with crises and disasters. Today, a small crisis in one part 
of the world can have a significant  impact on other parts of the world. The tourism 
industry is not immune to these events, as clearly demonstrated by September 11th, 
SARS, the Iraq War, and Hurricane Katrina (Hystad & Keller, 2008).  
SIDS are mainly located in the tropics and sub tropics, in the Pacific, Indian and 
Atlantic oceans, as well as the Caribbean and Mediterranean seas. In most SIDS, 
tourism is the main economic activity (Neto, 2003), bringing in most of their foreign 
currency earnings, in addition to being the largest source of employment generation 
(Scheyvens & Momsen, 2008). According to UN (1994), SIDS have some of the 
highest exposure levels to natural hazards globally; at least 13 of the 25 most disaster-
prone countries are SIDS. As per Mimura et al. (2007), environmental vulnerabilities 
of SIDS that were identified included, the threat of rising sea levels  and the location 
of small islands in relation to phenomena such as cyclones, hurricanes and seismic 
activity which can lead to tsunamis. Table 3 shows natural disaster events and deaths, 
from 1995 to 2015. 
Natural disasters are of special concern due to  the typically small size of SIDS; their 
dependence on agriculture and tourism which are particularly vulnerable to natural 
and environmental disasters; their narrow resource base; and the pervasive impact of 
such events on their people, environment and economies, including the loss of 
insurance coverage.  
For SIDS affected by such natural disasters, those particular characteristics can  mean 
long lasting economic, social and environmental consequences leading to high 
recovery costs.  In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, the issue of adequacy of 
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insurance company became apparent. Most of the businesses owned and operated by 
major international or local groups were covered for both physical damage and 
business interruption. However, smaller local companies operating one or two resorts 
unfortunately  discovered inadequacies in their cover. The financial and operational 
strength of these large companies ensured their resorts could be rebuilt from a mix of 
adequate insurance cover and their own resources.  
Insurance can be a risk transfer mechanism in post-disaster recovery, however as 
Wright (2013, p. 15) notes  its contribution to disaster risk management is limited in 
SIDS due to the low level of insured households and small businesses either due to 
unavailability or high cost. According to Holland (2009, p. 42) insurance coverage of 
Nadi households and businesses during 2009 flooding in Nadi, Fiji was very low. 
Only 1 per cent of households reported having any insurance to recover from flood 
losses, while 88 per cent of business operators reported having no insurance, which 
led to a government review of the insurance industry after insurance companies 
refused to issue policies in flood prone areas (Holland, 2009). Orchiston, Vargo, and 
Seville (2013, p. 23) reports that following the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010-2011, 
the tourism sector in Christchurch and surrounding areas was found to be well insured 
with a range of insurance products, however, relatively few operators had business 
interruption cover (44% of those surveyed). The region was fortunate to have a high 
level of insurance, which protected tourism businesses from hardships, allowed them 
to continue in the industry and to survive while it offered the chance to redevelop and 
create opportunities to thrive into the future (Orchiston et al., 2013, p. 23). 
As  Ritchie (2009) notes, these recovery issues put increasing pressure on tourism 
managers and planners in countries reliant on tourism economies to think about the 
impact of crises and disasters and to develop strategies to deal with the impact to 
defend tourism businesses and society. (Huang et al., 2008, p. 204) contends that 
“when a disaster happens, various aspects of international tourism demand can be 
affected negatively including reduced visitor arrivals, a fall in employment, declines 
in private sector profits, a reduction in government revenues, and eventually the 
cessation of further investment.” This poses many challenges for the destination 
management organizations. 
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Table 3: Natural Disaster Events, Deaths and Populations for SIDS, 1995-2015 
Types of Crisis Events Deaths  Total Population in 2014 
AIMS Region (Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and South 
China Sea) 
      
Cape Verde 6 9 503,367 
Comoros 13 90 752,438 
Guinea Bissau 13 2777 1,745,798 
Maldives 3 110 351,572 
Mauritius 7 4685 1,249,151 
São Tomé and Principe 0 0 197,882 
Seychelles 6 8 93,306 
Singapore 3 36 5,517,102 
Caribbean Region       
Antigua and Barbuda 6 6 90,903 
Bahamas 13 16 382,571 
Barbados 5 1 286,066 
Belize 11 64 339,758 
Cuba 37 78 11,258,597 
Dominica 7 7 72,341 
Dominican Republic 46 1689 10,528,954 
Grenada 3 40 106,303 
Guyana 6 34 803,677 
Haiti 141 236,686 10,461,409 
Jamaica 20 74 2,798,837 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 5 54,789 
Saint Lucia 7 21 183,598 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 7 16 109,371 
Suriname 2 5 543,925 
Trinidad and Tobago 6 3 1,344,235 
Pacific Region       
Cook Islands 6 19 20,732 
Fiji 22 126 887,027 
Kiribati 3 0 103,942 
Marshall Islands 4 6 52,772 
Micronesia, Federated States of 6 77 103,903 
Nauru 0 0 10,081 
Niue 2 2 1,307 
Palau 0 0 21,097 
Papua New Guinea 126 3103 7,476,108 
Samoa 5 165 191,831 
Solomon Islands 17 135 572,865 
Timor-Leste 8 29 1,152,439 
Tonga 8 10 105,782 
Tuvalu 0 0 9,894 
Vanuatu 20 171 258,301 
Source: Total Population Data is from UNDP (2014). 
 Disaster Events, Deaths Statistics of SIDS are from CRED International Disaster Database (accessed 
on June 2015) 
 
Ritchie (2009, p. 18) argues that “crisis and disaster management should be a core 
competency for tourism destination managers as well as business managers.” Santana 
(2004) notes that understanding how a crisis develops and evolves and being familiar 
with all phases, is a critical knowledge for effective crisis management. Santana 
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(2004, pp. 303-304) argues that “unfortunately, crisis management is still considered 
peripheral to the core activities of the day-to-day operations of organizations. 
Research on crisis management has been largely overlooked in comparison to other 
issues that promote “success.” The net result of such emphasis is that managers are 
not prepared technically, psychologically, and emotionally to deal with a common 
feature of business operation and management today: crisis.” Therefore, it is crucial 
that tourism organizations and businesses investments in SIDS focus on crises and 
disaster management as a core knowledge and competency area and incorporate crisis 
management at a strategic level to gain management commitment. 
2.1.4 Review of Disaster Studies in Tourism 
In the tourism literature, research has been conducted  on natural hazards and disasters 
generally (Méheux & Parker, 2006), and more specifically: 
 Hurricanes (Chandler, 2004; Soñmez & Backman, 1992); 
 Flooding and tsunamis (Carlsen, 2006; Cheung & Law, 2006; de Sausmarez, 
2005; Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001; Garcia et al., 2006; Henderson, 2007; 
Ichinosawa, 2006; Reddy, 2005; Sharpley, 2005); 
 Earthquakes (Huang & Min, 2002; Young & Montgomery, 1997);  
 Bushfires (Armstrong & Ritchie, 2008; Cioccio & Michael, 2007; Hystad & 
Keller, 2008; Hystad & Keller, 2006); 
 Biosecurity and disease, with an emphasis on the Foot and Mouth Disaster in 
the UK (Baxter & Bowen, 2004; Irvine & Anderson, 2006; Miller & Ritchie, 
2003; Ritchie, Dorrell, Miller, & Miller, 2004; Rodway-Dyer & Shaw, 2005; 
Sharpley & Craven, 2001; Williams & Ferguson, 2005); and  
 Biosecurity and disease, with an emphasis on the impact of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), particularly in the Asia-Pacific region (Hall, 
2005; Henderson & Ng, 2004b; McKercher & Chon, 2004; Pine & 
McKercher, 2004) 
These diverse studies focus primarily on  destination restoration and recovery during 
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those natural hazards and disasters and enhance the understanding of different 
approaches taken to prepare and respond to them. The selected cases from literature in 
table 4 are illustrative of the list and enhance the understanding of crises and disaster 
management in tourism. 
Table 4: Selected Cases of Disaster Studies in Tourism from Literature 
Case study Scenario Results/lessons 
Hurricane: 
 
An Analysis of the 
economic impact 
of Hurricanes’ 
Dennis, Floyd, and 
Irene on North 
Carolina’s Lodging 
Industry  
(Chandler, 2004) 
  
 
 
 
- During September and October of 1999, 
the state of North Carolina was devastated 
by the effects of successive hurricanes, 
followed by the worst flooding in 500 years.  
- At the request of the state hotel association 
and the division of tourism, a state-wide 
study was conducted to determine the 
economic impact of the natural disasters on 
the lodging industry.  
 
 
- Based on data provided by responding 
hotels, the physical damages suffered and lost 
room revenues were estimated to be between 
$96 million and $125 million for September 
and October alone.  
- To make accurate predictions about the 
future economic trends of the hospitality 
industry, North Carolina’s hoteliers and 
restaurateurs need to recognize the potential 
danger posed by tropical storms and 
developing appropriate response plans. 
Flooding and 
Tsunamis: 
 
Katherine, washed 
out one day, back 
on track the next: a 
post-mortem of a 
tourism disaster 
 (Faulkner and 
Vikulov, 2001) 
 
 
 
 
- On 26 January 1998, the Katherine Gorge 
in the Northern Territory was flooded. 
- For the Katherine community and its 
tourism industry, the ‘Australia Day Flood’ 
was a disaster of huge proportions, with half 
of the resident's homes, the whole of the 
town's Central Business District (CBD) and 
most of its tourism business premises being  
extensively damaged or destroyed. 
 
 
 
- This research argues that disasters are part 
of the evolution of a destination and if it has a 
tourism disaster management plan in place, 
the destination will cope with the challenges 
the situation presents more effectively.  
- In doing so the research refines a previously 
developed framework for tourism disaster 
management plans (companion paper) by 
examining the case of the 1998 Australia Day 
flood at Katherine.  
- In the process, the potential contribution of 
such a plan to destination preparedness is 
illustrated, and valuable insights into the 
details of such a plan and the more enduring 
tourism impact of disasters are provided. 
Bush Fires: 
 
Towards a 
destination tourism 
disaster 
management 
framework: Long-
term lessons from a 
forest fire disaster 
 (Hystad and 
Keller, 2008) 
 
 
- This research is a follow-up study 
investigating the long-term experience of a 
tourism industry affected by a major forest 
fire disaster that occurred during the summer 
of 2003 near Kelowna, British Columbia, 
Canada.  
- The first study determined the 
preparedness, responses, and recovery 
methods of the local tourism industry from 
interviews with 104 local tourism 
businesses, and a review of relevant 
government, media, and organizational 
reports. 
 
 
- This research investigates what the local 
tourism industry experienced over the long-
term after the disaster, what recovery 
strategies were initiated, the impacts that 
remained, and how tourism disaster 
management has changed.  
- The research includes repeat interviews 
with 60 of the original 104 businesses, two 
and a half years after the disaster. 
- A number of surveys conducted by relevant 
tourism agencies, 1 year after the disaster, are 
also examined to provide information on 
intermediate impacts.  
- The aim of this paper is to contribute to 
shortage of research investigating the long-
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term experiences of tourism industries after 
disasters.  
- The lack of disaster management in tourism 
is also addressed through a framework 
proposed to increase tourism disaster 
management at the destination level. 
Biosecurity and 
Disease: 
 
A Farming Crisis 
or a Tourism 
Disaster? An 
Analysis of the 
Foot and Mouth 
Disease in the UK  
 (Miller and 
Ritchie, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
- Cancellation of the Cheltenham festival  
- Managers were dealing with the crisis in 
the best way they could as limited proactive 
strategies were available for implementation  
- Additional funds provided to marketing to 
promote tourism  
- Introduced plans for a crisis management 
unit with the national government, with the 
aim of providing an early warning system 
for future disaster  
 
 
 
 
- Small tourism businesses were uninsured by 
the losses the FMD caused them  
- Disagreement between different 
communities on the most appropriate course 
of action  
- The perception from the media reports that 
the whole of the UK was closed due to the 
disease  
- There was no pre-determined disaster 
management planning 
 
 
2.2 Crisis and Disaster Management Models and 
Frameworks 
According to Ritchie (2009, p. 44) there is a belief that disasters and crises are 
temporary and that they have certain lifecycles, which has resulted in the development 
of a number of generic models to help managers and researchers to understand them. 
In order to more closely examine the lifecycle of a disaster various researchers  
(Faulkner, 2001; Fink, 1986; Henderson, 2003; Ritchie, 2004) have outlined different 
stages of a disaster. Ritchie (2004), Fink (1986) and Roberts (1994) developed models 
to clarify the lifecycle of crises (Table 5) explaining that crises and disasters go 
through series of progressive stages. This classification, based on the lifecycle or 
anatomy, is useful as it may provide managers with a list of strategies that could be 
considered or developed at the various stages of a crisis or disaster and how to stop 
crises moving into the next stage (Ritchie, 2004). 
Table 5: Crisis and Disaster Lifecycle 
Faulkners’s (2001) stages Fink’s (1986) stages Robert’s (1994) stages 
1. Pre-event Proaction Pre-event: where action can be 
taken to prevent disasters (e.g. 
growth management planning or 
plans aimed at mitigating the 
effects of potential disasters) 
2. Prodromal Prodromal Stage: when it 
becomes apparent that the 
crisis is inevitable 
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3. Emergency Acute Stage: the point of no 
return when the crisis has 
hit and damage limitation is 
the main objective 
Emergency phase: when the 
effects of the disaster have been 
felt and action has to be taken to 
rescue people and property 
4. Intermediate Reaction Intermediate phase: when the 
short-term needs of the people 
must be dealt with—restoring 
utilities and essential services. 
The objective at this point being 
to restore the community to 
normality as quickly as possible 
5. Long-term 
(recovery) 
 
Chronic Stage: clean up, 
post mortem, self-analysis 
and healing 
Long-term phase: continuation 
of the previous phase but items 
that could not be addressed 
quickly are attended to at this 
point (repair of damaged 
infrastructure, correcting 
environmental problems, 
counselling victims, 
reinvestment strategies, 
debriefings to provide input to 
revisions of disaster strategies) 
6.  Resolution Resolution: routine restored 
or new improved state 
 
Source: Adapted from Faulkner (2001, p.140) 
There are many crisis management models or frameworks identified in the literature. 
Table 6 outlines the 12 main models or approaches proposed, and their limitations. In 
the next sections I evaluate three generic tourism disaster management frameworks 
developed after careful analysis of previous research on disasters. These three 
frameworks are selected because they are tourism specific, frequently quoted in recent 
tourism disaster management literature  and have been tested in real case studies. 
They are Faulkner’s (2001) tourism disaster management framework, Ritchie’s (2004) 
tourism crisis management framework and Hystad and Keller’s (2008) destination 
disaster management model respectively. 
Table 6: Crises Management Models 
Model Approach Limitations 
Caplan’s (1970) Crises 
Model 
Psychological perspective, 
where the focus is on how the 
individual copes with a crisis 
The model lacks precision 
and is descriptive. The most 
important criticism is that it 
is homeostatic. 
Slatter’s (1984) Crisis 
Susceptibility Model 
Economic approach to crises It suggests only the factors 
that are susceptible to a crisis 
in an organization. It is not a 
process, merely a model 
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stating factors which may 
cause a crisis 
Arnold’s (1980) Model of 
Crisis 
Sociological perspective. 
Examines how communities 
react to crisis 
Only focuses on the 
sociological view and  
examiners  the individual in 
relation to a group. The way 
an individual views the crisis 
may be different to the 
organization 
Process Model of Crisis 
Development (Booth, 1993) 
Aims to identify features that 
appear to be common in 
many crises 
Too general and simple - all 
crises are unique in terms of 
the particular causes and 
effects involved  
The Crises Life Cycle 
(Seymour and Moore, 2000) 
Examines  the obstacles to 
decision making during a 
crisis 
Too descriptive and general -
although can be made to fit 
any organization 
Clarke and Varma (2004) Presents a model of risk 
management as a strategic 
process 
Difficult to put in to 
operation 
Model of Crisis Management 
(Smith and Sipika,1993) 
A process from start to finish 
of a crisis 
May be too general and 
descriptive 
Four Stage Model (Murphy 
and Bayley, 1989) 
 
Based on two detailed natural 
disaster case studies, 
addresses strategic 
management themes 
in the recovery stage, 
including resource allocation, 
planning, restoration and 
transformation. 
Simple assessment of disaster 
cycle, presently the 
emergency and restoration 
periods are combined and are  
separated from the  recovery 
phase, may be too 
descriptive. 
Santana’s (1999) crisis 
Management Model  
 
 
Theoretically-based and 
focused on human-induced 
crises and disasters 
 
Too descriptive, recovery 
component is minimal and 
undeveloped, the components 
and linkages are not 
explained and it is not clear 
upon which evidence or data 
it is based, focuses on 
human-induced crises and 
disasters thus limiting its 
general applicability 
Hystad and Keller (2008) 
Destination Disaster 
Management Model 
Based on a case study of the 
2003 Kelowna forest fires in 
British Columbia, Canada, a 
long term study of focusing 
on the roles, responsibilities 
and communication channels 
between stakeholders 
 
 
The authors argued that in its 
generic form it will be 
suitable to be applied in any 
disaster, however it is not 
known whether  it has been 
tested yet by any researcher, 
and its main limitation is that 
its primary  focus is  on the 
communication aspect of 
recovery 
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Faulkner’s (2001) Tourism 
Disaster Management 
Framework (TDMF)  
Based theoretically and later 
applied to the Katherine 
Floods (1998) in Australia 
(Faulkner and Vikulov, 
2001), basically the first 
tourism disaster management 
framework, suitable for 
studying complex crisis 
management steps in natural 
and man-made disasters in 
tourism 
 
 
Represents a mix of 
prescriptive and descriptive 
approaches, framework does 
not clearly separate tourism 
industry response with 
standard emergency 
management response, 
limited in its usefulness 
because crises and disasters 
are so variable. Despite some 
level of testing, it has not 
been applied to larger 
disasters or in  long term 
studies. 
Ritchie’s (2004) Tourism 
Crisis Management 
Framework  
 
He used the four elements of 
strategic management – (i) 
analysis,  ii) direction and 
choice, (iii) implementation 
and control, and (iv) 
evaluation and feedback - as 
the foundation for 
framework. 
Proposed a strategic and 
holistic approach to crisis and 
disaster management based 
on - prevention and planning, 
implementation and 
evaluation and feedback - 
with each featuring 
management actions, 
strategies, concepts or issues 
Prescriptive, theoretically 
based and too complicated, 
sometimes  actions and 
concepts are mixed. 
Framework is designed for 
public or private sector 
organizations but does not 
distinguish between 
businesses or DMOs 
specifically. 
Has been tested once using 
the ACT Canberra Bushfires 
of 2003.  
 
2.2.1 Faulkner’s Tourism Disaster Management Framework (TDMF) 
Faulkner (2001) developed a six-stage model of a disaster lifecycle (Table 7) using 
the lifecycle model developed by Fink (1986) and Roberts (1994). To these six stages 
Faulkner added disaster survival strategies based on previous research by Turner 
(1994) and Quarantelli (1996) and the ingredients of tourism disaster strategies 
developed by Cassedy (1991) and Drabek (1995) to develop the TDMF. As per 
Ritchie (2004), this is the first tourism specific disaster management framework. This 
framework has not been applied to a long term study of a disaster. 
Table 7: The Six Stages of a Disaster Life Cycle 
Stages Events  
Pre event Where action can be taken to prevent or mitigate the effects of the 
potential disasters 
Prodromal When it is apparent that a disaster is imminent/unavoidable 
Emergency The effect of the disaster is felt and action is necessary to protect the 
people and property/ medical relief activities 
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Intermediate A point where the short-term needs of the people have been addressed and 
the main focus of the activity is to restore utilities and services and the 
community to normal 
Long-term 
(recovery) 
Continuation of previous phase but items that could not be attended to 
quickly be attended to at this stage. Post-mortem, self-analysis, reflection, 
healings, rebuilding.  
Resolution Routine restored or new improved state established 
Source: Faulkner (2001, p. 144) 
 
Faulkner (2001) applied this framework to the Katherine Floods in Australia making 
some modifications based on application to the case study (Faulkner & Vikulov, 
2001). Miller and Ritchie (2003) further applied the Faulkner (2001) disaster 
framework to the 2001 Foot and Mouth Outbreak in the UK. In the former, the 
Australia Day Flood at Katherine in 1998, the whole community and tourism industry 
was affected with almost half of the Central Business District and most of the tourism 
business premises damaged or destroyed. The study’s focus was to examine the 
disaster’s impact upon tourism activities and responses within the tourism sector. It 
achieved this through interviews with individual tourism operators, representatives of 
key agencies associated with destination marketing and emergency services 
personnel, followed up by a workshop with the respective tourism operators.  
According to Prideaux (2004, p. 283), in this test, the TDMF (Figure 2) demonstrated 
a potential to be used as both a “preventative planning tool and as a template for real-
time disaster management.” An important element of TDMF’s success is the 
incorporation of a forecasting element that allows  authorities to develop contingency 
plans, based on generating a series of scenarios for a range of possible risks or threats 
(Prideaux, 2004, p. 295). This led to further development of theoretical and 
conceptual aspects of tourism disaster planning, so it represented a mixture of 
prescriptive and descriptive approaches. In the latter, Miller and Ritchie (2003) 
applied Faulkner’s TDMF to the 2001 Foot and Mouth Outbreak in the UK. However, 
it was of limited use, as Foot Mouth Disease was a much more complex disaster 
compared to the Katherine floods. The prodromal, emergency and recovery stages all 
happened concurrently over an extended period of time, in different locations and also 
different industrial sectors at the same location and, in some cases, within the same 
organization. 
Prideaux (2004) explored the adaptability of Faulkner’s TDMF to large scale disasters 
and recommended specific modifications. He examined the Australian Federal 
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Government’s response to a sequence of tourism disasters and crises that affected the 
Australian tourism industry in 2001 and measured its impact against the response 
mechanism suggested in the Tourism Disaster Framework (Figure 1) Model. Prideaux 
(2004, p. 295) suggests a range of modifications in his revised TDMF (Figure 2) to 
adapt the TDMF (Figure 1) to large scale disasters and to provide added capabilities 
to assist authorities to respond to single or multiple disasters. His first suggestion was 
to add a joint industry/government standing disaster coordination committee to the 
precursors element. The second suggestion was to add reviewing and identifying 
shortcomings that can be rectified to the review stage. A third suggestion was to add 
public sector funding requirements to the reconstruction and reassessment element. 
Prideaux (2004, p. 295) also suggested adding a forecasting capability (in addition to 
a risk assessment capability) and a review of risk assessment after the event to the 
disaster contingency planning mechanism. 
The TDMF (Figure 1) has also been adapted and tested on the 1999 Avalanche 
Disaster in Tyrol (Peters & Pikkemaat, 2006), the 2003 SARS epidemic (Henderson 
& Ng, 2004a) and the restoration of tourism after the 1999 Taiwan earthquake (Huang 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, it has also been used to design a strategic framework for 
terrorism prevention (Paraskevas & Arendell, 2007). 
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Figure 1: Faulkner and Vikulov’s (2001) Tourism Disaster Management 
Framework (TDMF) Source: Faulkner and Vikulov (2001, p.338) 
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Scott, Laws, and Prideaux (2008) developed the long term recovery phase in 
Faulkner’s TDMF model based on chaos and complexity theory and social network 
analysis (Table 8). They proposed three sub phases, 5A – recovery of damaged 
infrastructure, 5B – marketing responses and 5C, adaptations to the system to 
incorporate the role of marketing in post crisis recovery, stressing that failure to 
inform the customers about the reopening of business and normal operations will 
result in loss of markets and finance. 
Table 8: Faulkner’s Modified Tourism Disaster Management Framework 
(simplified) adaptation to stage 5 
Stages Phase 
1 Pre event phase: disaster contingency plans, scenarios or probability 
assessments play a major role in the disaster management strategy 
2 Prodromal phase: the disaster is imminent and warning systems and 
command centers are established. In this second phase contingency plan 
actions are initiated 
3 Emergency phase: disaster effects are felt and action is necessary to protect 
the people or property in the tourism destination 
4 Intermediate phase: short-term and immediate needs of people have to be 
addressed by emergency rescue teams. A clear media communication 
strategy is crucial in this phase. 
5 Long-term (recovery) phase: the damaged infrastructure has to be rebuilt 
and environmentally damaged areas have to be reconstructed. 
 5A-recovery of damaged infrastructure; includes roads, water, 
electricity, hotels, transport and other services 
 5B-marketing responses; by individual firms, DMOs, STOs, NTOs 
 5C-adaptation to the system itself; as rebuilding occurs 
6 Resolution phase: this phase corresponds to Smith’s (1990) feedback loop 
where existing assessment methods or contingency plans are improved 
Source: Scott et al. (2008, p.9) 
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Figure 2: Faulkner’s (2001) Tourism Disaster Management Framework Adapted 
by Prideaux (2004) Source: Prideaux (2004, p. 285) 
2.2.2? Ritchie’s Tourism Crisis Management Framework (TCMF) 
???????? ??????? ??? ????? ????????? ?? ?????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ??? ??????????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ????? ????????
??????????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ???? ?????????
??????????? ????????? ???? ????????? ????????????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ??????????
??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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control, resource management, understanding and collaborating with stakeholders); 
and resolution, evaluation and feedback (resolution and normality; organization 
learning and feedback). 
According to Ritchie (2004, p. 673), understanding and classifying a crisis or disaster, 
its type, scale and magnitude, will impact upon strategy development and 
implementation as it progresses through its lifecycle. A sustained crisis will require 
different strategies than an immediate crisis. Ritchie (2004, p. 673) further notes that 
there are similarities between the life cycle of a crisis and the strategic management 
framework proposed; a pre-stage allowing the development of strategy and plans; a 
stage immediately before or after a crisis or disaster occurs which requires the 
implementation of strategies to deal with its impacts; continued implementation of 
strategies to control or reduce the severity of the crisis/disaster; and a long term 
recovery or resolution phase allowing for evaluation and feedback into future 
prevention and planning strategies for destinations and businesses.  
The initial literature search revealed that the TCMF is a prescriptive, theoretically 
based framework and complicated when some of the actions and concepts are mixed. 
Ritchie’s framework is designed for public or private sector organizations but does 
not distinguish between businesses or DMOs specifically. This framework has been 
tested once using the details of the ACT Canberra Bushfires of 2003 and has been 
redeveloped by Armstrong (2008, p. 291). In his book, Crisis and Disaster 
Management for Tourism, Ritchie (2009, p. 266) contends that  researchers need to 
“further develop, expand or test the model or components of the model” (Figure 3). I 
accept his challenge. 
 
 
 
 
?   
29 
 
?
Figure 3: Ritchie’s (2004, p.674) Crises and Disaster Management: A strategic 
and Holistic Framework 
2.2.3? Hystad and Kellers’ (2008) Destination Disaster Management 
Model 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ???????????????????
????????? ?? ????? ????????? ?? ???????? ????????? ???????????????????? ??????? ????? ????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ???? ????????????????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????? ????????? ????? ????????????????
???? ?????? ???????? ???????????? ???? ?? ??????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ?????? ????
??????????????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ????????????? ???? ????? ????? ??????? ????
????????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ????? ???????? ??????????? ????
???????? ?????????????? ????????? ??? ???????? ????????? ??????????? ????? ?????? ????
????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ????? ????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????? ??????????????? ???? ?????? ????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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Figure 4: Hystad and Kellers’ (2008, p.159) Destination Disaster Management 
Model 
??? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ???? ????? ???????? ????? ???????? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ?????????? ?????????????? ??????? ????????? ??????????? ???? ????????????
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2.3 Disaster as a Mechanism for Positive Change 
A common theme in the  literature on recovery is the potential a disaster or crisis 
creates for positive change (Burnett, 1999; Faulkner, 2001; Kash & Darling, 1998), 
whether through more sustainable redevelopment, product repositioning, or better 
emergency preparedness. Scott et al. (2008, p. 2) argue that tourism crisis recovery 
may mean a change to  pre-existing ways of operating. Further, Scott et al. (2008, p. 
2) note “the consequences for an organization of a crisis (beyond its immediate 
impacts in terms of suffering, damage, and loss of business) are often more 
fundamental and may necessitate changes to the way the organization operates, 
forces it to create new networks, and even stimulate the development of new business 
opportunities or social objectives.” Faulkner (2001, p. 137) highlighted the potential 
for a crisis to produce a more vigorous and adaptable tourism industry in the affected 
destination, “crises and disasters have transformational connotations, with each such 
event having potential positive (e.g., stimulus to innovation, recognition of new 
markets), as well as negative outcomes.” 
In their case study of the Katherine floods, Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) highlighted 
the opportunities and the transformational effect in Katherine with refurbishment of 
infrastructure in hotels and community, clean streets, the team spirit and cohesiveness 
developed within the tourism sector, improved community awareness of tourism 
benefits, media coverage and flood history attracting the markets, disaster awareness 
through implementation of tourism disaster management plans and upgrading of all 
insurance policies to allow for flood damage. Faulkner (2001) positions this in the 
framework of chaos theory, which sees chaos not as a destructive process, but rather 
as a creative force with potential for innovative new creations emerging from the 
ruins. He believes that some shocks have lingering effects and, in terms of the chaos 
framework, systems are usually at the edge of chaos and one event can begin a series 
of positive feedback loops which make it impossible to return to the pre-crisis status 
quo. Faulkner (2001, p. 143) notes that the site of the disaster too can become an 
attraction in its own right. Beirman (2003)agrees that the scene of a battle, crime or 
natural disaster often becomes a tourist attraction and provides examples from all over 
the world stressing that sometimes much good can come from a crisis. 
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Burnett (1999, p. 475) notes that one positive outcome is that heroes or leaders 
emerge and help direct the destination or organization back to normality or an 
improved state. An improved state is possible because of  an organization’s ability or 
destination to learn from crises and disasters, make policy changes, and adapt and 
modify strategies that did not work effectively (Blackman & Ritchie, 2008, p. 46). 
Ritchie (2004, p. 680) proposed that during the resolution stage of a crisis or disaster, 
an opportunity exists for a feedback loop to proactive planning and prevention. 
Ritchie (2004, p. 679) agrees that crises can have enormous potential for creative 
improvements, through the generation of new knowledge, relationships and policy. 
Ritchie (2004, p. 680) notes that the Australian Tourist Commission discovered an 
over reliance on Asian markets during the Asian Economic Crises of 1997–1998. On 
discovering this flaw in their marketing efforts, they quickly redistributed resources, 
increasing their marketing efforts to New Zealand, Europe and North America 
(Ritchie, 2004). According to Blackman and Ritchie (2008, p. 55), some destinations 
have reduced their reliance on key markets, increased government support and 
funding for tourism, developed new products and tourism related policies. Examples 
include Australia after the Asian financial crisis (Prideaux, 1999) and the Foot and 
Mouth Outbreak (Miller & Ritchie, 2003). 
2.4 Media Coverage 
The media plays a central role in travel patterns since it has the power to shape the 
public’s perception of a destination or issue (Santana, 2004). Unfortunately, the agony 
and death caused by a disaster are often considered much more newsworthy than the 
recovery and redevelopment updates. Immediately after a crisis occurs there is a huge 
wave of media attention (Prideaux & Laws, 2007), often sensationalized. According 
to Ritchie (2009, p. 179), sensationalist media reporting coupled with consumer 
perceptions of risk can have a huge impact on tourism demand patterns at source and 
receiver destinations. The misconception of risk, frequently exaggerated by the mass 
media, can cause a significant level of unwarranted anxiety among potential 
customers (Huang et al., 2008, p. 206). A media communication strategy involving 
the early establishment of a centralized source is essential in order to ensure that 
misleading and contradictory information is not disseminated, and to support the 
coordination of responses (Faulkner, 2001). Every destination and organization must 
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take responsibility for having an effective public relations campaign in order to 
improve the destination image and decrease the perceived risk and “communications 
need to address tourist concerns, change false perceptions, and reinforce positive 
perceptions” (Huang et al., 2008, p. 206). Organizations responsible for tourism 
should have mechanisms and expertise to deal with both real and perceived issues 
(Santana, 2004). 
Faulkner notes that “the role of media in disaster management strategies can be 
crucial to such an extent that it might make the difference between whether or not a 
difficult situation evolves into a disaster” (Faulkner, 2001, p. 141). Sensationalist 
media coverage of the Mt St. Helens disaster and the 1985 East Kootenay forest fires 
were blamed for misleading the public about the severity of the disasters and 
contributing to confusion during the emergency phase of the disaster lifecycle 
(Ritchie, 2004). Ritchie (2004, p. 676) highlights the importance of responding 
quickly to  media demands because they have tight deadlines and must look for quick 
sources of information. Glaesser (2006) believes that companies will lose their 
opportunity to put forward their own position if they fail to make information readily 
available to the media. Following the tsunami in 2004, the major media networks 
continuously played images of people who were swept away by the waves, images 
showing the destruction of towns and cities alongside the images of Aceh, Indonesia. 
While some tourist areas in Asian countries received less damage, the stigmatization 
of total destruction remained causing a ‘second wave’, an economic crisis that 
continued throughout 2004/2005 in these countries. Similarly, this form of media 
attention has been blamed for slowing the long term recovery phase of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and giving the public the impression that Israel was 
enmeshed in violence at an important time for pilgrimage tourism in 2000 and 2001 
(Ritchie, 2004, p. 676). Faulkner (2001, p. 141) notes that the media can actually 
hinder recovery by spreading misinformation and distracting emergency personnel 
from their duties. As per Huang et al. (2008), secondary impacts after a disaster may 
occur when  news companies exaggerate the situation in order to attract audiences’ 
attention to their messages instead of reporting the truth of the incidents. 
The media plays a vital role in conveying information to tourists (Faulkner, 2001) and 
the message of recovery to the public. It can therefore have a positive impact on 
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destination recovery. Hall (2002, p. 461) notes that the media is very important in the 
process of rebuilding the image and restoring confidence in a destination or 
organization because of the power they have to influence  public opinion and can help 
speed up the recovery process (Ritchie, 2004). Ultimately, the speed of the 
destination's recovery hinges on the degree to which market communication plans 
have been integrated with disaster management strategies (Faulkner, 2001). 
Social media plays a significant role in the field of crisis communications. However 
few studies have been conducted in this area in the field of tourism. Pennington-Gray, 
London, Cahyanto, and Klages (2011) found that social media can be used to 
effectively communicate during a tourism crisis. More recently, this has been 
experienced in the 2010 eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland which caused 
enormous disruption to air travel across western and northern Europe over an initial 
period of six days in April 2010. The large number of people stuck in the airports 
communicated messages using all forms of social media. Following this, the 2011 
earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku and the resultant tsunami and the nuclear 
accidents at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was also widely shared in the 
social media. The Student Volunteer Army, a student movement, was born from a 
Facebook page following the Christchurch earthquakes of September 2010 and 
February 2011. More recently, following the April 2015 Nepal earthquake, Facebook 
launched applications to help profile users to confirm their safety. Schroeder, 
Pennington-Gray, Donohoe, and Kiousis (2013, p. 140) note that “more that is known 
about which subgroups of tourists are likely to seek information via social media, as 
well as the types of crises that they are likely to seek information about, the more that 
tourism managers can benefit during the development and operationalization phases 
of strategic social media crisis communication plans.” 
2.5 Post Disaster Market Recovery Strategies 
Tourism is the first sector to be impacted by disasters and crises and the first sector 
that community leaders look to in the recovery phase (Carlsen & Liburd, 2008, p. 
266). According to Santana (2004, p. 315), organizations seek to repair the damage to 
their images during this clean up-phase or the post-mortem phase. In the post disaster 
situation, recovery and crisis marketing plays a central role in the process to return to 
normalcy. However, due to negative publicity from the media, the anticipated period 
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usually takes longer (Faulkner, 2001) for the restoration of essential infrastructure 
and, the recovery of livelihoods took longer (Carlsen & Hughes, 2008) for those who 
depend on viable visitor arrival numbers. Therefore, it is imperative that strategies are  
implemented right away to revive and recover the markets as well as “normal 
business operations so that strategic goals are not further distorted or damaged” 
(Santana, 2004, p. 315). 
Marketing a destination soon after a disaster is complex due to the bad media 
publicity or the associated death and destruction, as was the case with the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami of 2004 when thousands of people died in the disaster. The survivors 
must have time to mourn their losses, as well as clean up and rebuild their destination 
before tourists can return. However, too much time before tourists return can  create a 
further ‘disaster’ by depriving an area of its key industry (Carlsen & Hughes, 2008). 
Some argue about the correctness of visiting a destination in the wake of a disaster 
and in this debate, two views emerge: those who believe travelling to tsunami-stricken 
areas was insensitive to grieving communities, and those pleading for tourists to 
return to tsunami-stricken areas, so that the communities would not be further 
devastated by an economic crisis.  
Armstrong and Ritchie (2008, p. 187) stress that crisis communication is a key role of 
DMOs (Destination Management Organizations) to minimize such negativity, bring 
together the private and public sectors and implement consistent messages and 
recovery marketing methodologies. This includes working with internal stakeholders 
(staff), and external stakeholders, including the government, tourism industry, tourists 
or potential tourists, the media and other DMOs (Blackman & Ritchie, 2008). As  
Pforr and Hosie (2008, p. 251) note, many South East Asian governments have shown 
a preference towards reactive crisis management and have developed specific 
response patterns or practical guidelines of how to respond to a crisis. Santana (2004, 
p. 318) believes that “perception is reality in tourism,” and restoration of 
infrastructure has to go along with a campaign to change public perception. 
Recommended responses include increased co-operation between all stakeholders 
(public and private) and marketing that focuses on developing  new markets, in 
addition to the expansion of existing ones (Carlsen & Hughes, 2008). 
In order to ensure that  disaster recovery can occur as rapidly as possible, market 
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confidence must be regained. To achieve this goal, the recovery process must be 
broadcast widely through constructive and optimistic media coverage, and the travel 
industry needs to be well informed as to the status of the destination’s resurgence. 
This strategy should be stepped up in the period immediately following the ‘end’ of 
the crisis, which Beirman (2003) refers to as the intensive phase, with discounts, 
value-added packages, and prizes offered as incentives to lure travelers back to the 
destination. The more creative and enticing the incentives are, the more allure and 
urgency will be created in the eyes of the media, and the consumer (Beirman, 2003). 
Ritchie (2004) believes that it is important for destinations to augment crisis 
management plans with marketing efforts to recover lost tourism revenue by restoring 
a positive image. Tour operators, travel agents, and other industry leaders need to be 
mindful of the opportunity to influence  travelers’ decisions. This can be achieved 
simply by maintaining contact with them, and keeping them informed of special 
events, discounts, and other offers. Beirman (2003, p. 27) explains that “successful 
marketing of tourism requires maintaining a balance between pull marketing 
(appealing direct to consumers) and push marketing (appealing to those who sell 
travel in a manner that will encourage them to sell a specific destination).” To use  
Beirman’s push/pull marketing strategies effectively, a careful balance must be 
maintained between the two tactics. The push marketing strategy relies on appealing 
to retailers, while the pull marketing strategy appeals directly to consumers, often 
through the media. An example of a successful balance of these elements would be an 
airline offering greatly discounted fares to media and travel professionals who are 
visiting an area to survey the recovery efforts (Beirman, 2003). One of the most 
important elements of this alliance is between national tourism authorities and flag 
carrier airlines (Beirman, 2003). Following the Izmit earthquake, Turkish tourism 
offices mobilized media and travel agency hosting to Turkey, which were facilitated 
by the Turkish Ministry of Tourism, Turkish Airlines and major tour operators 
servicing Turkey (Beirman, 2003). This is an excellent example of push marketing: 
journalists, television crews and travel agents were invited to come to see the extent 
of the damage, which made it a highly topical, desirable story. They were asked to 
visit the main tourist areas to reinforce the message that they were largely untouched 
by the quake (Beirman, 2003).  
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Ritchie (2009, p. 213) has highlighted the collaboration of tourism enterprises 
alongside emergency and disaster managers to restore and rebuild destinations 
affected by crises or disasters, arguing that it provides an opportunity for change and 
transformation and that such events can be viewed as positive in the long term, 
particularly if learning results from such incidents. Carlsen and Hughes (2008, p. 139) 
report a study on market responses in the case of the Maldives following the tsunami 
disaster. Post tsunami tourism strategies (Carlsen, 2006) have been adapted based on 
the ten steps of recovery identified by Beirman (2003). 
According to Walters and Mair (2012, p. 87) understanding how to communicate with 
the tourism market in the wake of a disastrous event is essential for destination 
marketing organizations seeking to manage the misperceptions and media-imposed 
attitudes held by potential visitors. Walters and Mair (2012, p. 101) suggest that 
tourism businesses need to maintain visitor databases, identify their loyal customer 
base, and communicate with their regular clientele and encourage their support within 
the six month period after the disaster. Furthermore, Walters and Mair (2012, p. 101) 
recommend integrating celebrity endorsed messages at early stages of post disaster 
market recovery, using  a famous celebrity known in  the region. They also advocate 
having honest factual messages and open for business style messages to portray 
community readiness while  discouraging short-term discounting strategies as a means 
of encouraging visitation. 
2.6 Stakeholder Collaboration 
Working with internal and external stakeholders is absolutely necessary in a tourism 
disaster. Due to the fragmented nature of the tourism industry, a diverse range of 
stakeholders are involved in a tourism disaster situation. Hystad and Keller (2008, p. 
160) define a stakeholder in the following manner:, “any individual business or 
organization with an interest in the success of tourism and who has the potential to 
become involved in tourism disaster planning, can be considered as a stakeholder.” 
Ritchie (2004, p. 679) argues that the relationship between the internal stakeholders 
(business units, staff, managers and shareholders) and external stakeholders (other 
agencies and organizations, general public, media, tourists) is critical due to their inter 
relationships, dependency on each other in developing strategies to deal with crises 
and disasters and the fact that these plans are usually integrated. Cooperation and 
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partnerships are required between public and private sector organizations, 
departments, emergency units, media instruments and other relevant stakeholders. 
Ritchie (2004, p. 679) proposes a “multi-disciplinary or multi agency approach” 
towards crisis and disaster management for the destination management 
organizations. 
Stakeholder actions and responses towards various disasters are important lessons that 
will be helpful for management of future crises and disasters. Even though 
stakeholders will usually be involved in the management of tourism crises or 
disasters, very few have documented disaster management strategies or plans 
(Faulkner, 2001; Hystad & Keller, 2008; Ritchie, 2004). Such preparedness is usually 
restricted to larger businesses (Hystad & Keller, 2008). The scale and type of disaster 
or crises determines what actions are required from different stakeholders. Hystad and 
Keller (2008, p. 160) note that businesses usually assume that some other authority 
(DMOs or emergency organizations) will take  responsibility for planning and 
executing emergency plans. Furthermore, there is little collaboration between the 
tourism businesses, tourism organizations and emergency organizations (Becken & 
Hughey, 2013; Hystad & Keller, 2008). 
2.7 Gaps and Direction 
The literature review reveals that there are few publications on crises management in 
the context of tourism (e.g., (Beirman, 2003; Faulkner, 2001; Faulkner & Vikulov, 
2001; Glaesser, 2006; Henderson & Ng, 2004b; Laws & Prideaux, 2006; Pizam & 
Mansfeld, 2006; Ritchie, 2009; Santana, 2004). Ritchie (2004, p. 680) argues that a 
“small but growing body of research on crisis and disaster management has been 
conducted in the tourism industry. This may be due, in part, to the “chaotic and 
complex nature of these incidents and an inability by some managers and researchers 
to understand such phenomena.” 
Faulkner (2001, p. 136) argues that relatively little research has been conducted  on 
disaster phenomena in tourism, the impact of such events on the tourism industry and 
the responses of industry and government agencies to cope with the impact. Méheux 
and Parker (2006, p. 69) highlight that the small amount of  literature available on 
disaster management in tourism is restricted to studies of larger, more developed 
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nations. Carlsen and Liburd (2008, p. 265) note  that more literature focuses on effects 
of risks, crises and disasters, but that response and recovery strategies are less 
understood. Prideaux and Laws (2007) stated that post disaster crisis recovery, visitor 
care strategies and media management are other significant areas of research that 
require further attention. Furthermore as Carlsen and Liburd (2008) suggest, the 
literature is mainly prescriptive, describing strategies and techniques for assessing, 
managing risk and preventing crises, focusing primarily on immediate and short term 
effects on destinations.  
Carlsen and Liburd (2008, p. 267) also identify  the absence of a theoretical 
framework for the study of this topic area and that there has been virtually no research 
as to the effectiveness of these prescriptive strategies, or have there been any real 
attempts to understand the scope of crisis management for research. In this context  
Pizam and Mansfeld (2006) have developed a theory on the tourism security 
phenomenon. Hystad and Keller (2008, p. 152) note that most tourism case studies 
focus on the importance of developing disaster management plans and very few have 
reported on long-term impact, recovery and lessons learned from the aspect of a 
tourism industry following a major disaster. Therefore, we need to advance such 
research which according to Faulkner (2001, p. 136) is “an essential foundation for 
assisting the tourism industry and relevant government agencies to learn from past 
experiences, and develop strategies for avoiding and coping with similar events in the 
future.”   
Hystad and Keller (2008, p. 152) point out that businesses which are more prepared 
are in a more competitive and advantageous position to react to negative events, and 
that decisions made before a crisis or disaster will enable a quicker and more 
organized response by providing  clear directions to follow. Despite the negative 
impact crises and disasters have on tourism there is little proactive planning within the 
tourism industry. Hystad and Keller (2008, p. 152) point out that, “research 
investigating the long-term impacts and responses of a tourism industry following a 
disaster may provide insights into: (i) how a major disaster has temporarily or 
permanently shifted the nature and quality of the tourism product; (ii) how the 
behavior of tourists may have changed; (iii) what strategic management actions and 
policy changes have yielded success; and (iv) what changed in terms of the 
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preparedness of the local tourism.” Hystad and Keller (2008, p. 152) further note that 
“case studies that investigate tourism industries during and after a disaster provide 
valuable information to assist tourism planning for and recovery from disaster’ and 
such exploration of the long term response to a disaster has the ‘potential to build off 
these initial studies by examining the long term impacts, recovery and experience of 
the tourism industry affected.” 
 There has been little research conducted on SIDS to determine the long-term effects 
upon the industry  following a disaster, what recovery strategies were initiated, the 
impact that remained and how the tourism crisis and disaster management has 
changed in a SIDS. As several authors have noted, an important part of any recovery 
effort in a tourism crisis is the collaboration and partnership between the private and 
public sector stakeholders (Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001; Hystad & Keller, 2008; 
Ritchie, 2004). However, stakeholder roles and responsibilities before, during and 
after a tourism crises or disaster both within the industry and within emergency 
departments is less understood (Ritchie, 2009, p. 681) and requires further 
investigation. 
In light of these arguments it is evident that there is a need for long-term and in-depth 
studies on tourism recovery following disasters. I intend to address the following gaps 
in this research: 
 The lack of an overall conceptual, theoretical or applied framework for 
tourism disaster management in SIDS; 
 The lack of research into tourism crisis and disaster management in SIDS with 
tourism based economies; 
 The lack of studies on the long-term impact to assist Destination Management 
Organizations (DMOs), National Tourism Organizations (NTOs) and industry 
associations who have an important role to play in educating the industry and 
facilitating readiness, response and recovery actions and strategies (Ritchie, 
2009); 
 The need to understand stakeholder collaboration and planning in the tourism 
industry (Ritchie, 2004) and research is needed into their activities before, 
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during and after a tourism crisis or disaster; 
 Tourism crisis and disaster literature appears to be dominated by response and 
recovery at the expense of planning and prevention (Ritchie (2009); 
 Case study approaches are needed to test the models and concepts surrounding 
crisis and disaster management in the tourism industry (Ritchie, 2004) and that 
also build on existing frameworks. 
After reviewing the literature on tourism crisis and disaster management it also 
appears that most of the research has concentrated on reactive responses and recovery 
strategies of the tourism industry. Ritchie (2009, pp. 266-267) identified this factor in 
an earlier study:  
“Further research on a number of topics associated with crisis and disaster planning 
and readiness are urgently required. Tourism crisis and disaster literature appears to 
be dominated by response and recovery at the expense of planning and prevention. 
Such research can assist tourism managers and policy-makers to develop effective 
policies and strategies.” 
Despite Ritchie (2004) more proactive and strategic planning approaches to tourism 
crisis and disaster management and more recent research on emergency management 
and hazards, focusing on reduction and readiness, tourism researchers and managers 
have Ritchie e not focused on tourism disaster planning (Ritchie, 2008, p. 316). 
Therefore, Ritchie (2008, p. 316) argues that “tourism managers must change their 
thinking from a reactive approach to tourism disaster management to a more 
proactive planning perspective’, and at the same time researchers should ‘focus at 
understanding the current level of industry reduction and readiness efforts as well as 
potential barriers and impediments in tourism disaster planning to ensure more 
effective planning and management are undertaken.” It is critical for countries to 
adopt a more structured approach to crisis and disaster planning and management. 
This thesis is interested in  closing this gap. 
Many authors have identified gaps in the research and have made recommendations 
for productive areas of tourism crisis and disaster management research. At the same 
time, this literature review has revealed a lack of descriptive and analytical case 
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studies on SIDS, medium and long term destination recovery and little testing and 
development of the various frameworks that have been proposed. Based on the 
research gaps identified, this thesis will focus on a descriptive and analytical case 
study of short, medium and long term actions taken by the stakeholders in the 
recovery of the tourism industry in Maldives following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 
2004. 
2.8 Summary 
This literature review has described the growth of tourism literature in crisis and 
disaster management. A review of crisis and disaster management frameworks by key 
researchers in the field was conducted before key themes of disaster response and 
recovery, disaster as a mechanism of positive change, media coverage; post-disaster 
market recovery strategies and stakeholder collaboration were discussed. The chapter 
concluded with an outline of research gaps that will be examined in the study and a 
justification of the research topic. The following chapter will outline the framework 
for tourism disaster planning and management that has been developed based on 
constructs used in disaster management theory and frameworks (Faulkner, 2001; 
Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001; Hystad & Keller, 2008; Miller & Ritchie, 2003; Ritchie, 
2004). 
   
43 
 
Chapter 3 
INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR TOURISM CRISIS AND 
PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the goal of this research is to build a broadly 
integrated theoretical model of tourism disaster management in SIDS. It aims to 
examine and analyze how tourism destinations that have suffered from natural 
disasters recover and plan for future disasters using a Small Island Developing State 
(SIDS) as an exemplar. Understanding tourism crises and disasters and how 
destinations have responded and recovered from them, will enable more effective 
planning for future disasters. Thus, this chapter proposes an integrated crisis and 
disaster management framework. It is further proposed that if applied, this framework 
could accelerate tourism recovery in the SIDS if applied. Ongoing competitiveness of 
the tourism state could be enhanced through sound crisis and disaster management 
practices which are included in the model. 
This chapter therefore, consists of three main sections. It begins with a brief review of 
crisis and disaster management in tourism, with the intention to understand the 
various ingredients of crisis and disaster management. The second section focuses on 
tourism crisis and disaster management frameworks appearing in the available 
literature from the last two decades. The third section introduces and proposes the 
integrated model of tourism crisis and disaster management. 
3.2 Review of Tourism Crisis and Disaster Management 
Coombs (1999), Richardson (1994) and Fink (1986) argue that the world has become 
increasingly crisis prone and all businesses are on the edge of chaos. Researchers have 
provided numerous definitions for crises and disasters, as has been highlighted in 
Chapter 2. Faulkner (2001) contended that crises are induced by internal factors, or 
actions or inactions of organizations, whereas disasters are induced by external 
factors, consisting of natural phenomena. Ritchie (2009) has summarized typologies 
of crises and disasters, their characteristics and examples. Table 2 (Chapter 2) 
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includes incidents that meet the core requirements of either being a crisis or a disaster, 
in the sense that they all include sudden change, severe socio-economic impacts and 
incidents that require quick action. Some are self-inflicted (such as organizational 
misdeeds), while others are not (such as natural disasters). Santana (2004) clustered 
various types of crises according to a range of broad factors and positioned disasters 
as severe crises that originate from natural and technological factors, whereas Preble 
(1997) explained these crises types as organizational-based disasters.  
The tourism industry is vulnerable to natural disasters, given its product’s sensitivity 
and customer perceptions of safety and security. Such incidents have an immediate 
impact upon the “hardware” of destinations. Faulkner (2001) and Laws and Prideaux 
(2006) suggest that extensive destruction can befall both tangible and intangible 
elements of tourism businesses, as well as the destinations involved. The tangible 
elements are facilities and physical infrastructure while intangible elements include 
long-term built reputation and perceived image for tourists and publicity. Given the 
fact that service products are intangible in nature, it is necessary to dedicate 
considerable time during tourism recovery efforts to rebuild customers confidence in 
a disaster struck destination, while reversing the public’s negative perception of the 
affected areas (Hystad and Keller (2008). However, these efforts are typically beyond 
the scope of usual tourism SMEs, destination marketing organizations (DMO), and 
local and regional governments. Rather, such recovery endeavors will require an 
integrated approach between destination stakeholders, which includes the 
government. The ultimate goal of operating and implementing effective tourism 
disaster management is to achieve long-term sustainability rather than short-term 
profitability (Gurtner, 2007). The question of how the tourism industry, as well as 
governments, could prepare, and should respond to disasters, is well researched.  
Tourism disaster management has been conceptualized in a number of ways. Many 
approaches emphasize strategic considerations; i.e., how to integrate resources in 
managing disasters whenever they occur, especially in their aftermath. Faulkner 
(2001); Méheux and Parker (2006); (Ritchie, 2009) and Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) 
have all summarized the broader disaster management literature (Cassedy, 1991; Fink, 
1986; Quarantelli, 1997; Roberts, 1994), thus synthesizing a tourism disaster 
management framework, and articulated a set of comprehensive principles for disaster 
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management strategies, for the benefit of tourism companies and destination 
management organizations. This framework follows a linear disaster process; pre-
event, prodromal, emergency, intermediate, long-term (recovery), and resolution.  
Long-term recovery and resolution engender experiences for mitigating the effects of 
similar potential disasters, thereby showing a repetitive pattern leading to the 
replacement of the pre-event and prodromal processes (Heath, 1998; Kolb, 1984). 
Spillan (2003) and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) have identified two simplified 
approaches to disaster management: proactive and reactive. The proactive approach 
includes risk assessment, warning signal detection, and preparation. In contrast, the 
reactive approach comprises limitation of damage and recovery of the destination. In 
his model, Ritchie (2009) highlighted the components of tourism disaster 
management, including (a) disaster prevention and planning, (b) strategic 
implementation and resolution, and (c) evaluation and feedback. Strategic 
implementation consists of crisis communication and control, resource management, 
and stakeholder collaboration.  
Hystad and Keller (2006) led a study of a 2003 forest fire involving interviews with 
104 local tourist businesses. The authors found that the tourism industry, in general, 
was poorly prepared for the fire and responded to the disaster reactively. Two and a 
half years later, the authors conducted a longer term study in an attempt to understand 
recovery strategies in the same case. They assessed the tourism industry and whether 
it has learned any lessons from the previous experiences. They found some changes 
had taken place such as: having to close businesses forever, minimizing the number of 
employees and changes to the products and/or concepts. They also found that less 
than half of the businesses surveyed either had a disaster management plan in place or 
were considering developing plans as a result of the disaster. The authors explained 
these findings in their destination disaster management model (Figure 4, p.30), by 
assigning different roles (such as managing marketing responsibilities) to the various 
stakeholders. The roles of the tourism organizations (regional, local or national) and 
emergency organizations were seen as being very important, while the role of tourism 
businesses was considered less vital in pre-disaster and post-disaster periods. 
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3.3 Crisis and Disaster Management Models and 
Frameworks (1986-2009) 
According to Fink (1986), crisis management involves the planning for, responding to 
and recovering from a crisis. It is the skill of removing much of the risk and 
uncertainty inherent in low-probability and high-impact events so that tourism 
administrators and business managers can achieve more control over management 
operations (Fink, 1986). Crisis and disaster management plans in tourism must deal 
with the identification of crises at the destination and the recovery and rebuilding after 
a crisis and disaster, while aiming to restore a positive image and impede a decrease 
in tourist arrivals. In an organization or tourism destination, potential crises or 
disasters could be avoided with the use of active crisis management plans (Peters & 
Pikkemaat, 2006).  
In its most basic form, crisis management implies being prepared before the crisis 
strikes, effectively executing the crisis management plan during the crisis, and quickly 
recovering to normal after the crisis (Yu, Stafford, & Armoo, 2006). During the past 
two decades (1986 - 2009), crisis and disaster management has made significant 
progress in focus and numerous strategic approaches, frameworks and models. 
Patterns of crisis and disaster can be determined by looking at the major models. A 
detailed literature search has resulted in the following frameworks which have been 
proposed during this period.  
Table 9 summarizes the crisis and disaster management frameworks, the approaches, 
stages, and approaches that different authors specified in their crisis and disaster 
management frameworks. The frameworks were studied closely for their content and 
patterns. It was found that they primarily drew upon three different crisis and disaster 
management approaches. These three approaches were summarized to make it easier 
to highlight the various components in order to understand approaches recommended 
by the authors. The three approaches identified were: life-cycle approach, action 
oriented crisis management approach and strategic crisis management approach. The 
following paragraphs explain these approaches. 
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Table 9: Crisis and Disaster Management Frameworks 
Model/Type  Crisis and Disaster Management Stages/ Content  Elements of Crisis or Disaster Management  
 
Fink (1986), General  Detailed Audit  
 Prodromal 
 Acute/Emergency stage 
 Chronic/Recovery stage 
 Resolution 
 
Person and Mitroff (1993), 
Management 
Portfolio Planning Approach 
 Detection of signal 
o Early warning 
 Prevention /preparation 
o Crisis management team 
o Crisis training and simulation 
exercises 
 Damage limitation/Containment 
o Damage control 
o Evacuation plans and procedures 
 Recovery 
o Short-term and long-term recovery 
mechanisms 
o Alternatives 
 Learning 
o Learning and reassessment 
o Critical examination 
 
 Strategic actions 
o Integrate  crisis management  into strategic planning 
process 
o Include outsiders in the crisis management team 
o Training and workshop 
o Diversity crisis management strategies  
 Technical and structural actions 
o Crisis management team 
o Dedicated budget expenditures for crisis management 
o Emergency policies and manuals 
o Backup system 
o Working relationship with public and private sectors 
 Evaluation and diagnostic actions 
o Legal and financial audit 
o Insurance coverage with crisis management 
contingencies 
o Environment impact audits 
o Tracking system for warning signals and past crisis 
 Communication actions 
o Training for dealing media 
o Communication line with local community 
o Communication with intervening stakeholders 
 Psychological and cultural actions 
o Increase visibility of top management  commitment 
o Relationship with activist group 
o Improve upward/downward communication 
o Psychological support and training 
o Reinforce symbolic recall 
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Preble (1993), Financial Normative Approach 
 Pre- event / CM Formulation 
o Top management initiates 
contingency planning 
o Risk assessment 
o Develop alternative strategies 
 Crisis Management  Implementation 
o Documentation of plan 
o BOD approval 
 Post -event / CM Evaluation 
o Recycle 
 
 Group formed 
 Resources allocated 
 Identity threats 
 Estimate likelihood 
 Determine impact 
 Prevention techniques 
 Backup plan 
 Steps 
 Responsibilities 
 Strategies 
 Procedures 
 Update 
 Revise 
Roberts (1994), Natural 
Disaster-Flood 
 Pre-event 
o Warning system 
o Monitoring vulnerable area 
o Liaison group 
o Evacuation plan 
 2. Emergency 
o Mass rescue 
o Immediate safe and care 
o Evacuate 
 Intermediate 
o Short-term needs 
o Re-establishment of utilities 
o Essential service 
o Accessibility 
 Long term 
o Re-housing 
o Repairing 
o Providing clear information 
o Dealing with stress and counselling 
o Re-investment policy 
o Producing financial plan and aid 
o Assessing response 
o Learning from experience 
 Obtain an overview of the incident(s). 
 Obtain a clear picture of the main events. 
 Decide on priorities. 
 Insert order into chaos. 
 Build up a cohesive team. 
 Check on needs. 
 Fulfil needs. 
 Reduce duplication. 
 Ensure the most essential tasks are carried out. 
 Set a program of actions. 
 Instigate quality control. 
 Care for people in a better way. 
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Preble (1997), General, 
Business Oriented 
Crisis/Strategic Management Integration 
 Formulation 
o Develop mission statement 
o Perform internal and external audit 
o Revise mission statement and 
establish long-term objectives 
o Perform crisis audit 
o Generate, evaluate, and select 
planned and crisis strategies 
 Implementation 
o Establish policies, annual objectives 
and crisis plans 
o Allocate resources 
o Crisis approval and simulations 
 Evaluation 
o Evaluation and control 
 SWOT analysis 
 Conduct a crisis audit 
 Worst-case scenario 
 Environmental impact assessment 
 Outside-in/inside-out vision 
 Extensive contingency capabilities 
 Use of advanced technology 
 Expected crisis procedures 
 Employee and manager area of responsibility 
 Crisis management team 
 Sufficient support and authority 
 Training and education 
 Media communications for public trust 
 Simulations and rehearsals 
 Seek formal approval and commitment 
 Feedback and feed forward controls 
 Special alert controls 
 Extensive evaluation 
 New crisis prevention strategy 
Burnett (1998), 
Management 
Burnett’s Strategic Approach-Classification Matrix focused 
on crisis assessment mechanism. There are four dimensions 
of strategic approaches to managing crisis: 
1. Time pressure 
2. Control issues 
3. Threat level concerns 
4. Response option constraints 
 
1) Goal formulation 
2) Environmental analysis 
3) Strategy formulation 
4) Strategy evaluation 
5) Strategy analysis 
6) Strategic control 
 
 
Faulkner (2001), Natural 
Disaster-Flood 
 Pre-event/Precursors 
o Disaster management team (DMT) 
o Relevant institution and department 
o Communication system 
Initial stage: 
Risk assessment on disaster probability, impact, 
contingency plans 
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o Develop strategy 
o Education system 
o Activation protocols 
 Prodromal/Mobilization 
o Warning system 
o Command centre 
o Secure facilities 
 Emergency/Action 
o Rescue/Evacuation 
o Daily supplies 
o Medicals 
o Monitoring systems 
 Intermediate/Recovery 
o Monitoring system 
o Restoration/Clean-up 
o Media 
 Resolution/Reconstruction and reassessment 
o Repair 
o Rehabilitation 
o Reactivate 
o Revision 
o Counselling victim 
o Review 
Implementation detail: 
 
Disaster contingency plans 
 Likely impact 
 Community and visitor capabilities 
 Minimum impact action 
 Priority action 
 On-going review on experience, structural change, environment 
Luhrman (2005), General  Before a crisis-preparing for the worst 
o Communication strategy 
o Promotion planning 
o Reviewing security system 
o Research readiness 
 During the actual problems- minimizing 
damage In a crisis 
o Communication from the front line 
o Hard decision about promotion 
o Ensuring security 
o Quick research tactics 
 Immediately after a crisis 
o Image building communication 
o Flexibility in promotion 
o Security for the future 
o Using research effectively 
 Designate spokespersons 
 Press and communications department 
 Communicate and pay attention regularly with media 
 Maintain working relationship with public and private sectors 
 Security training 
 Emergency centre 
 Monitoring system 
 Not to impose a news blackout 
 Media centre 
 Challenge untrue statement 
 Positive and honest 
 Increase promotional budget 
 Financial assistance 
 New niche market product 
 Experienced and special interest travellers 
 Special price 
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 Incentive 
 Post-evaluation 
Wilks and Moore 
(2005), General 
 Reduction–detecting early warning signal 
o Crisis awareness 
o Political awareness 
o Standard operating procedures  
 Readiness–preparing plans and running 
exercises 
o Crisis management plan 
o Tourism planning 
o Health and safety measures 
 Response–executing operational and 
communication plan In a crisis situation  
o Emergency response procedures 
o Investigation 
o Family assistance 
o Communication 
 Recovery–returning the organization to 
normal after a crisis 
o Business continuity plan 
o Human resource 
o Debriefing 
 SWOT analysis 
 Identify risk and impact 
 Secure political cooperation and involvement 
 Anticipate system 
 Enhance staff awareness 
 
 Crisis management team 
 Public and private sectors involvement 
 Priority decision 
 Contingency plan 
 Training system 
 
 Caring for visitors and involving the community 
 Target marketing 
 External marketing communications 
 Leadership 
 Victim support 
 Public communication 
 Domestic health services 
 Disability issues 
 Counselling 
 Return of effects of deceased victims to next-of-kin 
 Community harmony 
 Community support 
 Rural issues 
 Inter-governmental welfare issues 
 Role of airlines 
 Insurance coverage 
 Domestic economic issues 
 International issues and interaction with other disasters 
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Hystad and Keller (2008), 
Forest Fire  
The model demonstrates the importance of coordination 
between primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders 
(tourism, organizations (TO), tourism businesses (TB), 
emergency organizations (EO)) before, during and after a 
disaster. Authors point out that businesses usually assume 
that some other authority (emergency organizations and 
DMOs) takes the responsibilities for planning and executing 
emergency plans. In this model emergency organizations 
were considered as primary stakeholders before and during 
a disaster while tourism businesses and tourism 
organizations were suggested to take the lead role after the 
disaster. The bottom-up approach of encouraging tourism 
businesses to take the initiative in developing their own 
disaster management plans was considered ineffective. 
 
 Pre-disaster:  
o EO : Primary ( develop and communicate disaster 
strategy; develop warning systems; coordinate plan with 
TO);  
o TO: Secondary (develop media and marketing strategy; 
coordinate planning with TB; facilitate communications 
between EO and TB); 
o  TB: Tertiary ( develop individual plan; communicate 
plan with employees; communicate with TO) 
 Disaster:  
o EO: Primary ( emergency responses; communicate with  
TO and TB; establish media response centre);  
o TO: Secondary (communicate with EO; Communicate 
and update TB; support media communications; create 
tourism information line);   
o TB: Tertiary ( implement individual disaster plans; 
update tourists on situation) 
 Post-disaster:  
o TO: Primary ( fine-tune marketing response; establish 
recovery marketing;  communicate with TB; continue 
tourist info line); 
o TB: Secondary ( Communicate issues with TO; stay in 
contact with clientele; conduct individual recovery 
marketing);  
o EO: Tertiary ( situation  review) 
 Resolution:  
o Sharer experiences between TO. EO , and TB: review 
and revise disaster management plans 
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Ritchie’s Tourism Crisis 
Management Framework 
(2004) 
 
He used the four elements of strategic management –  
(i) Analysis,   
(ii) Direction and choice,  
(iii) Implementation and control, and  
(iv) Evaluation and feedback - as the foundation for 
framework. 
Proposed a strategic and holistic approach to crisis and 
disaster management based on - prevention and planning, 
implementation and evaluation and 
feedback - with each featuring management actions, 
strategies, concepts or issues 
 
 Crisis/ disaster prevention and planning 
o Proactive planning and strategy formulation: environmental 
scanning; issues analysis; scenario planning; strategic 
forecasting, risk analysis.  
o Scanning to planning: developing plans from scanning and 
issues analysis; contingency and emergency planning 
 Strategic implementation 
o Strategy evaluation and strategic control: formulation of 
strategic alternatives, evaluation of alternatives, selection 
of appropriate strategies; making effective decisions 
quickly; influence or control over crises/disasters.  
o Crisis communication and control: control over crisis 
communication; development of crisis communication 
strategy including use of a public relations plan; 
appointment of a spokesperson; use of crisis 
communication to recover from incidents; short versus long 
term crisis communication strategies. 
o Resource management: responsive organisational 
structures; redeployment or generation of financial 
resources; leadership styles and employee empowerment. 
o Understanding and collaborating with stakeholders: 
internal (employees, managers, shareholders) and external 
(tourists, industry sectors, government agencies, general 
public, media) stakeholders; need for collaboration 
between stakeholders at different levels to resolve crises or 
disasters.  
 Resolution, evaluation and feedback 
o Resolution and normality: resolution and restoration of 
destination or organisation to pre-crisis situation; 
reinvestment strategies and resourcing; crises/disasters as 
agents of change. 
o Organisational learning and feedback: organisations or 
destinations may reassess and take stock’ of themselves; 
evaluating effectiveness of strategies and responses; 
feedback to pre- event planning; levels of learning depend 
on single or double loop learning. 
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The first categorization of crisis and disaster management focused on the life-cycle 
approach (Faulkner, 2001; Fink, 1986; Roberts, 1994). This three-phase (pre-event, 
emergency, post-event) crisis management approach is the earliest version of the life 
cycle approach which was later integrated by Faulkner (2001) into a six-phase (pre-
event prodromal, emergency, intermediate, long-term, and resolution) crisis 
management plan to more comprehensively manage tourism disasters.  
The second categorization is the strategic crisis management approach. Preble (1997) 
and Ritchie (2009) argue that It has three key components; crisis management 
formation, implementation, and evaluation . The thirds categorization was action-
oriented crisis management (Burnett, 1999; Hystad & Keller, 2008; Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992; Wilks & Moore, 2004). These frameworks used the Four R s: 
Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. 
3.4 Components of an Integrated Framework for Tourism 
Disaster Planning and Management  
It is evident from the literature discussed above and the various themes discussed in 
Chapter 2 that there is no overall integrated framework for tourism crisis or disaster 
management. Therefore, this study presents an integrated approach that could be used as 
a crisis and disaster management framework for tourism in SIDS (Figure 5). In this 
model, similar actions to those identified in the life cycle phases (Faulkner, 2001; Fink, 
1986; Ritchie, 2009; Roberts, 1994) are included. This integrated approach includes both 
proactive and reactive strategies targeted for management planning before, during and 
after disasters. Activities that are planned and conducted before the disaster to minimize 
the adverse impacts are called proactive approaches. In contrast, post-disaster activities 
related to responses and recovery are termed reactive approaches (Moe & Pathranarakul, 
2006). Furthermore, there are three primary components within these two approaches 
(Preble, 1997). First, the formulation phase is concerned with determining the future 
management of the crisis. Second, the implementation phase focuses on the modification 
of organizational structures and processes to help ensure that the planned results are 
obtained. The third phase is evaluation, which is concerned primarily with review and 
feedback after a disaster (Preble, 1997).  
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The next sections detail the main constructs that have been used to develop the 
integrated model for tourism crisis and disaster management. They are; the proactive 
approach (prevention), the reactive approach (communication, resource management, 
stakeholder collaboration, resolution and feedback) and government and private sector 
roles. 
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Figure 5: Proposed Integrated Framework for Tourism Disaster Planning and Management 
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3.4.1 Proactive Approach  
Ritchie (2009) argues that a disaster, as its definition indicates, is capable of forcing 
organization into an extreme condition due to the fact that it is unable to prevent it 
from occurring. Attempts should be made to develop coping strategies for such 
events, especially when certain forms of crises and disasters are likely to happen or 
repeat over time. The tourism industry has experienced numerous disasters and crises 
over the review period, which suggests that they should be prepared for the next 
disaster. Management must constantly evaluate threats in the internal and external 
environment, identify risks in the environment and their disaster management toolkit 
should be regularly revised. According to Glaesser (2006), an awareness strategy aims 
to generate cognition of vulnerability and capability of individuals and companies in 
handling disasters. Scenario analysis, a method discussed by Ritchie (2009), aims to 
use structural means to develop full preparation for future disastrous hazards, 
although Méheux and Parker (2006) argued that these cognition-based results could 
be biased. Rousaki and Alcott (2006) argued that an organization’s overall experience 
is more important than its size or managers’ job level in determining successful 
preparedness in the case of a crisis or a disaster. One outcome of disasters should 
always be the agreement of all stakeholders that tourism disaster management 
strategies should be continuously reviewed. The tourism industry has much to gain 
from persistently assessing the collective and cumulative experiences acquired from 
disasters. This step belongs to the range of reactive measures. Disaster management is 
literally an ever-lasting process that galvanizes proactive strategies in the long run 
(Kolb, 1984). Therefore, past experiences need to be reviewed perpetually. This effort 
should be paired with continued communication, stakeholder cooperation and a 
combination and advancement of resources. 
3.4.2 Crisis and Disaster Communication 
Disaster communication plays an important role in emergency and revitalization 
processes. Both tourism businesses and associations are responsible for facilitating 
speedy, up-to-date and accurate information communication on a consistent basis 
(Cassedy, 1991; Faulkner, 2001; Ritchie, 2009). Modern crisis communication 
suggests the formalization of a system in conjunction with communication leadership 
and team effort (Fall & Massey, 2006; Faulkner, 2001). For obvious reasons, in times 
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of crisis, tourists and their hosts will equally rely on timely and relevant information 
communicated through various media channels. It is essential that key stakeholders, 
i.e., decision-makers, and managers, follow public announcements through the media 
closely (Fall & Massey, 2006), in order to be able to make informed decisions in 
times of emergencies. Experience shows that media distortion may result in negative 
effects. The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, devastated only a small portion of the 
island of Phuket, however the media instead stated that the island had been 
completely destroyed (Gurtner, 2007). On a different note, the reporting of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict had a  damaging impact on the perception of the Israeli 
tourism industry (Beirman, 2003). Unfortunately, as the negative side of disasters are 
over emphasized, and news of increasing death tolls and lost tourists reiterated, such 
reporting may gravely effect subsequent recovery efforts (Ritchie, 2009). Many 
researchers have highlighted the importance of a public relations program within a 
strategic communications strategy (Fall, 2004; Marra, 1999; Massey, 2005).  
3.4.3 Management of Resources 
In accordance with Ritchie (2009) propositions, emphasis is placed on flexible and 
effective resource management. In this respect, financial, human, and marketing 
resource elements are explored. During times of acute emergency and short-term 
recovery (Faulkner, 2001), certain tasks are seen as the top priorities of any emergent 
disaster plan list; i.e., the rehabilitation, repatriation, and redevelopment of physical 
assets. Attention will be given to tangible resources, including indispensable 
documents, which are needed to normalize routine operations. When the Katherine 
flood hit Australia in 1998, the Northern Territory Tourism Commission (NTTC) 
implemented its damage audit system. It assessed the damage and identified the 
recovery potential to ensure the reconstruction process was implemented (Faulkner & 
Vikulov, 2001). Its primary role was to ensure the viability of the tourism industry 
and the entire destination (Coombs, 1999; Ritchie, 2004).  
Sufficient financial resources and human resources have to be allocated and human 
resources empowered in such a way that they are able to take the necessary actions. In 
such a disaster management framework, employees are viewed as intangible assets. 
Human capital is to be retained, even in times of crisis. Since the economy declines 
soon after a disaster, and in the case of tourism, many companies face a very sharp 
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decline in occupancy; many employees are thus encouraged to take unpaid leave. This 
is done to prevent exhaustion of cash flow. Companies also have to minimize payroll 
costs and other operational recurrent expenditures to prevent net cash outflows. 
Another commonly used method for preventing layoffs is job sharing, where two or 
more employees split one job. This method is vital in retaining the competency of the 
employees at the core, since the peripheral employees usually are made redundant in a 
similar situation. This method also reduces some payroll costs. As Faulkner and 
Vikulov (2001) argue, from a human resource perspective, the uncertainty of such 
times becomes an “acid test” for testing the loyalty of employees. Similarly, these 
turbulent times give employees an opportunity to learn about loyal and good 
employers. 
Learning opportunities present themselves to employers and employees. To make the 
operations more efficient at such times, investments in technology can occur. At the 
same time, organizations can update their knowledge to be better prepared for future 
operations. Hence, making a crisis or a disaster an opportunity for change is a time in 
which strategies and operations are reviewed and foundations are laid for innovation 
which may benefit the organization’s effectiveness and efficiency in using its 
resources. Small companies also learn the importance and role of human resource 
management which can ensure the organization’s long-term success. 
Similar to the human resources component, market recovery and image restoration is 
equally important. According to Ritchie (2009) and Faulkner (2001) literature in the 
field examines refreshed marketing and promotion plans and confidence-building 
campaigns carried out in the event of crises and disasters. Genuine disaster cases in 
the past involved joint marketing usage and tourism product diversification when 
dealing with a range of contexts, e.g., Foot and Mouth Disease (Miller & Ritchie, 
2003); forest fire (Hystad & Keller, 2008; Hystad & Keller, 2006); tsunamis (de 
Sausmarez, 2005); or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Henderson, 2007). During 
the post-disaster recovery phase much investment is made in market recovery. 
Gurtner (2007) explains that the slogans used in the case of the Bali bombings; 
“Unified in Diversity”; “United We Stand”, and “Bali for the World”, were not only 
promotional activities, were also activities to build overall confidence in the 
destination. 
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3.4.4 Collaboration with Stakeholders 
Collaboration with stakeholders is a fundamental ingredient of tourism crisis and 
disaster management (Faulkner, 2001; Fink, 1986; Ritchie, 2009). Sautter and Leisen 
(1999) designed a tourism stakeholder map that includes government, competitors’, 
national business chains, tourists, activist groups, residents, local businesses and 
employees. Tiernan, Igoe, Carroll, and O’KEEFE (2006), argue that one of the key 
features of a crisis communication response strategy in the tourism industry is to 
ensure a positive relationship between tourism stakeholders. Such a strategy would 
require stakeholders to be aware of their role under each critical circumstance so that 
required crisis communication processes can be successfully initiated and facilitated. 
This perspective is explored further by Hystad and Keller (2008) who integrated this 
component in their tourism disaster management framework. In their model, they 
allocated different tasks to each tourism stakeholder during the pre-disaster, disaster, 
and post-disaster period. Ritchie (2009) also noted that stakeholder collaboration will 
make a significant difference when reacting to a disaster. 
3.4.5 Government Sector Roles 
While the government sector plays the most important role in disaster management, 
discussions about the government’s involvement in tourism disaster management is 
relatively rare (Prideaux, Laws, & Faulkner, 2003). Several researchers have agreed 
on the importance of the government either locally or nationally in forecasting 
potential disasters and coping with them (Henderson, 2003; Prideaux, 2004; Ritchie, 
2009). A disaster’s severity will naturally require emergency actions (Faulkner & 
Vikulov, 2001). Immediate actions will include: (a) rescue and evacuation procedures, 
(b) emergency accommodation and food supplies, (c) medical services, and (d) 
monitoring and communication systems (Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001). Governments’ 
timely actions involve relief and security measures, tax rate reduction (Blake & 
Sinclair, 2003), tax deferment and business employment assistance (Sharpley & 
Craven, 2001), disaster related law enforcement (Henderson, 1999), long-term risk 
assessment (Prideaux, 2004), and economy stabilization and domestic and inbound 
tourism promotion (de Sausmarez, 2005). After the Bali bombings, government 
efforts to reactivate the tourism industry included the acceptance of inter-migrants 
(Hitchcock & Putra, 2005). Thailand and Indonesia relaxed their immigration policies 
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during the Asian Financial Crisis (Henderson, 1999) and Malaysia adopted a bipolar 
budgeting strategy. While it reduced spending for some budgetary items, it also 
contributed more to stabilizing the national economy, including spending on tourism 
promotion (de Sausmarez, 2005). On a smaller scale, governments may decrease taxes 
for particular areas of business, e.g., the tourism industry (Blake & Sinclair, 2003; 
Sharpley & Craven, 2001), to help cope with difficult economic challenges. 
3.5 The Proposed Integrated Framework for Tourism 
Planning and Management 
Figure 5 illustrates an integrated framework for tourism disaster planning and 
management in SIDS based on constructs used in disaster management theory and 
frameworks (Faulkner, 2001; Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001; Hystad & Keller, 2006; 
Miller & Ritchie, 2003; Ritchie, 2004), discussed in section 3.4. 
As a model of tourism disaster planning and management for SIDS, this approach 
assumes that disasters need to be effectively managed through quick and effective 
reaction based on adequate preparation. Both proactive and reactive strategies (see 
Figure 5) are needed to assist the crisis management team in responding to a disaster, 
during and after the initial event. These strategies are not mutually exclusive, but in 
fact impact upon each other, resulting in an ongoing learning process.  
Proactive strategies incorporate preparation efforts and promote prevention and 
awareness. They include activities carried out for mitigation, preparedness and 
warning for disasters before they occur to minimize adverse impacts. Examples of 
such activities are; a written disaster management plan based on a worst case 
scenarios for crisis management, a coordinated approach between private and public 
sector organizations, regular procedures in place for staff training and staff 
participation and involvement in development, implementation and revision of these 
plans. Post-disaster activities related to response and recovery are termed reactive 
approaches (Moe & Pathranarakul, 2006).  
Reactive strategies integrate four aspects: (a) crisis communication, (b) management 
of resources, (c) collaboration with stakeholders and, (d) resolution. Crisis 
communication is a vital component of an integrated approach. A crisis 
communication plan needs be incorporated into the overall tourism disaster 
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management plan and the crisis management plans of particular businesses. A 
scenario-based crisis communication plan should address common issues that could 
happen in a crisis situation and therefore are beneficial for both government and the 
private sector tourism businesses, to enable a quick reaction and implementation of 
plans. Such plans could consider short and long term strategies depending on the 
impact of the crisis or disaster. It should also involve clear instructions on media 
management, centralization of communications and appointment of a spokesperson. 
Furthermore, it should include the use of a crisis website, and internal and external 
communications with stakeholders. Communication campaigns need to be supported 
by public relations activities. 
 
Another vital task in response and recovery is the management of resources. 
Effectively dispatching, generating and sourcing funding can speed up the response 
and recovery. Conducting damage assessments, monitoring of emergency expenses 
and insurance records are crucial for revising future management plans. Similarly, 
crises and disasters have a huge impact on employees. The disruption for some 
businesses may mean temporary or even long-term closure, which can result in 
immediate measures such as giving leave for employees or even making some of 
them redundant. Counselling and medical support should be made available for those 
in need. Appropriate feedback, recognition and rewards may help to keep staff 
motivated. Employees may have to volunteer to work extended hours with periods of 
leave.  
 
For SIDS, destination and community recovery, following a disaster depends upon the 
recovery of tourism. In order for this to happen, negative media images following a 
disaster need to change and markets need to recover. Usually familiarization trips for 
the media, discounting and value-added packages are offered as part of a perception 
change campaign. Crisis market recovery strategies should have clear goals and 
objectives to achieve tourism recovery. The final step in response and recovery 
management is stakeholder collaboration. Communication, consultation and 
empowerment of internal and external stakeholders are very important steps in 
gaining their co-operation, clarity of their role and continuous support throughout the 
response and recovery process. 
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The resolution and feedback stage corresponds to long-term recovery and resolution. 
It is not possible to return to a pre-crisis situation. However, redevelopment, 
rehabilitation and re-opening of the tourism infrastructure and services are important 
as is the restoration of the industry and destination to an improved state. At this stage, 
learning from the crisis and disaster is achievable. The incorporation of lessons 
learned to an existing or new tourism crisis and disaster management context is a  key 
step in the resolution stage. 
The private sector of the tourism industry and the government sector play different 
roles at different stages in disaster management. Any actions or strategies for disaster 
management in tourism therefore will combine both private and public sector efforts. 
Any ensuing policies and regulations or changes to them will thus be negotiated 
outcomes of an ongoing dialogue and co-operation and/or sharing of experiences and 
knowledge between different stakeholders. In general, governments bear the tasks of 
enforcing law and order but also providing immediate relief and informing the general 
public and private sector of reliable risk assessments to adapt to these critical 
situations. The public depends upon emergency measures instituted government 
institutions. Successful tourism disaster management depends not only on sharing the 
knowledge and experiences, but also on proactive and reactive strategies. The 
integrated management approach is proactive by allowing for mitigation, 
preparedness, and disaster warnings before events occur. It is also reactive because it 
includes assessing the impact of a disaster. Communication between all stakeholders 
is therefore crucial before, during and after a disaster in the tourist industry. 
3.6 Summary 
Building upon the previous chapter, this chapter initially reviews key crisis and 
disaster management frameworks with the intention of constructing an integrated 
framework for tourism crisis and disaster planning and management in SIDS. 
Secondly, it examines strategic approaches, frameworks and models developed during 
the last two decades. It summarizes these approaches and examines them in detail to 
identify patterns of crisis and disaster ingredients and their main focus areas. There 
were three main approaches identified: they were the life-cycle approach, the strategic 
crisis management approach and the action-oriented crisis management approach. An 
opportunity to develop an integrated approach was identified and the main theoretical 
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constructs were explored further to develop such a framework. 
The chapter concluded with an outline and an explanation of the proposed framework 
that will be applied and tested in a SIDS post-disaster tourism crisis and disaster 
recovery case study. The following chapter discusses vulnerabilities, and some of the 
challenges and constraints faced by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in their 
development pathway to provide the context for considering how such states can plan 
and respond to crises and disasters.  
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Chapter 4 
SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES  
4.1 Introduction 
Islands are often shaped by their remoteness, or insularity, which results in ecologies and 
cultures that are usually distinctive to their location. Islands tend to have fragile environments, 
fragile economies, and are highly vulnerable to some of the most devastating hydro 
meteorological and geological disasters. This chapter outlines some of the challenges and 
constraints faced by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) during their development. In 
doing so, it first provides definitions for SIDS and vulnerability, as both of these terms are 
used throughout the chapter. This section is  followed by a discussion of characteristics of 
SIDS that lead to their vulnerabilities in relation to their socio-economic and environmental 
contexts. The Maldives is introduced as a SIDS while discussing the issues related to 
environmental vulnerability and sustainability. The Maldives is further outlined as the 
research setting, and why the recovery of Maldives tourism following the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami 2004 was chosen as the case study for the thesis.  
The Small Island Developing States Network (2009) defines SIDS as: 
“are small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar sustainable development 
challenges including small population, lack of resources, remoteness, susceptibility to natural 
disasters, excessive dependence on international trade and vulnerability to global 
developments. In addition, they suffer from lack of economies of scale, high transportation 
and communication costs, and costly public administration and infrastructure.” 
The term “vulnerability” refers to the possibility of  damage from external forces. SIDS are 
particularly vulnerable because they tend to be  exposed to factors outside their control, and 
the impact of external shocks tends to be relatively greater on these states  (Witter, Briguglio, 
& Bhuglah, 2002). Conceptually, vulnerability provides an easier context for understanding 
how a particular SIDS is responding in a comprehensive manner to the economic, 
environmental and social challenges it faces (Binger et al., 2002). Economic vulnerability 
arises largely from the  high exposure of SIDS to economic conditions in the rest of the world. 
SIDS economies frequently experience “shocks” from external factors originating in major 
global commercial centers, sometimes leading to serious instability. One type of external 
shock originates when natural forces, such as the destruction of tourist facilities by a hurricane 
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or typhoon. Environmental vulnerability is concerned with the risk of damage to the country’s 
natural ecosystems (e.g., coral reefs, swampland, mangroves, ground water, coastal areas and 
marine resources, forests, and soils). Each of these resources is essential in providing services 
to the economy and the general public. Degradation in the quality of the environmental 
resources could lessen the level of services they can provide to meet local needs and 
contribute to export earnings. Unsustainable use can result in irreversible long term damage. 
Natural environmental resources may also be affected by natural disasters, the risk of which 
varies across  time and place (Binger et al., 2002). 
Social vulnerability reflects the degree in which societies or socio-economic groups of people 
are affected negatively by stresses and hazards, whether brought about by external forces or 
intrinsic factors (internal and external) that negatively impact upon the social cohesion of a 
country. Social vulnerabilities caused by these stresses and hazards are more common in 
SIDS compared with other developing countries. This is due to their typically high recurrence 
rate in SIDS and their limited capacity to respond adequately (Binger et al., 2002). Therefore, 
the social impact of such stresses can have long-lasting effects. Social vulnerability is 
characterized by many factors such as increased growth in criminal activities, growing rates 
of HIV/AIDS infection, and rising  rates of children dropping out of school, declining age of 
the prison population, declining public health, poor  public infrastructure and migration of 
skilled professionals (Binger et al., 2002). The next section outlines the vulnerabilities faced 
by SIDS. 
4.2 Small Islands and their Vulnerability 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are mainly located in the tropics and sub tropics, in 
the ocean regions of the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic, as well as the Caribbean and 
Mediterranean seas. The UN (United Nations) currently classifies 52 countries and territories 
as SIDS, with a combined population of over 50 million people. Forty-three of these countries 
are located in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. The UN has continuously advocated special 
considerations to address the multi-faceted issue of structural weakness and vulnerability. The 
Global Conference on Sustainable Development of SIDS held in Barbados in 1994 adopted 
the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS. Later on, the 
International Review Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action 
(Mauritius, January 2005) resulted in the Mauritius Strategy for  the implementation of the 
agreed programme (Santos-Paulino, 2011). 
All SIDS are vulnerable to economic shocks and natural hazards, in a way that few other 
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countries or regions are (McGillivray, Naudé, & Santos‐Paulino, 2008; Naudé, Santos-
Paulino, & McGillivray, 2009, 2011). These states share common challenges and face a 
greater risk of marginalization from global economic activities than other developing 
countries. The problem results from their small size, remoteness from large markets, and 
vulnerability to economic and environmental shocks. According to the UN (1994), SIDS have 
some of the highest exposure levels to natural hazards globally; at least 13 of the 25 most 
disaster-prone countries are SIDS (refer Chapter 2, section 2.1.3). SIDS environment hazards  
identified included, the threat of sea level rise and the location of small islands in relation to 
phenomena such as cyclones, hurricanes, volcanism and seismic activity which can lead to 
tsunamis (Briguglio, 1996). SIDS are known for their cultural diversity as well as influences 
from former colonial powers in Western Europe, Africa and Asia. SIDS include countries like 
Singapore and the Bahamas, which are relatively rich by developing country standards, but 
also some of the poorest countries in the world, such as Haiti. Despite being structurally 
disadvantaged, for some countries, the advantage of smallness and more consistent population 
might allow some countries to adapt or  change.  
As far as development and other financial flows are concerned, SIDS received high levels of 
foreign aid relative to GDP, when compared with other developing countries. Foreign 
remittances are also a very important source of income, and some depend heavily on export 
revenues. The quality of governance varies tremendously among SIDS and many are prone to 
state failure. These and other factors combine to make SIDS highly vulnerable to external 
economic shocks and  susceptible to natural disasters and climate change. 
4.3 Characteristics Leading to SIDS Vulnerability 
SIDS consist of small land masses surrounded by ocean, and are frequently located in regions 
prone to natural disasters, often of a hydro meteorological and/or geological nature. In tropical 
areas they host relatively large populations for the area they occupy, with high growth rates 
and densities. As  Mimura et al. (2007) argue, several SIDS have poorly developed 
infrastructures and limited natural, human and economic resources.  Small island populations 
are also often dependent on marine resources to meet their protein needs. Most of their 
economies are dependent on a limited resource base and are subject to external forces, such as 
changing terms of trade, economic liberalization, and migration flows (Mimura et al., 2007). 
Many small islands are highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change and sea-level rise. 
At the same time adaptive capacity to climate change is generally low, though traditionally 
there has been some resilience in the face of environmental change.  
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Other factors that increase the extreme vulnerability of SIDS include; socio-economic 
conditions, natural resource and space limitations, and the impact of natural hazards such as 
tsunamis and storms. According to Cocklin (1999), in the Pacific, vulnerability is also a 
function of internal and external political and economic processes which effect forms of social 
and economic organization that are different from those practiced traditionally, as well as 
attempts to impose models of adaptation that have been developed for Western economies, 
without sufficient thought as to their applicability in traditional island settings (Cocklin, 
1999). 
4.3.1 Social and Economic Conditions 
Socio-economic stressors to island vulnerability include external pressures such as financial 
crises, increasing external debt, positive and negative effects  of globalization, terms of trade, 
international conflicts and domestic/local conditions such as increasing rates of poverty, 
higher rates of unemployment, reduced social organization, fast population growth, political 
instability, and a widening gap between  rich and poor, together with  interactions between 
these factors (ADB, 2004).  
With the exception of some of the larger Melanesian and Caribbean islands, most settlements 
in small islands are located in coastal locations, with the main  town or city also hosting the  
port, international airport and center of public services (Mimura et al., 2007) . Heavy 
dependence upon coastal resources for subsistence is also a major feature of many small 
islands. As  Mimura et al. (2007) notes, rapid and unplanned movements of rural and outer-
island residents to the major population centers is occurring throughout small islands, 
resulting in deteriorating urban conditions, with pressure on access to urban services required 
to meet basic needs. High concentrations of people in urban areas create social, economic and 
political problems, and make people more vulnerable to short-term physical and biological 
hazards such as tropical cyclones and diseases. It also increases their vulnerability to the 
impact of climate change and sea-level rise (Connell, 1999, 2003).  
Globalization is also a major issue, although it has been argued that it is nothing new for 
many small islands, since most have had a long history of colonialism and, more recently, the 
rise of  global capitalism (Pelling & Uitto, 2001). Nevertheless, in the last few years, the rate 
of change and growth of internationalization have increased, and small islands have had to 
contend with new extra-territorial economic, political and social forces such as multinational 
corporations, transnational social movements, international regulatory agencies, and global 
communication networks. In the present context, these factors become increasingly relevant, 
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as they may influence the vulnerability of small islands and their adaptive capacity (Adger, 
Huq, Brown, Conway, & Hulme, 2003; Pelling & Uitto, 2001). 
4.3.2 Natural Resources and Space Limitations  
The availability of freshwater is a major limiting factor for economic and social development 
in SIDS (UNFCCC, 2005). SIDS mainly depends upon ground water, rainfall or desalination 
plants for their fresh water supplies. Therefore, like every other utility in SIDS, water is  
costly and represents a constraint for development of agriculture and industry. Many small 
islands are experiencing water stress, as current levels of rainfall, and extraction of 
groundwater  often outstrips supply. As SIDS populations grow, the demand for water will 
increase. So far, the dominant policy response has been to establish  very costly desalination 
plants, which also have high electrical energy requirements (Binger et al., 2002). 
Conservation, efficient use and recycling are options still awaiting evaluation. The 
desalination plant option is much easier to implement, but increases vulnerability. Despite 
being expensive, due to its high energy demand, desalination and abstraction of water from 
deep aquifers are also measures for increasing the availability of good quality water in SIDS 
(UNEP, 2014). Groundwater pollution is often a major problem, especially in low-lying 
islands.  
Poor water quality is just one of several health issues linked to climate variability and change 
and their potential effects on the wellbeing of the inhabitants of small islands (Ebi, Lewis, & 
Corvalan, 2006). It is also inevitable that the ecological systems of small islands, and the 
functions they perform, will be sensitive to the rate and magnitude of climate change and sea-
level rise, especially where exacerbated by human activities (ADB, 2004), as is the case of 
small islands in the Pacific. Both terrestrial ecosystems on the larger islands and coastal 
ecosystems on most islands have been subjected to increasing degradation and destruction in 
recent decades. For instance, analysis of coral reef surveys over the past three decades has 
revealed that coral cover across reefs in the Caribbean has declined by 80% in just 30 years, 
largely as a result of continued pollution, sedimentation, marine diseases, and over-fishing 
(Gardner, Côté, Gill, Grant, & Watkinson, 2003). 
Once the possessors of unspoiled ecosystems and breathtaking beauty, SIDS have had to 
sacrifice natural capital in order to generate economic resources (Binger et al., 2002). Also 
being sacrificed is the less visible chemical composition of the soil, coast, ocean, and fresh 
water. Chemicals imported for agriculture, industry, transportation, health services, and 
households, are now a growing source of pollution. The ecosystems that make SIDS desirable 
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tourist destinations are also very fragile. Continued pollution from sewage, solid waste and 
chemicals will have negative long-term effects on the environment and, over time, will result 
in reduced capacity to provide environmental and economic services for the country. This is 
evident in the Maldives, where poor waste management strategies and scarcity of land have 
created a “toxic bomb”, the largest waste island (landfill) in the world (Matturi & Beykan, 
2014).  The degradation of critical ecosystems like coral reefs, mangrove forest and sea grass 
will reduce the natural defenses of the coast, increasing the potential for erosion from 
hurricanes and storms. 
4.3.3 Susceptibility to Climate Change  
The Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted in its Third Assessment 
Report (Change, 2001) that SIDS are likely to be among the countries and communities most 
adversely affected by climate change as a result of their small size, economic dependence on a 
limited number of natural resource-based sectors (particularly agriculture, tourism and 
extractive industries), and finite human and financial capacities. The IPCC Report also points 
out that these, mostly small island countries are already extremely vulnerable to a range of 
natural hazards and  variations in oceanic and atmospheric conditions.  
The IPCC  notes that while the severity of the threat will vary regionally, sea-level rise of the 
magnitude currently projected (i.e. 5 mm yr-1, with a range of 2-9 mm yr-1), is expected to 
have disproportionate effects on the economic and social development of many small island 
states. Coastal land loss is already projected to have widespread adverse consequences. 
Indeed, it is argued that land loss from sea-level rise, especially in the low limestone islands, 
is likely to be of a magnitude that would disrupt virtually all economic and social sectors. 
This, in turn, will increase the vulnerability of coastal environments by reducing natural 
resilience and increasing the costs of adaptation (Change, 2001). 
The likely negative impact on tourism, water resources availability, and food supplies 
represent significant new threats to SIDS’ continued viability. The increasing national 
vulnerability will be costly, based on the experience of the Maldives and other SIDS that have 
recently had to implement the equivalent of climate change adaptation measures to protect 
vulnerable populations and valuable infrastructure. According to Nath, Roberts, and Madhoo 
(2010) one economic instrument that has been discussed as a method of promoting adaptation 
in SIDS is insurance. Insurance cannot solve a problem that occurs constantly, however it can 
provide an effective method of risk management for storm damage and other intermittent 
problems (Nath et al., 2010). This increased level of vulnerability has already resulted in 
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SIDS having one of the highest property insurance cost structures. 
External pressures that contribute to the vulnerability of small islands to climate change 
include energy costs, population movements, financial and currency crises, international 
conflicts, and increasing debt. As  Mimura et al. (2007) contends, internal processes that 
create vulnerability include rapid population growth, attempts to increase economic growth 
through the exploitation of natural resources such as forests, fisheries and beaches, weak 
infrastructure, increasing income inequality, unemployment, rapid urbanization, political 
instability, a growing gap between demand for, and provision of, health care and education 
services, weakening social capital, and economic stagnation. These external and internal 
processes are related and interact in complex ways to heighten the vulnerability of island 
social and ecological systems to climate change (Parry, 2007). 
4.3.4 Sensitivity and Exposure to Extremely Damaging Natural Disasters 
Natural hazards of hydro meteorological origin remain an important stressor and effect the 
economies of small islands that are disproportionally large (Bettencourt, 2006). According to 
UNISDR (2004), the impact of these hazards upon small island states, especially tropical 
cyclones and hurricanes, demonstrates a proportional impact not usually experienced by 
continental countries. Whether measured in terms of area affected, population affected, 
houses destroyed, or as economic loss, the highest proportional impact is felt in the island 
states (UNISDR, 2004). The devastation of Grenada following Hurricane Ivan on 7 
September 2004 is a powerful illustration of the reality of small-island vulnerability (Nurse & 
Moore, 2005). In less than 8 hours, the country’s vital socio-economic infrastructure, 
including housing, utilities, tourism-related facilities and subsistence and commercial 
agricultural production, suffered numerous damages. The island’s two principal foreign 
exchange earners – tourism and nutmeg production – suffered heavily. More than 90% of 
hotel guest rooms were either destroyed or damaged, and more than 80% of the island’s 
nutmeg trees were lost (Nurse & Moore, 2005).   
In some instances, natural disasters threaten the very survival of some small islands. The 
effect of natural disasters on small economies include the devastation of the agricultural 
sector, wiping out of entire village settlements, and disruption of a high proportion of 
communication services and injury or death of a relatively high percentage of inhabitants. 
One of the major challenges with regard to hydro meteorological hazards is the time it takes 
to recover from them. In the past it was common for socio-ecological systems to recover from 
hazards, as these were sufficiently infrequent and/or less damaging. In the future, climate 
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change may create a situation where more intense and/or more frequent extreme events may 
mean there is less time in which to recover. Sequential events may mean that recovery is 
never complete, resulting in long-term deteriorations in affected systems, e.g., declines in 
agricultural output because soils never recover from salinization; and, urban water systems 
and housing infrastructure deterioration because damage cannot be repaired before the next 
extreme event. 
4.4 Small Islands and Tourism 
Twenty-seven of the Commonwealth’s 53 members are Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) with populations of less than 1.5 million. Ashe (2005), like many others, highlights 
their vulnerabilities in terms of  environmental disasters, limited human resources, economic 
resources and security. SIDS (including low lying coastal countries) share similar sustainable 
development challenges, including small populations, lack of resources, remoteness, 
susceptibility to natural disasters, excessive dependence on international trade and 
vulnerability to global developments. In addition, they suffer from a lack of economies of 
scale, high transportation and communication costs, and costly public administration and 
infrastructure. SIDS also have limited availability of human, institutional and financial 
resources to manage and use natural resources in a sustainable way, and ever increasing 
demographic and economic pressures on existing natural resources and ecosystems (Ashe, 
2005).  
 Scheyvens and Momsen (2008) disagree with this view, claiming that SIDS do not embrace  
their potential to chart their own paths in the global economy and provide self-determined 
futures for their people. Furthermore, they suggest that SIDS can capitalize on their size, 
economic performance, socio cultural and natural capital, respect for traditional holistic 
approaches to development, strong international linkages and political strength. Remoteness, a 
frequent feature of SIDS, is an advantage for tourism because relative isolation can render the 
destination “more attractive, exotic and enticing, especially in the case of small islands” 
(Scheyvens & Momsen, 2008, p. 498). 
Tourism is widely seen as the driver behind economic activities in SIDS. In a growing free 
trade environment, it became clear that island states could no longer rely on guaranteed 
markets or prices for their traditional export earners, primary products, and thus, many island 
states sought growth in the tourism sector. According to UNWTO (2013) the number of 
international tourists visiting SIDS destinations has been  significant: from 28 million in 2000 
to 41 million in 2013. In the same period, exports from tourism grew from US$26 billion to 
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US$53 billion. Tourism accounts for over one quarter of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in at least seven SIDS and represents 9% of the overall exports (US$61 billion).  Tourism has 
been key in the recent graduation of Samoa, Cabo Verde and the Maldives from Least 
Developed Country (LDC) status (UNWTO, 2013). Similarly, according to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) tourism contributes to economic resilience in SIDS where there is 
growing revival of tourism in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, and there is 
growing momentum for economic recovery, leading to improved fiscal stance, more social 
spending, and balanced budgets (UNWTO, 2013). 
Many SIDS have demonstrated continued economic and social development during the last 
thirty years, proving that  size does not hinder sustained growth (Read, 2004). Hence, it is not 
surprising that in most SIDS tourism is the main economic activity (Neto, 2003), bringing in 
most of their foreign currency earnings (Ashe, 2005). Not surprisingly,  in most SIDS tourism 
also provides the largest source of employment generation (Scheyvens & Momsen, 2008). 
However, in spite of these positive outcomes, the global tourism industry is also believed to 
have a negative impact upon SIDS. As Rosalie (2002, p. 95) stated, “Tourism in the 
developing world has both the potential to be an agent of social and economic development ... 
or a source for friction and alienation within the local community.” 
A lack of resources often makes natural environmental assets the only means for economic 
development for SIDS (Ashe, 2005). But, when tourism development is dependent on fragile 
ecosystems it causes immense pressures on these resources (Neto, 2003). The extent of the 
impact can be understood when the small land area and population of most SIDS is weighed 
against annual tourist arrivals per year, which often exceeds several times that of the total 
population (Scheyvens & Momsen, 2008). In addition, SIDS are among the countries that are 
most vulnerable to the threats of climate change such as rising sea levels (Quarless, 2007). 
Unfortunately, due to limitations in human and financial capabilities, these countries are often 
less capable of protecting their natural heritage than their larger counterparts (Rosalie, 2002).  
At the same time, tourism is blamed for fostering unbalanced dependency and the spread of 
unequal socio-economic development (Milne, 1997). While tourism provides much needed 
employment and revenue for SIDS, its overall contribution to a country’s national income and 
any tourism multiplier effects are significantly diminished due to the high leakage of tourism 
benefits (Ashe, 2005). A considerable drain on tourism earnings from SIDS comes from the 
high rate of imports in comparison to domestic production. Unable to generate sufficient 
domestic investment for tourism development, these countries turn to foreign investors and 
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Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) for the development and establishment of tourism. This 
leads to leakage of tourism revenue as repatriation of wages and profits, loss of control of the 
tourist industry by the host country and the creation of tourist enclaves detached from local 
communities. In addition, SIDS rely on “the management skills, technological know-how and 
access to international markets” from MNCs for the successful development of tourism 
(Bende-Nabende, 2002, p. 82). This is one of the 20 reasons why MNCs are described as  
“key agents for economic activity in SIDS” (Read, 2004, p. 366). However, the dominant role 
of MNCs in SIDS contributes to a number of adverse effects. Among these are the leakage of 
tourism revenue as repatriation of wages and profits, loss of control of the tourist industry by 
the host country and the creation of tourist enclaves detached from local communities (Bende-
Nabende, 2002). These negative effects are further aggravated when tourist hotels establish 
supply systems with foreign suppliers cutting out local businesses, as is often the case in 
SIDS.  
High dependency upon tourism also makes an economy susceptible to external shocks from 
both global and regional incidents. The impact is often more profound on SIDS whose 
tourism industries often rely on long-haul flights for the majority of their incoming tourists. 
The devastating impact on tourism after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United 
States, and the spread of Avian Flu and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Asia 
(Kuo, Chen, Tseng, Ju, & Huang, 2007) are examples of how external shocks can affect local 
tourism industries. In addition, any event that causes changes in tourists’ travel patterns, such 
as political unrest in a region, e.g. Fiji, or a rise in oil prices can have a direct impact on 
tourism-dependent economies. Excessive reliance on a particular economic sector, 
particularly when combined with unstable social and economic conditions, is said to create an 
ideal situation for political insecurity which may  impede sustainable development (Sönmez, 
2002).  
When most investment and development is focused on tourism, development in other 
economic sectors can be overlooked. Neglect and decline in industries such as fisheries and 
agriculture can cause locals to abandon these occupations for jobs in tourism, and the 
motivation for developing, expanding and modernizing local production may  be restrained. 
Tourism multipliers can be limited and the resulting inequalities of income distribution can 
lead  local farmers, fishermen and others who work in food sector to feel alienated from the 
tourism industry (Jamal & Lagiewski, 2006). This may eventually foster hostility among local 
communities towards tourism and lead to social unrest (Telfer & Wall, 1996). Participation 
and involvement of local communities is necessary for the successful and sustainable 
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development of a tourism industry (Tsaur, Lin, & Lin, 2006), hence local communities should 
not be ignored (Dodds & Butler, 2009). Although the above inherent characteristics make 
sustainable development a challenging task for SIDS (Ashe, 2005), due to their lack of other 
resources, any diversion from tourism as a major economic activity may  create further 
economic hardships for SIDS.   
4.5 Maldives: A Typical Small Island Developing State 
 Maldives’ environmental vulnerability and sustainable tourism development  is analyzed in 
the following section. The Maldives share many similarities in terms of environment and 
socio-economic features with other SIDS. 
4.5.1 Geography 
The Maldives is a chain of Indian Ocean islands spread over a distance of 960 kilometers, 
located between northern latitude 4 to slightly south of the equator (Figure 6). Although the 
area with the highest elevation is approximately three meters above mean sea level, about 
80% of the nation’s total area is less than one meter above mean sea level. The land area, 
which covers about 26 geographic atolls, is grouped into 20 administrative atolls within a land 
area of 298 square kilometers. The population of the Maldives is about 350,000.  
The country has 1,192 islands, of which 199 are inhabited. Of these islands, only 28 have a 
land area greater than one square kilometer and 70% of the inhabited islands have a 
population of less than 1,000. This extremely low population density makes the Maldives 
unique, even among small island archipelagic states. The water depth in and around the atolls 
varies considerably: lagoon waters within the atolls have depths of between 30 to 80 m, with 
the depths increasing as one moves from the north to south. At the outer margins of the atolls, 
the ocean floor drops abruptly to depths of up to 2,000 m or more. Along the inside of the 
atoll chains, the water is shallower, with depths of 250 to 300 m. The straits between the east 
and west atolls are more than 1,000 m deep (Ministry of Environment and Construction, 
2004). 
4.5.2 Disaster Risk Likelihood 
The disaster risk scenario of the Maldives can generally be described as moderate (UNDP, 
2006). Nonetheless, its vulnerability to natural disasters was brought to the forefront when it 
was hit by the devastating Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 26, 2004. The Maldives is also 
occasionally prone to adverse climatic events such as storms, prolonged dry periods, heavy 
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rains and strong winds caused by cyclones in the Southern Indian Ocean (the frequency of 
some of these hazards are outlined in section 4.5.3). Given that the Maldives is a nation of 
islands whose highest elevation is no more than three meters above mean sea level, the 
country is at particular risk from rising sea levels associated with climate change. 
The small islands (on average, only16 hectares), with their flat topography and very low 
elevation, also suffer from damage to their ecosystems (coral reef), land loss and beach 
erosion due to sea level rises, changes in air and sea surface temperatures and changes in 
rainfall patterns. The predominant dependence of the country upon the tourism and fisheries 
sectors enhances economic and social vulnerability to sea-related hazards. 
Figure 6 represents the GDP contribution by economic sectors in 2013. As can be seen from 
the graph, a quarter of the pie (27%), or total GDP comes from tourism. Transport and 
communication contributed 19% to GDP while construction, manufacturing, electricity and 
water together contributed 17%. Government administration contributed 11% to GDP in 
2013. The percentage share of fisheries and agriculture to GDP was 3%. Other services 
contributed 23% to GDP in 2013, these include, real estate, wholesale and retail trade, 
education, health, financial services, business services and social services. 
 
Figure 6: GDP Contribution by Major Economic Sectors of the Maldives, 2013, Source: 
Ministry of Tourism (2014) 
 
A multi-hazard disaster risk vulnerability assessment was undertaken by the Risk 
Management Solution, India (RMSI), a Delhi based Information Technology Company, to 
develop a disaster risk profile for the Maldives under the auspices of the UNDP Maldives in 
2005 (UNDP, 2008). The report covers five natural disasters; tsunamis, climate change, 
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storms, floods and earthquakes (some of these hazards are discussed in section 4.5.3).  
This study (Developing a Disaster Risk Profile for Maldives) provides a hazard and risk map 
for all of the islands on a GIS format, for independent hazards as well as a composite hazard 
map. The map indicates the potential hazards and risk on an ordinal scale (e.g. high, 
moderate, and low). As a result of the study, each island has been given a vulnerability 
ranking of 1-5, with1 being low and 5 being the highest. The vulnerability ranking also 
includes socio-economic vulnerability. For example, Figure 7 shows a sample hazard map for 
a tsunami. The report is useful for disaster managers and development planners to decide on 
locations for high infrastructure investment to safeguard already settled communities and 
avoid population settlement in areas of high risk and vulnerability. This study has guided the 
UNDP’s safe shelter planning and its prioritization of islands for immediate disaster 
preparedness planning. 
4.5.3 History of Natural Disasters in the Maldives 
Overall, the Maldives faces a moderate hazard risk except for the low probability and high 
consequence tsunami hazard, and high probability and high consequence of rising sea levels 
in the distant future (UNDP, 2006). There is very little recorded history about hazards.  
In the Maldives, islands along the eastern frontier are more vulnerable to tsunamis than those 
along the northern, southern and western boundaries, where the risk is considered low (see 
figure 7). The Maldives has already been affected by 3 earthquakes in the Indian Ocean, and 
since  1816, 85 tsunamis have been generated in the region (UNDP, 2006). The maximum 
tsunami wave height is estimated at 4.5 m and a tsunami similar to the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
2004 is likely to occur again sometime within the next 219 years (UNDP, 2006). The 
likelihood of earthquakes with magnitude of 5 and above in the Maldives is limited only to 
the southern parts of the country, namely Seenu, Gnaviyani, Gaafu Alifu and the Gaafu 
Dhaalu atolls. Since earthquakes of this scale are known to cause damage to life and property, 
the population of these atolls may be at higher risk. Attention should be paid to the possible 
occurrence of future events in western India and in the waters west and southwest of the 
Maldives, the oceans lying south of the Maldives, and the Carlsberg Oceanic Ridge Zone, 
which has a high level of seismic activity (ADRC, 2005). 
78 
Figure 7: Tsunami Hazard Zones in the Maldives Islands, Source: UNDP Maldives (2005) 
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on low‐lying islands, a rise in sea levels by 50 cm could see significant portions of the islands 
being inundated or washed away by erosion. Rises in sea levels could have far reaching 
consequences including a  loss of land, the flooding of low‐lying coastal areas, displacement 
of population, the loss of crop yield, devastating effects coastal aquaculture, and the erosion 
of sandy beaches (Fujibayashi, 2009). As most of the economic activities in the Maldives are 
heavily dependent upon the coastal ecosystem, rising sea levels will impact the social and 
economic development of the country. Residential areas, major industries  and vital 
infrastructure of the country lie close to the shoreline, within 0.8 to 2 m of mean sea level. 
Even now, some islands are seriously affected by the loss of shoreline, as well as houses, 
schools and other infrastructure, compelling the government to initiate urgent coastal 
protection measures. 
4.5.4 Sustainable Tourism 
Most of the definitions of sustainable tourism focus on socio-cultural and environmental 
preservation, a high level of community involvement and planning that reflects present and 
future use (Liu, 2003; Ritchie & Crouch, 2003). Some definitions also advocate that 
sustainable tourism must contribute to the economic stability of the host region or community 
(Ritchie & Crouch, 2003; Twining-Ward & Butler, 2002). Sustainable tourism is about 
economic, social and environmental sustainability, and is dependent upon all three areas 
(Mbaiwa, 2005). The main purpose of tourism is to gain economic benefits by using a 
destination’s cultural or environmental wealth. Detrimental impacts on those assets are 
alarming for the overall tourism industry because, “what is at stake is not just tourism but the 
survival of tourism-dependent economies” (Poon, 1993, p. 25). Therefore, tourism is required 
to be sustainable in order to contribute to development (Ntibanyurwa, 2006), particularly in a 
SIDS like the Maldives. The Ministry of Tourism has developed sound guidelines for 
planners, managers and operators of tourism establishments in the Maldives. Under the 
“Environmental Guidelines for Tourist Resort Developers and Operators” published by MOT 
(2005), several environmental regulations and concerns have been addressed. 
The major selling point of Maldives’ tourism is the Maldives’ environment (MCST, 2001). 
Rapid development of tourism and a dramatic increase in population exert more direct 
environmental concerns. Further, factors such as poor water quality, coastal erosion, flooding, 
sanitation pollution of land and water, deforestation, solid waste collection and disposal, 
environment related health problems, due to urban congestion and loss of biological diversity, 
are some indications of the need to move towards more sustainable pathways. Like other 
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small island nations, the Maldives are  vulnerable to global climate change, climate variability 
and sea level rise.  
To limit environmental degradation and sustain the natural integrity, carrying capacity for 
tourist resorts have been defined to limit the number of users below environment thresholds. 
Maximum built-up area is limited to twenty percent of land area and building heights may not 
exceed vegetation levels. Only 68 % of beach length can be utilized for guestrooms. Twenty 
percent has to be reserved for public use and 12 % must be left as open space. Constructions 
on reef flats and lagoons are discouraged, though may be permitted provided equal open space 
is left on the island for the building of floors developed in the lagoon on stilts. All guest 
rooms must face the beach and five linear meters of beach line is to be allocated to each 
tourist in front of their rooms. 
Efforts are being made by the Government through the implementation of environmental 
standards to promote and preserve the integrity of the eco-system. These include: restrictions 
on cutting down trees or the preservation of natural vegetation, mandatory environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) prior to any coastal works, control of the construction of jetties and 
groynes, restrictions on the construction of sea walls, and detached/submerged break-waters. 
Promotion of greater coral colonization on the peripheral reefs and other natural methods of 
shoreline protection are also encouraged. The government prohibits coral and sand mining on 
resorts and uninhabited islands, and has deemed a number of sites  protected marine areas. In 
these areas fishing, anchoring, removal of coral and any other destructive activities are 
prohibited. There are moves to identify and declare more sites as protected marine areas 
(WTO, 2000). 
The problem of waste management is addressed through the compulsory installation of 
incinerators, bottle crushers and compactors at  every resort. Sewage disposal through soak 
pits into the aquifer is discouraged, rather, developers are now required to recycle water, 
permission to do so being determined by the island size and the extent of the aquifer used on 
the island (MOT, 2005). The installation of desalination plants and the provision of 
desalinated water on tourist resorts have reduced the stress on aquifers. Developers are 
required to present plans for new resorts that meet strict environmental design guidelines, 
which stipulate how many buildings can be constructed, and what they should look like 
(MOT, 2005). Combined with regulatory efforts to curb coral mining and protect beaches 
without building breakwaters, these design guidelines have pushed developers to maintain 
environmental standards. To some extent, resorts have begun to embrace  the eco-tourism 
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concept and are coming up with environment management systems (MOT, 2005).  
Tourism in the Maldives appears to be relatively environmentally friendly due to the close 
relationships between regulating agencies. While the overall policy for environmental 
protection and environmental impact assessment is within the remit of the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy; the Ministry of Tourism is also directly involved in environmental 
regulation through its own laws. This has meant that the Tourism Ministry has had to develop 
its own level of environmental expertise. Coordination is managed through the National 
Commission for the Protection of the Environment, which has high-level representation from 
a number of Government agencies and other interest groups.  
Another concerning issue is of physical geography and cultural influence. The country is 
made up entirely of  small coral islands. There are no complex linkages of upland, coastal and 
marine systems to deal with. As a consequence, the cause-effect linkage between 
environmental disturbance and impact is almost always clear (MOT, 1996). In addition, 
almost anyone who visits the Maldives cannot but be affected by the tenuous physical 
integrity of the atoll-State. With a consistently low reef, the constant threat of obliteration is 
always with local inhabitants. As a consequence, they have developed an understanding of the 
need to protect the physical integrity of their land. The above developments have helped to 
boost activity in the sector and shape the environment-friendly model of tourism in the 
Maldives. Critically, however, the development of sustainable tourism remains dependent on 
the willingness and the ability of individuals in the tourism industry to act on such guidelines 
(MOT, 1996). 
4.5.5 Research Setting 
The recovery of Maldives tourism following the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 was chosen as 
the case study for various reasons, including the fact that the country is a SIDS, and highly 
dependent on tourism for economic growth.  It is familiar to me and I have lived and worked 
in the tourism industry in the Maldives throughout all the major tourism crises during the last 
decade or so, including the tsunami of 2004.  
The Maldivian economy is dependent upon tourism and the hospitality industry. Spread over 
18 atolls across the island nation (Figure 8), there are 23,677 beds in 101 resorts 
(approximately 11,838 rooms) and 106 new projects, helping the local economy to grow by 
ten percent per annum (MOT, 2014). In the Maldives, tourism revenues contributes nearly 30 
% of the GDP and 63% of total employment (Shakeela, Ruhanen, & Breakey, 2012). A total 
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Figure 8: Map of Maldives, Source: www.worldmapfinder.com/En/Asia/Maldives 
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largest share for the tourism sector being US$100 million (World Bank, 2005). By early 
October 2005, it was reported that tourism faced a slow recovery. In terms of tourist arrivals, 
it was said that the country had been pushed back eight years, which would mean a 37 per 
cent reduction in arrivals. Direct income from tourism was reduced by over US$40 million 
which included 68 per cent of government revenue in 2005 (World Bank, 2005). There were 
significant environmental damage resulting in serious repercussions for the Maldives natural 
and cultural attractions, coral reefs, beaches, soil, vegetation and crops. Several tour operators 
and other tourism businesses were directly impacted by the tsunami. The effect on destination 
image was also profound with images of the devastating tsunami being shown on regional, 
national and international media (UNEC, 2005).  
A joint report published by the Ministry of Planning and National Development in the 
Maldives (MPND, 2005, p. 29) one year after the tsunami clearly outlines the various 
environmental and disaster risks facing the Maldives: 
“…environmental features such as low elevation, beach erosion, high freshwater table, and 
lack of coastal vegetation—combined with the population’s dependency on tourism and 
fisheries, high import dependence, and limited transport facilities—make the Maldives one of 
the most environmentally vulnerable countries in the region if not the world. Today the 
country faces three major disaster risks: climate change, particularly resulting in rising sea 
levels; storm surge; and tsunami. It is also exposed to droughts, heavy rains, and high waves 
caused by cyclones in the southern Indian Ocean.” 
The impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 on Maldives tourism was significant. Carlsen 
(2005) developed a destination level market recovery strategy for the Maldives soon after the 
tsunami. The study was reactive, focusing mainly on marketing strategies in the short term to 
be adopted in order to revive the decline in markets. The Maldives government initiated a 
macro level disaster management plan (UNDP, 2005). The Disaster Management Strategy and 
Plan for the Tourism Sector of the Republic of the Maldives suggested a results based 
framework for disaster management planning, and presented goals, strategic objectives, 
results and tasks based on the geography, institutional and administrative policy framework 
with the tourism industry functions (UNDP, 2005). The disaster management plan for tourism 
recommended the inclusion of the three phases of a tourism crisis with its elements; readiness, 
response and recovery (Post-Tsunami Review Workshops and Seminar, 2005). Apart from 
this, there is no known research about how the tourism industry in the Maldives recovered 
following the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. 
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4.6 Summary 
This chapter has described the three types of vulnerabilities that pervade Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS): economic, social and environmental. These vulnerabilities arise 
from a wide variety of factors; such as their small size, geographical dispersion, the fragility 
of their ecosystems, isolation from markets and their limited internal markets. Characteristics 
leading to vulnerabilities of SIDS were outlined. The extreme vulnerability of SIDS to 
disaster events and climate change was outlined. The chapter has argued that the small size of 
many island nations makes retreat from such elements impossible. A single disaster event can 
impact an entire country, rendering large portions uninhabitable and potentially, completely 
devastating narrowly based economies. The chapter concluded with a discussion on SIDS 
sensitivity and exposure to extremely damaging natural disasters within the context of the 
Maldives. The following chapter outlines the research design including methodology, 
methods and means of analysis. 
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Chapter 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter informs and justifies the epistemology, theoretical perspective and methods 
adopted for this study. This research was carried out in three phases: pre field-work, field-
work and post field-work. In the first phase, a critical literature review of disaster studies in 
tourism research was done to build the conceptual framework for tourism disaster 
management based on the constructs and dimensions derived from the theory using 
documentary methods. The second phase (1st and 2nd field work and analysis stage), 
operationalized and tested the framework by applying it to the Maldives (Small Island 
Developing State at readiness stage of a disaster), a destination that recovered following the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. During phase 3 (post field work/conclusion stage), once  data 
from the case study was analyzed, the model was further refined based on the findings and 
research outcomes.  
This research adopted a single case study approach and used qualitative methods for data 
collection and analysis. The various weaknesses and limitations of the approaches are 
described in addition to the challenges faced by the researcher during data collection. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of the data collection and analysis procedures and the 
ethical issues that affected this research. 
5.2 Epistemology and Theoretical Perspective 
Jennings (2010, p. 36) explains epistemology as “the relationship between the researcher and 
the participants/subjects/objects.” Crotty (1998) identifies three epistemology stances: 
objectivism, constructivism and subjectivism. Moreover, Crotty (1998) suggests that an 
interrelationship exists between the theoretical stance adopted by the researcher, the 
methodology and methods used, and the researcher’s view of the epistemology. This study 
draws on the constructionist epistemological tradition (Jennings, 2001). In constructionism 
meanings are constructed by individuals as they engage with and interpret their world. So, in 
this study, the focus is on the social construction of meaning about disaster recovery by the 
participants and researcher. In other words it examines how the participants and the researcher 
collectively understood and interpreted crisis management of a natural disaster in the social 
context of Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. 
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More widely known theoretical perspectives include positivism, interpretivism, critical 
inquiry, feminism and postmodernism (Crotty, 1998). Of the available theoretical 
perspectives, positivism and various strands of interpretivism are, or have been (arguably) 
among the most influential (Gray, 2013). Jennings (2001) suggests that the deliberate choice 
of a theoretical perspective is to ensure the researcher maintains consistency in data collection 
and construction of knowledge. The interpretive social sciences perspective is primarily 
informing this research. An interpretive approach sees people and their interpretations, 
perceptions, meanings and understandings as the primary source of data. From an ontological 
standpoint this research assumes there are multiple explanations for a phenomenon and the 
approach to research is primarily considered to be inductive – that is, the explanations or 
theories are ‘induced’ from the data collected (Jennings, 2001; Veal, 2006). The approach is 
also holistic-inductive, meaning that the whole phenomenon is studied in all its complexity 
rather than trying to break something into parts and study discrete variables and relationships 
(Jennings, 2001). Thus the case study of post-disaster recovery with all its complexity can be 
understood within its (physical, social, cultural, symbolic, psychological, etc.) full context. 
The meanings of the various characteristics of the case depend on their relationship with 
others, as well as the context(s) within which they manifest themselves as an integrated 
system that does not allow us to study parts of it in isolation (Willig, 2013). 
5.3 Positionality 
The key component of a qualitative inquiry is the researcher, because it is through the eyes 
and ears of the researcher that the stories of the participants are told. In this section I hope to 
draw attention to possible aspects of my personal and professional self that may have 
relevance to the research for the benefit of the readers. According to McDowell (1992), 
researchers must take account of their own position in relation to their participants and 
research settings. In particular, the researcher must consider the reconstruction of 
insider/outsider status in terms of one’s positionality in respect of education, class, race, 
gender, culture and other factors, as these offer us tools for understanding the dynamics of 
researching within and across one’s culture (England, 1994; Merriam et al., 2001). Since bias 
remains a naturally occurring human characteristic, positionality is often used in the context 
of the inductive approach to social science inquiry as an exploration of the investigator’s 
reflection on one’s own placement within the many contexts, layers, power structures, 
identities, and subjectivities of the viewpoint (England, 1994).  
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As identified (in Chapter 1, 1.1 and Chapter 4, 4.5.5), I worked in the Maldives tourism 
industry for 15 years and during this period I developed professional networks with many 
public and private sector organizations. My identity as a Maldivian familiar with the context 
and the networks gave me advantages as a researcher to complete the work despite the 
difficult political situations occurring during the field trips (See 5.9).  
 
Despite my familiarity, I entered to the field as an outsider. I never worked in any of the 
government sector organizations that I interviewed (though I interacted with them on day-to- 
day concerns and issues) and neither had I worked in any of the tourism businesses 
interviewed. I felt the participants took me as  neutral, as a person who might objectively 
listen to their views and recollections. During the field-work I also emphasized that I was not 
on a government scholarship and that I was a self-funding student who had no obligation to 
work for any government organization. The participants were receptive of this position and 
were willing to share their experiences. As I became immersed in the process I felt I became 
an insider and that through what I learned I would be able to take proper account of their 
concerns. 
5.4 Research Design 
Ritchie and Goeldner (1994) present a classification of five research types (policy, evaluation, 
managerial, action and operational) based on three dimensions of management-level and stage 
of management and functional areas of management activity. Ritchie and Goeldner (1994) 
explain that managerial research can be done if there is a need for an in-depth understanding 
of a specific problem. Descriptive information is required to understand the key factors in the 
problem and also precise data that permit analysis of the important variables influencing a 
situation. Characteristics of data collection techniques in this case may be technical and 
factual data related to the problem and nature of analysis of the data may be methods of 
extracting information from secondary data, surveys, experimentation, observation, model 
building while the research output from a managerial perspective may be background/briefing 
document and/or precise recommendations to overcome a problem and/or take advantage of 
an opportunity (Ritchie & Goeldner, 1994). 
This research is therefore aligned with managerial research which focuses on a specific 
problem for which management needs additional information on which to base decisions. In 
this case, the need is for managerial research on destination recovery so that future recovery 
efforts are based on sound and comprehensive data and recommendations. In terms of 
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destination recovery the management of crisis and disaster includes key themes such as crisis 
and disaster management planning, coordinating organizations, training, research, recovery 
planning, policy and product development, crisis communication, allocation of resources 
(financial, human), organizational change, stakeholders and partnerships, organizational 
learning, evaluation and feedback. Information and data were gathered using iterative 
processes involving secondary (documentary), case study and in-depth interviewing. 
5.5 Research Methods 
This research aimed to build a broadly integrated theoretical model of tourism disaster 
management to extend the existing theory on tourism disaster management. It has been 
conducted in three phases: pre field-work, field-work and post field-work. The methods used  
are outlined in the next four sub sections. 
5.5.1 Documentary Sources 
Stake (1995, p. 68) argues that reviewing documentary sources is an important part of the case 
study research, highlighting that it may help to surface some ‘unexpected clues’. Similarly 
Yin (2013, p. 107) insists that “because of their overall value, documents play an explicit role 
in any data collection in doing case studies,” stressing their strengths as (i) stable (they can be 
evaluated as often as necessary); (ii) unobtrusive (were created independently of the case 
study); and, (iii) exact (contains names and details of events). However, semi-structured 
interviewing when used along with documentary sources as a form of secondary data does 
have some limitations. Yin (2013, p. 106) notes that a researcher may presume that a 
document includes the ‘unmitigated truth,’ however most of the time they reflect the unknown 
bias of the author. Therefore the researcher should be aware that  documentary evidence 
reflects a communication among other parties attempting to achieve some other objectives. 
Similarly, the original data may be of poor quality or be modified as a mean of influencing 
data, in which case the researcher should take care to ensure that the secondary data comes 
from a reliable source. 
The first phase (preliminary stage) involved a critical literature review of disaster studies in 
tourism research which are deemed to advance the understandings of tourism disaster 
management in a systematic manner towards disaster mitigation and industry resilience. Three 
main types of secondary data; documentary, survey and those from multiple sources were 
used in this research. Documentary secondary data includes books on tourism crisis and 
disaster management, journal articles, government and industry published reports, statistics, 
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newspaper articles, press releases and websites were used together with surveys and 
frameworks carried out and tested by academics in the field. Various crisis management 
models developed to restore the tourism industry following disasters were studied in detail to 
evaluate their content, differences and similarities. Thus, a documentary method was 
employed to build the conceptual framework for tourism disaster management based on the 
constructs and dimensions derived from the theory. Chapter 3 explained the model and its 
main components; proactive and reactive strategies, communication, resource management 
and stakeholder collaboration. In this process a more detailed framework with an integrated 
approach was developed for tourism disaster management which is applicable to SIDS. 
Little has been written specifically on the impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 on 
Maldives tourism, apart from media reports. Therefore, while in the field, I requested all of 
the interviewees to give me any important secondary information  they could share. In the 
process I received a lot of government and industry published reports, Standard Operation 
Procedures, sector disaster plans, statistics, newspaper articles, press releases, and websites 
and NGO resources focusing upon destination recovery. 
5.5.2 Case Study as a Method 
The second phase (1st and 2nd field work visits and analysis stage) operationalized and tested 
the framework by applying it to the Maldives (Small Island Developing State at readiness 
stage of a disaster), a destination that was recovering following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 
2004. Research case studies are used to gain knowledge of “individual, group, 
organizational, social, political, and related phenomena” (Yin, 2003, p. 1) in a range of 
disciplines including tourism and can include a mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003). A case study method is the most suited to studying this 
topic as it provides a comprehensive picture of the event. Jennings (2001) indicates that case 
studies that are informed by the holistic-inductive paradigm use interviewing, the 
documentary method and participant observation as the key methods and some of these have 
been adopted in this research. Thus, this research adopted a case study approach in order to 
effectively examine the role of each major stakeholder in destination recovery. Yin (2003) 
presents four types of case study design based on whether the study uses single or multiple 
cases and the number of units of analysis (Table 10). 
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Table 10 : Basic Types of Design for Case Studies (Yin 2003) 
 Single case designs Multiple case designs  
Holistic (Single unit of analysis) Type 1 Type 2 
Embedded (Multiple units of analysis) Type 3 Type 4 
 
The approach used in this study is a single case (embedded) design; type 3 in Yin (2003)’s 
categorization. Single case refers to the examination of a single organization, place or event.  
Single case design in this research hopes to achieve a thorough examination of a destination 
and its tourism industry recovery following a disaster. The embedded units of analysis are the 
government and industry stakeholders who contributed to or played some role in recovery. 
Similar to Hystad and Keller (2008), the emergency organizations and destination 
management organizations were considered as primary stakeholders as they had an important 
part to play before and during the disaster together with the tourism businesses and tourism 
organizations who  take the lead after the disaster. Beeton (2005, p.37) outlines some reasons 
to justify that case study is a “valid methodological tool in tourism research”; (1) it can 
explain why an innovation worked or failed to work, (2) it has the advantage of hindsight, yet 
can be relevant in the present and to the future, (3) it can illustrate the complexities of a 
situation by recognizing more than one contributing factor, (4) it shows the influence of 
personalities and politics on an issue, (5) the reader may be able to apply it to his/her 
situation, (6) it can help evaluate alternatives not chosen, and (7) it can utilize information 
from a wide variety of sources. A case study provides the opportunity to adopt a range of 
research methods. In this research, qualitative in-depth interviewing is used in combination 
with an examination of government and industry and media reports to gather information to 
supplement the case study. Similarly, there are limitations related to case study research. 
These include the possibility of generalization, bias and important details being lost when 
there are restrictions around length. 
5.5.3 Qualitative Interviewing 
Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola (2007, p. 34) state that interviewing local citizens, risk 
managers, community leaders, academics, non-profit relief agencies, international 
organizations, and other municipal and private sector staff can provide a wealth of 
information as they maintain records on past or future potential hazards. In-depth interviewing 
was chosen as the primary method of data collection in this research. The interview method 
was felt to be of most use because it had the potential to provide a wealth of insight and 
information. Denzin and Lincoln (2003) state that a major benefit of data through in-depth 
   
 91 
interviews is that it  offers the potential to capture a person’s perspective of an event or 
experience. As  Babbie (2004) notes, qualitative interviewing is generally like a conversation 
with a general plan of inquiry, and a set of topics to be discussed in depth.  
In this research, qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted in the field with  individual 
tourism operators, the government, emergency services and private sector agencies 
responsible for destination marketing to investigate the extent of crisis impact and how they 
have mitigated and learnt from those impacts. I chose in-depth interviews because “complex 
systems, processes or experiences are generally best addressed in in-depth interviews” 
(Lewis, 2003, p.58). The qualitative interviews were undertaken during two field visits to the 
Maldives. The first field trip was from 2nd April 2011 to 6th June 2011 and the second trip was 
from 24th January 2012 to 15th February 2012. 
5.5.4 Interview Questions and Topics 
According to Jennings (2005, p.104), semi-structured interviews are linked to a qualitative 
research approach, where “the use of semi-structured interviews is associated with the 
phenomenological, constructivist or interpretive paradigm, which holds an ontology 
(worldview) that recognizes multiple perspectives in regard to the research process, an 
epistemological stance that is subjective in nature and a methodology which is predicated on 
qualitative principles.” Semi-structured interviews are also used in studies of varied and 
complex information, particularly when the interview subjects range from various levels and 
backgrounds. 
The interviews were semi-structured, conducted in an open-ended, conversational fashion and 
the range of questions was adjusted to interviewees’ specific roles and occupations. Two sets 
of questionnaires were developed for this purpose: the first was for tourism and emergency 
organizations (See Appendix I), and the second was for tourism businesses (See Appendix J).  
Faulkner and Vikulov (2001)  DIRE grid developed by was the basis for the interview 
structure and topics (Table 11). The grid followed the life cycle approach and has already 
been tested on how a flood affected tourism in a destination, in the case of the 1998 Katherine 
floods in Australia. For the community in Katherine, and its tourism industry, the disaster was 
huge with half of the residents’ homes, the Central Business District and most of the tourism 
business premises being inundated, and extensively damaged or destroyed. From the tourism 
industry’s perspective, the flood characterized all the essential ingredients of a disaster 
(Faulkner and Vikulov (2001).  
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Similar to the Katherine floods, the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 was very significant for 
the tourism industry of Maldives, with direct damage to the tourism infrastructure and other 
related businesses resulting in loss of revenue from the downturn in tourism arrivals, both in 
the private sector and Government and the impact on those working directly or indirectly for 
the industry. The tsunami also fits the same context of a disaster (to that of the Katherine 
floods) from the tourism industry’s perspective in the Maldives, and included  all the essential 
ingredients of a disaster: 
 
• A triggering event (surge and waves that resulted in flooding) which was so significant that 
it challenged the existing structure, routine operations and survival of tourism businesses and 
the tourism association 
• The tsunami presented tourism businesses and the NTOs with a high threat situation, 
involving a short decision time and an element of surprise and urgency 
• There were perceptions of an inability to cope among those directly affected 
• The tsunami represented a turning point in the evolution of the destination  
Within the same context, the Maldives was a destination in post-disaster recovery and having 
passed through the stages identified by Faulkner and Vikulov (2001), and therefore it fits to 
the context of the framework and the DIRE grid. 
This DIRE grid provides a framework for the respondent’s recollection of the sequence of 
events during the disaster, and their reactions to these events (Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001). 
Interviews conducted with individual tourism operators, representatives of key agencies 
associated with destination marketing and emergency services personnel by Faulkner and 
Vikulov (2001) were designed to: (a) gain insights into how events associated with the 
disaster unfolded, from the individual respondent’s perspective; (b) develop a chronology of 
actions taken by individuals and their organizations in response to these events, and the 
reasons for these actions; (c) establish the extent to which the actions taken were pre-planned 
and/or a response to the actions of other parties; (d) engage individuals in a post-mortem of 
the event in order to identify how, with the benefit of hindsight, they may have coped more 
effectively with the situation; (e) through the post-mortem process, to identify how other 
parties might have reacted more effectively to the emergency (Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001). 
Thus, the DIRE grid was adapted to the needs and context of this research as described above. 
At the end of each interview the participants were asked to reflect on the lessons that they 
and/or their organization had learned in relation to recovery to emphasize the way the 
research was creating knowledge. The first round of interviews was planned practically to 
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make sure that complete and thorough foundation data were collected whereas later 
interviews were less structured, allowing greater flexibility in handling different stages of 
recovery.  
During fieldwork, I had to develop some extra questions for specific areas such as insurance 
companies. This gave me a lot of rich data and different perspectives. The semi-structured 
interviews allowed the participants to freely express their point of view as much as possible 
and answer honestly in an informal atmosphere. Being from the same culture, and knowing 
the social context, I tried to use an informal approach in my interviews, establishing a 
conversation whilst getting the best out of participant’s responses. 
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Table 11 : Disaster Incident Response Evaluation (DIRE) 
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5.6 Sample Selection 
The sampling for qualitative interviews was via purposive or judgmental sampling which is a 
form of non-probability sampling (Gray, 2007) where participants are purposely selected by 
the researcher. Lawrence (2007) explains the appropriateness of purposive sampling in three 
situations. Firstly, when the researcher uses it to select unique cases; and secondly, to select 
difficult to reach specialized population; and finally, when the researcher wants to identify 
particular types of cases for in-depth investigation (Lawrence, 2007). The major advantage of 
purposive sampling is “to ensure that we get at least some information from respondents who 
are hard to locate and crucial for study” (Gray, 2007, p.105). Another reason for selecting 
non-probability sampling is because it is “particularly well suited for exploratory studies, 
where the focus is on the generation of theory and research ideas” (Gray, 2007, p.104).  
Veal (2006, p. 284) defines a population as “the total category of subjects which is the focus 
of attention in a particular research project.” Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 27) state that 
“Qualitative researchers usually work with small samples of people, nested in their context 
and studied in-depth unlike qualitative researchers, who aim for larger number of context-
stripped cases and seek statistical significance.” I selected 15 government agencies (see 
Appendix D) and 23 private sector tourism industry operators (see Appendix J) from an initial 
list of 46, who  handled the tsunami recovery efforts in the Maldives and those who were 
directly and indirectly affected. The private sector sample covers four primary sectors of the 
Maldivian tourism industry (accommodation providers, activities, tourist services and 
transport). The list was further checked with the available publications on recovery efforts and 
feedback and references received from initial interviews. I minimized some organizations 
such as tour operators due to the difficulty of getting feedback from them for interviews. 
Further, I removed guest houses from the accommodation providers list because they did not 
receive any physical damage, being mainly in the capital city and they remained 
predominantly full due to bookings from resorts and government agencies. Most resorts 
impacted by the tsunami in 2004 were able to start operations within a year after minor or 
major renovations although a few resorts took two or more years to totally rebuild. For the 
purpose of this research, the damaged resorts were organized into three categories: 
resorts/hotels where slight damage occurred and which were restored (Appendix A); those 
which received some reconstruction (Appendix B); and, those which were totally 
reconstructed (Appendix C). The number of resorts selected for survey from each of the three 
categories were; four from the resorts/hotels which received slight damage, three from those 
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which undertook some reconstruction and three of those that were totally reconstructed. 
Snowball sampling was used in a few cases where interviewees referred me to other 
individuals or agencies. Some participants recommended that I interview particular 
individuals or organizations whom I had already selected for interview, thus proving the 
coverage of my original sample. A total of 38 interviews were conducted ranging from 30 
minutes to 1 hour (Table 12). 
Table 12: Selected Government and Private Sector Stakeholders for Interviews in 
Maldives 
Government Agencies No. of  participants 
Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation 2 
National Disaster Management Centre 2 
Ministry Planning, Environment and National Development 1 
Maldives Tourism Promotion Board 1 
Ministry of Health 1 
Immigration Department 1 
Airports Authority 1 
Department of Meteorology 1 
Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Marine Research 1 
Ministry of Defence  1 
Coast Guard , Search and Rescue 1 
Maldives Police Services 1 
Ministry of Education 1 
Private Sector (Maldivian Tourism Industry)   
Maldives Association of Tourism Industry (MATI) 1 
Accommodation Providers   
Tourist Resorts and Mariners (87) – 21 resorts damaged 10 
Safari Vessels (116) 2 
Activities    
Dive Centres and Schools ( resorts and  independent) 1 
Souvenir Shops ( resort and independent) 1 
Water Sports Centres ( resort and independent) 1 
Tourist Services   
Tour operators and Travel Agents ( local and foreign) 2 
Transport   
Air Transport Services ( seaplanes ) 2 
Sea Transports Services ( resort, travel agency, independent ) 1 
Insurance Companies 2 
Total 38 
5.7 Data Analysis 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10) the richness and holism of well collected 
qualitative data allows for ‘thick descriptions’ to be analyzed. Lewis, Thornhill, and Saunders 
(2007) outline four set of processes in qualitative analysis; categorization, unitizing data, 
recognizing relationships and developing and testing hypotheses to reach conclusions. Miles 
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and Huberman (1994, p. 10) discuss three stages: data reduction, data display and 
conclusions. This section summarizes the data analysis procedures followed in this study, in 
line with Miles and Huberman (1994) three stages.  
This research has utilized an interpretivist method to analyze the data. According to Miles and 
Huberman (1994) phenomenologists are cautious when condensing material from interview 
transcripts and emphasize gathering a deep understanding and interpretation of meaning of 
data. As Basit (2003, p. 143) states, “Throughout analysis, researchers attempt to gain a 
deeper understanding of what they have studied and to continually refine their 
interpretations.” Furthermore, the analysis and interpretation of qualitative data continues 
throughout the research and is not a separate self-contained phase (Basit, 2003). In this 
research the transcripts were carefully studied to make sure a deeper understanding was 
achieved by following Miles and Huberman (1994) three stages. 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10), data reduction is “the process of selecting, 
focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming the data that appear in written-up field 
notes or transcriptions.” This stage allows conclusions to be derived from the research 
findings, which will contribute to the existing literature in crisis management and address the 
research questions accordingly. It thus allows conclusions to be drawn and verified from this 
case study. According to Basit (2003, p. 144), coding or categorizing the data has a significant 
role in analysis and “codes or categories are tags or labels for allocating units of meaning to 
the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study.” Before beginning the 
analysis, the collected data from the interview transcripts and the documentary sources were 
read and re-read several times to understand their content. Whilst it was initially coded and 
reviewed, notes were made of the first impressions of the data. In this research, the data was 
then displayed “in an organized, compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion 
drawing and action” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 11).  
Yin (1994) proposes that where you have made use of existing knowledge and theory to 
formulate your research questions and objectives, you should also use the theoretical 
propositions which helped you to do this as a means to devise a framework to help you to 
organize and direct data analysis. Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 18) state that “a conceptual 
framework explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied - 
the key factors, constructs or variables - and the presumed relationships among them.” The 
proposed conceptual framework in Chapter 3 was derived from constructs used in the existing 
theory and study of them. Using Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) the six stages identified  in 
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their TDMF, and the interview schedule as the data collection tool, the data was labeled and 
organized within each of the following six categories: pre-event, prodromal, emergency, 
intermediate, long-term recovery and resolution. This was the provisional ‘start list’ of codes 
prior to fieldwork as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Veal (2006, p. 211) outlines a range of manual methods of analysis, including that of 
mechanics where the analysis is completed by hand on hard copy transcripts. This was found 
to be the best method to use in this research. The emerging themes and the categories 
established from the analysis of the transcripts were easily grouped and addressed under the 
six crisis management stages. 
The interviews were conducted in English, except for one in Dhivehi (the Maldivian local 
language). Interviews were digitally recorded with the consent of the participants. After the 
completion of field-work the interviews were transcribed verbatim, coded and analyzed 
manually. According to Salanda (2009) in focused coding, most significant initial codes are 
developed into salient categories. In this research, focused coding was carried out after the 
initial coding. Transcripts were checked to eliminate less useful categories and smaller 
categories were combined to form larger themes that connected the different codes. These 
codes have been used throughout the results Chapters, 6 and 7, and in the discussion chapter. 
Participants were identified using alphabetic codes (Government Sector TBEO-A through to 
O, Private Sector: PS-A through to M and Private Sector: PS-R1 to R10) to maintain 
confidentiality, whilst each script was coded using numbers to identify the key themes. 
5.8 Ethical Considerations 
For the most part, issues of ethics focus on establishing safeguards that will protect the rights 
of participants and include informed consent, protecting participants from harm, and ensuring 
confidentiality. As a qualitative researcher, there is a need for the researcher to remain 
attentive throughout the study to the researcher-participant relationship, which is determined 
by roles, status, and cultural norms (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008). This research was conducted 
in accordance with ethical principles of research in social sciences.  
An application to Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee for ethical approval of a 
project involving human participants was completed on 30th November 2010 and submitted 
and approved before field research commenced in 2011 (Appendix E). Questions and 
concerns raised by the committee regarding the research were answered and the approval was 
given on 10th January 2011. Questionnaires for tourism businesses, and tourism organizations, 
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and emergency organizations, were approved, as were the consent form, research information 
sheet, telephone script (Appendix F) and invitation letter (Appendix G) to prospective 
participants. The invitation letter and research information sheet (Appendix H) was sent by 
email to the selected participants, explaining to them the main purpose of research, and their 
rights before the face-to-face interviews were carried out. The interviews were held during the 
two field trips to the Maldives, first trip from 2ndApril 2011 to 6th June 2011 (n=26 
interviews) and the second trip from 24th Jan 2011 to 15th Feb 2011(n=12 interviews). 
5.9 Limitations  
Initially, I proposed a multiple case study involving two SIDS, i.e., Maldives and Samoa, both 
countries affected by recent tsunami disasters. The Maldives was afflicted with the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of December 2004 and Samoa by the Pacific Ocean tsunami of October 2009. 
As anticipated, due to unfamiliarity and lack of connections, difficulties were encountered in 
contacting and gaining the support of key stakeholders from Samoa. Therefore, it was decided 
to focus on a single case study of the Maldives.  
Due to issues of confidentiality, centralized decision making and lack of co-operation, I was 
able to complete interviews in only three tourist resort businesses (out of 10) during the first 
field trip. However, I was able to conduct all of the interviews in Male, with the government 
sector participants. Resort business owners were t contacted and during the second field trip I 
was able to complete 12 further interviews with tourism businesses with the approval of travel 
to the resorts. Due to the change in the government in 2008, nearly all the political appointees 
who handled the tsunami disaster at the strategic level were removed from the government. 
Therefore, I noticed that some in senior positions were not really aware of the work that had 
been done in their organizations following the tsunami. 
Three participants from both the private sector and the government sector did not want their 
interviews to be recorded. They were more comfortable to discuss the issues. Due to audio 
files leaked to the media due to political issues and newly found freedom of speech and free 
private media, some people unfamiliar with research, feel uncomfortable with recorded 
interviews. As anticipated a low response rate from the tourism businesses  initially posed a 
serious limitation to  the data collection.  
Political instability and chaos in the Maldives effected the dates for the fieldwork. Initially I 
had to delay the first field trip by 6 months due to the earthquakes and the continuing 
aftershocks in Christchurch and due to the first local council elections in the Maldives from 
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Feb-March 2011, which meant that the political and social climate was inappropriate for field 
research. Ongoing street demonstrations for a month during my field trip further aggravated 
problems. During my second fieldtrip, the first democratic government was ousted by a police 
and military coup following a series of mass protests and street demonstrations. This was a 
huge impediment to the field trips and focus. 
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research methods used in this research. It opened with a 
discussion of the research’s design, outlining that the research is aligned to managerial 
research which focuses on specific management problems. The managerial research approach 
used here was informed by the social constructionist epistemological perspective and was 
carried out in three phases: pre field-work, field-work and post field-work. The first phase 
refers to the literature review of disaster studies in tourism research which was done to build 
the conceptual framework for tourism disaster management based on the constructs and 
dimensions derived from the theory, using documentary methods. The second phase (1st and 
2nd field work visits and analysis stage), tested the framework by applying it to the Maldives 
context. During phase 3 (post field work/conclusion stage), the model was further refined 
based on findings and research outcomes.  
 
Information and data were gathered using iterative processes involving, secondary 
(documentary), case study and the main method for data collection in this research was 
through in-depth qualitative interviews. The sampling for qualitative interviews was selected 
using purposive or judgmental sampling which is a form of non-probability sampling. The 
methods used for the analysis of the data followed three stages proposed by Miles and 
Huberman (1994): data reduction, data display and conclusions. Finally, the analysis of data 
and use of manual methods of data analysis was addressed before concluding with ethical 
issues and limitations. The following two chapters  present the results extracted from 
interviews of government agencies and private sector tourism industry respectively. 
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Chapter 6  
RESULTS FROM GOVERNMENT TOURISM AND EMERGENCY 
ORGANIZATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results from interviews of 15 government representatives 
interviewed for the thesis along with evidence from documentary sources collected for the 
research. The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth. As explained in Chapter 5, the 
DIRE grid developed by Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) was the basis for the interview 
structure and topics. This grid provides a framework for the respondent’s recollection of the 
sequence of events during the disaster, and their reactions to these events (Faulkner & 
Vikulov, 2001). These questions were then linked to the conceptual framework for tourism 
crisis and disaster management which was developed using a documentary method based on 
the constructs and dimensions derived from the theory.  
The coded interview results are presented in order of the Grid’s main components; pre-event 
and prodromal, emergency and intermediate, and long-term recovery and resolution, each in 
separate sections. These components or stages are explained below and subsequently the 
results are presented.  
Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) explain the life cycle stages as: (1) pre-event; a stage when 
action can be taken to prevent or mitigate the effects of potential disasters, (2) prodromal; a 
stage when it is apparent that the disaster is impending, (3) emergency; a stage when the 
effect of the disaster is felt and action is necessary to protect people and property, (4) 
intermediate; a point when the short-term needs of people have been addressed and the main 
focus of activity is to restore services and the community to normal, (5) long-term recovery; 
continuation of the previous phase but a stage when the items that could not  be focused 
quickly are attended as self-analysis or post-mortem, and finally, (6) resolution stage; a stage 
when routine is restored or an improved stage is established (Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001). 
Drabek and Gee (2000) explain that disaster recovery can be divided into two phases: short-
term (restoration) and long-term (reconstruction). Short-term recovery is the restoration of 
vital life support services and facilities to minimum standards of operation and safety. During 
short-term recovery, severely damaged buildings are either replaced or removed, water and 
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sewer repairs are made, and electricity and telephone services returned to normal. Short-term 
recovery efforts are usually done by each individual component of the tourism industry. The 
long-term disaster recovery process may continue for a number of years after a disaster. The 
purpose or goal of long-term disaster recovery is to return life to pre-disaster or improved 
levels (Drabek & Gee, 2000). Similarly, Drabek and Gee (2000) suggest that long-term 
recovery may include the complete redevelopment of damaged areas. Long-term recovery 
provides unique opportunities for adoption and implementation of important disaster 
mitigation activities, including structural measures. The long-term recovery of a tourism 
destination after a disaster involves both the physical reconstruction of infrastructure and 
more importantly, the rebuilding of the tourism destination’s image (Drabek & Gee, 2000).  
6.2 Tourism Organizations and Emergency Organizations 
The participating government organizations changed over the course of the interviews (during 
my two field visits); from my initial list as the participants directed me to relevant personnel 
and I interviewed more than one participant from some agencies. In summary, I interviewed 
15 representatives from 12 organizations. NTOs include Ministry of Tourism and Civil 
Aviation and Maldives Tourism Promotion Board (MTPB). Appendix D provides details of 
participants from Emergency Organizations (EOs), National Tourism Organizations (NTOs) 
and other relevant government agencies consulted for the research. 
6.3 Pre-event and Prodromal Stage 
6.3.1 Potential for Disasters and Probability of Occuring 
The first stage of the DIRE Grid includes questions about the pre-event context to establish 
work that had been done to prevent or mitigate the effects of potential disasters. Four 
questions that considered whether a proactive approach had been taken by their organizations 
prior to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 were asked. The likelihood and likely impact of a 
tsunami was considered, whilst the development of disaster contingency plans, issue analysis 
and strategic management strategies are reviewed. The questioned asked were: 
 Before the tsunami, had your organization considered what crisis management strategies 
would be required in the event of such a disaster?  
 Could you elaborate on any disaster planning your organization had in place to deal with 
the tsunami? 
 Had your organization conducted any environmental scanning, scenario planning or risk 
analysis assessments in case of a crisis?  
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 Did you then develop any strategic plans from your scanning and risk analysis?  
All participants from Emergency Organizations (EO) and the National Tourism Organizations 
(NTOs) reported that they were not prepared for a tsunami and had not considered the 
probability of one. This was due to there being only a moderate disaster risk scenario in the 
Maldives, occasionally prone to storms, prolonged dry periods, and heavy rains and strong 
winds caused by cyclones in the Southern Indian Ocean. Given that the Maldives is a nation 
of islands and the highest elevation is no more than two meters above sea-level, the country is 
prone to risks of climate change and sea-level rise associated with the characteristics. 
However, all the participants specified that the tsunami demonstrated the vulnerability of the 
nation.  
All respondents from EOs and NTOs indicated that there were no institutional structures for 
disaster management in the Maldives prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. Prior to the 
tsunami a Committee to co-ordinate Natural Disasters existed, however it was merged with 
the National Commission for Protection of the Environment (NCPE) and in the event of a 
natural disaster the Ministry of Home Affairs has taken a lead role. Therefore, there were no 
systems for early warning established at any level. In particular, there were no trained 
personnel to handle a crisis or a disaster of this scale and magnitude. 
Following the tsunami, the Government organized a Ministerial Committee and Task Force to 
facilitate response and coordination. A National Disaster Management Center (NDMC) was 
established. The Defense Ministry, Finance Ministry and Ministry of Planning and 
Development led the emergency response and relief efforts in collaboration with other 
Departments, UN agencies and other development partners. The NDMC has been the focal 
point for all response, relief and recovery activities since then. 
According to respondent (TBEO-C): “Prior to the tsunami, trainings and scenarios were 
done for disasters at a smaller scale such as a plane crash in the main airport or an oil spill, 
but not for a disaster of this scale. Therefore, there were no focal points for information or no 
emergency operation centers.” Respondent (TBEO-H) stated: 
“We don’t have a separate emergency plan; however we have an airport emergency plan and 
an airport emergency committee which will be activated following any airport emergency.” 
All respondents said that there were no documented crisis/disaster management plans 
covering the risks/hazards to the country prior to the tsunami. Due to the lack of preparedness 
for such an eventuality, participants from government agencies highlighted the following 
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issues: 
“The systems and facilities for communications between the islands which functioned well 
prior to tsunami were vulnerable and in the most affected islands they were shut down 
temporarily while there were no backup systems in place. At the same time there were no 
evacuation or response plans at any level” (TBEO-D). 
“The country was not at all ready for such an event; there were no emergency shelters, 
emergency equipment, and emergency water supplies. Transportation between the islands 
was so difficult and slow using the dhonis during the rescue operations” (TBEO-C). 
 “The public had no idea of what a tsunami was, the school curriculum didn’t have anything 
other than basic things about a disaster and therefore no awareness was there at all. There 
were also very few people who were trained to handle this sort of thing and there were many 
people who didn’t know how to swim” (TBEO-O). 
“We didn’t have any plans. Most of the buildings were single storey buildings. For example 
two hospitals totally collapsed only from Meemu Atoll. We moved our staff to another island 
to start the health care. Without a plan we were in shock, we didn’t know what to do, whom to 
communicate, whom to co-ordinate. So the whole day we couldn’t do anything. In the evening 
the government established the crisis center” (TBEO-G). 
However, after the tsunami, all of these organizations have developed specific sector crisis/ 
disaster management plans. Five organizations out of the twelve provided these documents to 
the researcher (Table 13). Some of these documents were drafts and Standard Operating 
Procedures developed by them after the Indian Ocean Tsunami and other recent health scares. 
A closer look at these documents has revealed that they have not been updated and have been 
drafts since they were developed. 
Table 13: Disaster Management Plans Developed by Government agencies 
Document Agency Date 
 
Disaster Management Plan Tourism Sector 
(Draft) 
Ministry of Tourism August 2005 
Strategic Plan for Maldives National 
Emergency Medical Services 2008-
2013(Draft) 
Ministry of Health 1st Dec 2007 
Tsunami Response Standard Operational 
Procedures for Health Sector in the Maldives 
Ministry of Health Not known 
National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness 
Plan 
Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
Fisheries, Agriculture and Marine 
Resources 
Dec 2005 
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National Plan for Disaster Management   
(Draft) 
National Security Service Not known 
Guide for “School Emergency Operations 
Plan, Maldives” (First Edition) 
Ministry of Education 2009 
Standard Operational Procedures on Flu 
Pandemics 
Ministry of Education Not known 
Standard Operational Procedures for Early 
Warning 
Ministry of Education 2009 
 
 
6.3.2 Pro-Active Planning Measures 
The second stage of the DIRE Grid includes assessing any proactive or direct measures taken 
to prevent or mitigate effects of potential disasters by the authorities. Four questions that 
ascertained whether any proactive approaches were followed in their organizations prior to 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 were asked of the 15 interviewees. The questions asked 
were: 
 Before the tsunami hitting the country, had your organization received any warning?  
 What did you do to prepare for the event?  
 Do you have a documented crisis/risk management plan which covers major 
risks/hazards? 
 Were you acting in response to the advice or actions of other departments or agencies?   
The participants indicated that none of them had a procedure for crisis/disaster management 
or a documented crisis/risk management plan in place prior to the tsunami. They also 
indicated that none of them had been warned of the incident from any authorities, therefore 
strategies could not be implemented to deal with the onset until the emergency phase. 
Participants became aware of the tsunami only when the waves hit the islands and from news 
reports from the media. As results indicated, in the absence of early warnings, no procedures 
were followed until the emergency phase. Reactive measures were taken by the institutions 
which included preliminary assessment of casualties, rescuing and evacuations, emergency 
accommodation and food supplies, crisis communication strategies and assessment of overall 
damage sustained. NTOs were mainly concerned with tourist and staff causalities, information 
dissemination, preparing short term crisis management plans based on stakeholder 
consultations. One participant added: 
“We didn’t know it was a tsunami. The waves came instantly and the whole airport was 
flooded. We then closed the airport and then when things got settled we did the cleaning 
process. The people then needed to leave” (TBEO-H). 
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Once again these findings are similar to previous research conducted on crisis and disaster 
management focused on tourism recovery (Armstrong & Ritchie, 2008; Faulkner & Vikulov, 
2001; Miller & Ritchie, 2003). These reactive crisis/disaster management strategies are 
thought to be connected with large scale natural disasters or crises which are usually beyond 
the capabilities of the usual contingency plans in organizations. The absence of contingency 
plans and proactive strategies makes it difficult to evaluate how effectively institutions have 
implemented them. However, the size and scale of the Asian Tsunami of 2004 was 
unpredictable and beyond any emergency measures or even contingency plans in any of the 
countries affected, including the case study country. 
6.3.3 Environmental Scanning, Risk Analysis and Disaster Contingency Plans 
A number of researchers in the area of crisis and disaster management (Faulkner & Vikulov, 
2001; Henderson, 2007; Ritchie, 2009) emphasize the significance of crisis contingency plans 
for crisis management preparedness. However, none of the participants interviewed had 
developed a crisis/disaster management plan prior to the event. Results from the case study 
indicated that these institutions have developed specific crisis/disaster management plans 
within the period 2005-2009, mostly as a reactive measure. Plans that were implemented 
addressed the issues on an ad hoc and reactive basis rather than proactive basis. Similarly, the 
participants were asked about any recent external environmental analysis that includes SWOT 
analysis or monitoring of any potential risks and impacts. From the responses received it was 
evident that few measures have been taken in spite of the draft plans that have been prepared 
as a reactive measure to the isolated tsunami event.  
It is evident from the research that in the absence of effective sector disaster management 
plans (tourism, heath, education, agriculture, defense, airport, etc.) the organizations under the 
specific sectors had no procedures or management plans to implement. For example, in the 
absence of an effective tourism sector disaster management plan, tourism businesses 
including resorts, safari boats, guest houses and picnic islands, had not prepared effective 
emergency procedures for disasters. Another issue identified in the research was the absence 
of risk assessments done for any specific sector interests. For example, even the first disaster 
risk profile of the Maldives was first done only after the Asian tsunami. One participant 
added: 
“Before the tsunami we were prepared for heavy rains, strong winds and tidal waves. Now we 
are prepared for other hazards. We are continuously working with a lot of parties to improve 
our response to a tsunami hazard” (TBEO-J). 
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“In the weather we give early warning for bad weather; strong winds and thunder storms and 
incase of earthquakes; earthquake warning and tsunami warning. Also for the marine 
hazards; tidal wave and swell wave warnings” (TBEO-J). 
6.3.4 Warning Systems in Place 
As discussed in the previous section, no early or prior warnings were provided to any NTOs 
and there were no early warning systems developed prior to the Asian tsunami. All 
participants from EOs highlighted that during the post-tsunami stage, equipment for an Early 
Warning System was procured and installed in the Department of Meteorology and staff were 
trained in the use of the new equipment. A national Early Warning System (EWS) was 
developed and the plan had color codes for the four stages and a warning dissemination 
protocol was developed. Research findings showed that there were many challenges for 
developing warning systems. One reason was due to the lack of trained human resources and 
local capacity in the destination due to being a small country. The second reason was that an 
EWS had to be implemented through partnership with all the ministries and information 
dissemination to the islands had to be addressed. According to participant (TBEO-J): 
“Similar to other countries in the region, we also didn’t know about the tsunami and we 
didn’t give any warnings to the public. When tsunami washed ashore we gave news bulletin 
on television. It was too late and people hadn’t received any warnings and so no precautions 
were taken.” 
6.4 Emergency and Intermediate-Phase 
6.4.1 Crisis Response and Communication Strategies Implemented 
The third stage of the DIRE Grid includes the authorities’ direct response when the disaster 
hit and the emergency procedures that were implemented. This includes the rescue and 
evacuations undertaken, emergency accommodation and food supplies, crisis communication 
strategies followed and co-ordination with other authorities. The questions asked were: 
 What was the main impact of the tsunami at this stage? Who was at risk and what property 
damage had occurred? 
 What actions were taken by you and your organization? 
 What action was taken by other organizations and relevant agencies and how did they 
affect your actions? 
The Ministry of Tourism (MOT) and Maldives Tourism Promotion Board (MTPB) were the 
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two main National Tourism Organizations during the time of the Asian Tsunami of 2004. 
Soon after the tsunami struck the islands, the employees of the MOT and MTPB gathered at 
the MOT and set up a unit consisting of staff of MOT and MTPB to monitor the situation in 
the resorts. According to participant (TBEO-C): 
“We were having close co-ordination with the ministerial committee but we did not go and sit 
there. We operated from the ministry, because the Minister also decided that it would be best 
interest for us to work in the ministry since all the data were here. We had to communicate 
with the resorts with whatever the resources and means available and also we have to find out 
other kinds of details like the telephone numbers, and the names of resorts, the names of 
foreign counter parts, occupancy of the resorts.” 
All participants from the tourism organizations indicated that the main objective at the 
emergency stage was to conduct a preliminary assessment of tourist and staff casualties and 
overall damage sustained by the resorts. As there was a near total communication breakdown, 
MOT gave very high priority to disseminating information as to the status of tourists, staff, 
and the resort. This was done in an attempt to reduce the confusion and stabilize the situation. 
The information about what had happened, together with required actions from the 
stakeholders, were updated on the www.visitmaldives.com website and circulated by fax and 
e-mail. A circular was also sent to safari operators, requesting them to report damage and 
details of any casualties.  
Following the circular, MOT started a series of consultations with the industry to learn how to 
best address the crisis situation. Another important step taken by MOT at this stage was 
liaison with diplomatic representatives. A letter explaining the situation of the tourism 
industry of the Maldives was sent to embassies, high commissions and consulates of all the 
concerned governments of the main tourism source markets (mainly Italy, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Japan, France, Switzerland and China) as many of them had issued travel bans and 
travel advisories. Similarly, the letter was also sent to the travel industry. Some of these letters 
were followed up with a telephone call by senior officials from the respective government 
authorities. As a result of such co-ordination from 29th December 2004, travel bans were 
slowly relaxed by the respective foreign offices of major markets.  
6.4.2  Crisis Control Mechanisms Implemented 
According to all the respondents from the tourism organizations, the second main task they 
undertook during the crisis was providing assistance in evacuations. They gathered and 
   
 109 
disseminated data on the status of customers, employees and other structural damage to the 
resorts’ buildings and premises. The information was gathered and disseminated through the 
internet, TV, radio, telephone, fax, e-mail and through communication systems in boats and 
island offices in nearby inhabited islands. The preliminary assessment was completed in 18 
hours with delay due primarily to communication breakdown, including the mobile phone 
network. 
With regard to providing assistance in evacuations, the MOT and the MTPB task force played 
a central role in facilitating evacuations, search and rescue and rescue in association with the 
NDMC and Coast Guard Division of the Ministry of Defense and National Security. A special 
help desk for MOT was established to assist tourists who were distressed at Male’ 
International Airport on 28th December 2004. This desk offered free telephone calls to 
relatives. In addition, the use of the cyber cafés was also arranged free of charge. The task 
force played a crucial role in providing customer service and relief to the tourists at the Male’ 
International Airport. The task force was also involved in other aspects, such as body 
repatriations and liaising with tour operators, travel agents and hospitals. Similarly, the 
Department of Immigration and Emigration coordinated the airport response along with the 
other stakeholder during the emergency. 
“Many tourists wanted to go back immediately, but their passports were lost or damaged. We 
issued travel documents to them based on identification data after verifying with their 
respective tourist establishment” (TBEO-H). 
“Tourist establishments sent lists of tourists in advance with their departure dates to prepare 
their travel documents. Our setup at the airport assisted the tourists and coordinated with 
embassies and consular agencies” (TBEO-H). 
All respondents from tourism organizations indicated that the main constraints for the 
immediate response were damage to the telecommunication network, inadequate ‘facilities’ 
for evacuation and message distortion. One participant added: 
“In 2004 we were lucky that we restored the telecommunications network to the fullest 
capability within 2-3 weeks. We restored the initial network in less than 10 days even while 
half of the country’s network was affected. The reason for such early restoration was that we 
didn’t have a major effect to the capital in terms of the telecommunications infrastructure, but 
in the remote islands it was damaged” (TBEO-N). 
Similarly, respondents from tourism organizations highlighted the major strengths as 
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solidarity and support from the industry, together with the teamwork of public and private 
sector stakeholders, particularly the Maldives Association of Tourism Industries (MATI). 
“We co-ordinate with them (MATI) very closely in situations like this and whenever we need 
regulations to be implemented in the tourism industry we always come up with our draft plans 
and regulations and we talk to them” (TBEO-C). 
6.4.3 Short-Term Challenges to the Organization and Restoration 
The intermediate stage is the fourth component of DIRE grid. This stage includes the recovery 
phase and short-term restoration activities. The purpose was to clarify the challenges faced, 
which were both internal and external to the agencies interviewed, including stakeholder 
collaboration. The questions asked were: 
 What were the main challenges in restoring operations to normal conditions? 
 What action did you and your organization take to restore normal services? 
 How did the action of other firms and relevant agencies assist or hinder the return to 
normality? 
Once the crisis stabilized, at least to an extent (having accounted for the tourist and staff 
numbers and their status), the focus of the activities was placed on recovery. This period 
usually takes up to 1 or 3 months. According to all of the participants from tourism 
organizations the most concerning issue with regard to the recovery, particularly in terms of 
tourist arrivals, was the issuing of travel bans or restrictive travel advisories by the main 
source markets to the Maldives. For this reason, special consideration was given to measures 
to ease adverse travel advisories. However, in the light of the way the region was portrayed in 
the media, coupled with the ‘devastated Maldives’ image create by the other authorities 
themselves, this was a very difficult issue for MOT to handle. 
“Next step was to promote the destination. We brought journalists, news channels and all the 
important magazines from traditional markets to the Maldives to show our products and to 
give the message that that Maldives is safe. However, until April 2005, we didn’t see any 
growth in the markets and bookings started to come only after that” (TBEO-F). 
Respondents from tourism organizations indicated that the crisis unit consisting of MOT and 
MTPB gave a number of interviews to foreign and local media, explaining the situation in the 
tourism sector of the Maldives during the first week after the tsunami. They included 
Aljazeera, the Asian Wall Street Journal, Ashahi Shimbun and Czech TV. In addition, 
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together with the MTPB office in Frankfurt, the MTPB’s PR agent in Germany also gave a 
number of interviews in German to the German media. Respondents from tourism 
organizations provided copies of press releases and recovery marketing campaigns during the 
recovery phase.  
Table 14 shows the list of documents provided by participants from MOT and MTPB to the 
researcher. They were used to cross check and analyze the responses given by the participants 
on their actions during response and recovery phases of the disaster.  
Table 14 :  List of Press Releases and Recovery Marketing Campaigns from MTPB and 
MOT 
Document Agency Date 
Press release Ministry of Tourism 27th  Dec  2004 
Press release Ministry of Tourism 29th  Dec  2004 
Press release 
Maldives Tourism Promotion 
Board 
05th  Jan   2005 
Press release 
Maldives Tourism Promotion 
Board 
09th  Jan   2005 
Action Plan of Post-tsunami Marketing Campaign Ministry of Tourism 09th  Jan   2005 
Minister’s Statement Ministry of Tourism 11th  Jan   2004 
Post Tsunami Recovery Marketing Campaign – A 
Summary Proposal 
Maldives Tourism Promotion 
Board 
25th  Jan   2005 
 
Participants from tourism organizations highlighted that following the ‘government to 
government’ telephone calls and the visits of officials from various governments (within the 
first two weeks) to the Maldives; their observance of the ‘system’ that was in place at the 
MOT to manage the tsunami-disaster; their observance of the national infrastructures and the 
tourism facilities and services that were intact; and the fact that Internally Displaced 
Population (IDPs) had been accounted for and have ascertained their safety and security, 
eventually led to a growing level of confidence and foreign offices to ease travel bans.  
Respondents from both MOT and MTPB said that their officials visited the damaged resorts 
to complete preliminary assessments. They estimated the initial cost of reconstruction at 
US$100 million, and the business loss to total at least US$250 million. At this stage, thirty 
percent of the bed capacity was out of operation. Once the assessments were completed and 
travel advisories were lifted, the focus was placed on the marketing campaign. Participants 
from tourism organizations indicated that a series of meetings were held between industry 
stakeholders and a team of volunteers between 1st Jan 2005 to 17th January 2005, who were 
assigned the task of the compiling a post-tsunami marketing campaign which was later 
approved by the Tourism Promotion Advisory Council (TPAC). The main objective of the 
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campaign was to reduce cancellation rates (Figure 9) and encourage new bookings. The 
campaign included a series of steps and activities (MOT, 2005): 
 An official letter, indicating that the Maldives tourism industry is functioning, to be 
sent to all concerned. 
 FAM trips for media from all major markets: who could air/publish reports 
immediately or as soon as possible: 
- TV – national and international 
- National newspapers, magazines. 
- Tour operators’ inspection teams 
- Foreign Governments /International organizations’ inspection teams. 
 Coverage of the ‘status’ of the tourism industry on local media, particularly on 
television and radio. 
 Interviewing arriving and departing guests  
 Monitoring and writing on internet discussion forums 
 Resort ‘operating status’ to be uploaded by the resort, and link to be provided by the 
MTPB site 
 Make a ‘short’ documentary of ‘post-tsunami tourism industry’ to be distributed to 
concerned parties 
 FAM trips for the industry (Tour operators/travel agents from major markets) 
 Road shows (promotional workshops) in major markets 
 Advertising on international television and other media 
 Visits of high level delegations to meet operators and concerned government 
authorities of major markets 
 Banner at the airport thanking the tourists for coming  
 E-Newsletter to be distributed every second month by MTPB 
 Affiliate ‘destination promotion’ with major tour operators and airlines 
 Service providers to include a ‘value added’ dimension to their product, at their own 
discretion 
 To continue using “Maldives: The Sunny Side of Life” as the promotional slogan, 
instead of using a new slogan. 
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Figure 9: Tsunami Effect on Tourist Arrival/Departure Numbers (Source: Ministry of 
Tourism, Statistics Section 2005) 
 
The key activities of the promotional campaign were implemented parallel to the main 
activities of the MTPB’s 2005 Marketing Plan and required additional budgets and financial 
resources. The campaign budget was initially US$ 1,445,000.00 (MTPB, 2005). 
“The budget for the year was Mrf 40 million. Ministry of Finance organized another Mrf 40 
million and we started using the funds in 2005. In fact, it went up to Mrf 90 million. We used 
this budget during 2005 to 2007. The main focus was to create confidence in markets and 
show media that Maldives was safe to visit and we tried not to talk about tsunami. We did 
road shows in all the major markets in all major cities and communicated with the tour 
operators and also we participated in all major travel exhibitions” (TBEO-F). 
The main activities of the marketing campaign (MTPB, 2005) are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15: Key Activities and Details Provided in the 2005 Recovery Marketing Campaign 
by MTPB 
Key activity Details 
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TV advertising 
 
Run destination advertisements on international 
and national television to stimulate demand 
(CNN, BBC and some national channels of the 
major source markets). To start in late January 
2005. 
 
 
Newspaper, internet magazine and 
billboard advertising   
 
Run destination advertisements in major 
newspapers of source markets: Italy, United 
Kingdom, Germany, Japan, France and 
Switzerland. Specialty ‘lifestyle’ and ‘tourism 
related’ magazines. Popular travel websites. 
Key location ‘billboard’ style advertising in 
major markets. Some of these advertising to be 
done as affiliate advertising with other industry 
stakeholders: tour operators and airlines. 
 
 
Worldwide media coverage 
 
Bring media groups from major markets, and 
prominent ‘media channels’ to produce and 
air/publish reports about the Maldives (in 
relation to the tsunami) with a strong focus on 
the tourism industry. This has been continuing 
and is planned to be continued until the 
‘consumers’ of the world is fully aware that the 
tourism industry of the Maldives is functioning 
well. This program is/will be conducted with 
direct logistical support from the tour operators, 
airlines, resort operators, and local transport 
providers. As the media groups that were here 
in the first few weeks following the tsunami 
focused on the ‘affect’, the future groups would 
focus on the reconstruction, and recovery, 
particularly of the tourism industry.  
 
 
Travel industry familiarization trips 
 
Arrange ‘group familiarization trips’ for agents 
of major tour operators in major markets to be 
conducted in partnership with major operators, 
airlines, and resorts. 
 
 
Producing a documentary video of 
the Maldives with a tourism focus 
To give a visual representation of the post-
tsunami Maldives, at workshops, press 
conferences, and other relevant occasions to be 
distributed to the industry. 
 
   
 115 
 
Road shows at main markets across 
Europe and Asia 
 
Road shows, workshops to be conducted in 
major markets in Europe and Asia. This is to be 
initiated in mid-April, and program details to be 
planned based on the ‘market response’ of the 
coming weeks.  
 
 
Visit of high level-delegation 
 
A delegation compromising of key government 
and industry people to visit major markets in a 
‘public relation enhancement program’. The 
delegation is also to hold press conferences. 
Source: MTPB (2005) 
Respondents from MOT noted a range of measures were taken as an immediate relief to the 
industry. In order to ease the financial burden to the resorts it was decided to defer the lease 
rents of the first quarter to be paid in the next three quarters, waiving of lease rent payments 
during the time the beds are not in operation, for the repairs/reconstruction and import duty 
exemption for the construction materials brought in for repairs/reconstruction. 
“When we received the details of the damage, it showed a huge loss for the industry. So what 
the government did for them was to give them some financial concessions. Government 
deferred the rent of the first quarter to be paid in next three quarters; those resorts which 
were hit and who became unoperational, the government deferred their rent payment for one 
year. Of course there will be no bed tax because there were no guests as the resorts weren’t 
used” (TBEO-C). 
Respondents from MOT and MTPB noted that post tsunami destination recovery activities 
were successful due to the support and contribution of all the private sector tourism industry 
stakeholders. This reflected positively in improved visitor arrivals.  
6.4.4 Challenges Faced by Emergency Organizations 
At the national level, the picture was more serious with the largest disaster ever faced by the 
Maldives. One participant from the emergency organizations explained the challenges in the 
following manner: 
“The biggest challenge was, we never expected such a disaster to face Maldives, and there 
was no evacuation plan, no emergency SOP’s, no guidelines, no shelters, there was nothing 
has been formed during that time. So each and every decision that had been taken by the 
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government was a challenge” (TBEO-D). 
Another participant identified it as total chaos: 
“It was chaos that day, there was no actual plan or mechanism to help or to provide any of 
the emergency medical assistance. There were sufficient volunteers already to help but since 
there was no mechanism or procedure to help everybody was just running here and there” 
(TBEO-C). 
A call center was established in a school in the capital city Male’. Several people came with 
relief items to volunteer. People from the most affected atolls were brought to the capital as 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) until their homes could be repaired. Communities in the 
affected islands were mainly involved in the search and rescue efforts along with members of 
the armed forces who were dispatched soon after the tsunami to provide immediate relief. 
Twenty six people were missing and 82 bodies were found. Participants from emergency 
organizations identified numerous management issues at the time of response. Due to the lack 
of coordinated assessment at the emergency stage it was not clear what relief assistance was 
required by whom. As one participant stated: 
“First of all, the dispatch of the emergency funds which actually came with guidelines saying 
that this much of money will be given to these families. But just when few islands were 
finished, the teams were facing such difficulty because the island offices and the island 
community itself couldn’t actually identify or say that this is not a family who was not affected 
by tsunami and how they could identify, there was no identification procedure, how they 
would differ from flooded, so what they have taken was if the house has been affected with 
salt water they would get this much and if anything has been lost or the wall or a room has 
been damaged this much or if the house has been totally destroyed this much” (TBEO-D). 
Similarly, participants indicated that island task forces that were created had no terms of 
reference and there was no particular responsible authority for psycho-social support. When it 
came to the dispatch of relief items there were not enough vessels that could hold heavy loads 
of food, supplies and essential equipment. Liaison with aircraft operators was poor and all 
these management issues led to a slow response to the affected communities during the 
emergency phase.  
6.4.5 Challenges Faced in Managing Foreign Aid 
According to the participants from emergency organizations, during the first few weeks of the 
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tsunami, many international donor agencies arrived in the Maldives. The country was not 
ready to manage such a large numbers of international aid agencies in the absence of 
procedures for dealing with such. Likewise, the participants from emergency organizations 
noted that very little co-ordination took place, due to confusion between the line ministries, 
the donors and the ministerial committee formed to handle the tsunami disaster (National 
Disaster Management Committee). This led to some major inconsistencies and conflicts in the 
information collected by the government and aid agencies leading to big mismatches in terms 
of demand and supply in some areas.  
“We received a lot of aid. But those were not used. For example, we received 14 tons of 
plaster of Paris from one government. But we didn’t need it. Most were already expired. We 
received a lot of medicines. Our practitioners didn’t know how to use them. Some were in 
their own languages. We were unable to manage those aids. We had no plan to even 
distribute these things” (TBEO-G). 
The respondents from emergency organizations highlighted that there was no proper co-
ordination between the international and individual donor agencies when they made these 
initial damage assessments leading to repetition in the surveys and unfulfilled promises which 
the community carries until today as grievances. Similarly, costs of transportation increased 
sharply with the demands for relief goods, materials and all of the personnel. In the absence of 
a mechanism and a framework for all stakeholders to work together, government authorities 
worked separately from the international aid agencies who worked through local Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  
According to Shabau (2007) Maldivian farmers expressed disappointment with the aid given 
by the government and foreign donors in efforts to regenerate their livelihood following the 
tsunami. While they appreciated the aid, they also complained that assistance towards 
recouping their genuine losses was very limited and aid had been of little use in the 
regeneration of farming. Furthermore, planting materials, fertilizers and pesticides distributed 
by the government had generated false hopes among the general farming communities and 
there was particular disappointment when most crops became diseased due to the poor quality 
of planting materials. Likewise farmers faced difficulty in adapting to the new fertilizers and 
pesticides (Shabau, 2007).  
Shabau (2007) outlined the medium and long-term needs identified by farmers for recovery of 
their agricultural activities. He stated those needs as; the need for good quality planting 
materials, and improved availability of tools, fertilizers and pesticides on their islands, 
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training programmes on crop management and assitance in marketing produce (Shabau, 
2007). Considering the suseptibility of Maldives to natural disasters he made suggestions for 
improving and continuing agricultural activities and building farmer’s capacity to cope with 
future natural disasters.   
6.4.6 Lack of Consultation with the Community 
The respondents from emergency organizations also indicated a lack of community 
involvement and consultation in the early stages. For example, the affected communities were 
not involved during the process of making damage assessments and therefore, particular needs 
of segments of society such as the elderly, pregnant or feeding mothers, and the disabled were 
not properly addressed. Similarly, the NDMC organization structure did not include or 
provide any role for local NGOs to operate. At the same time, the distribution of various aid 
and relief goods to affected communities were mainly handled by the island offices and army 
personnel without any participation from NGOs. In the absence of a proper communication 
process there were many communication break-downs between the affected communities and 
the responsible government authorities leading to suspicion, gossip and rumors which resulted 
in resistance in some communities.  
Immediately after the tsunami, the inhabited islands which were badly hit were evacuated and 
there were large displacements of inhabitants resulting in indirect impact to their livelihoods. 
Similarly, some resorts were evacuated and closed for the short-term resulting in lower 
occupancy and business performance subject to low visitor arrivals to the destination. 
Severely hit resorts were totally flooded resulting in a loss of power and massive damage to 
their infrastructure, water and food supplies and severe damage to guest and staff 
accommodation structures and furnishings. Some of the severely hit resorts received less 
damage to their reception area, restaurants and front office facilities but suffered considerable 
structural damage to their accommodation infrastructure, both to water bungalows/ beach side 
accommodation and utilities. Details of these issues will be discussed in the following 
chapter.  
As reported earlier, the government’s immediate concern was to provide temporary housing 
for the Internally Displaced Population (IDPs). Donor agencies helped the government by 
providing finance and skilled people during this process. One of the challenges in the local 
response was the limited presence of UN agencies prior to the Asian Tsunami (UNICEF, 
UNDP, UNFPA and WHO had a small office). There were no bilateral donor offices, no local 
Red Cross/Crescent society, only one INGO (Voluntary Services Overseas) present, and there 
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was a very small local Non-Governmental Organization sector. Once the scale of the disaster 
became apparent, the NDMC was established and the Minister of Defense was appointed as 
the Chief Coordinator for the inter-ministerial committee formed under the NDMC.  
People from less damaged islands accommodated homeless while the Island Development 
Committees were active in coordinating all these activities. According to participant (TBEO-
C): 
“One of the principal tasks undertaken by the inter-ministerial committee was to speed up the 
joint needs assessments with the Asian Development Bank, World Bank and United Nations. 
All the Ministries were also temporarily relocated in the NDMC to work round the clock, 
which of course created a huge back log of their routine responsibilities. Then responsibilities 
of the NDMC were structured into various units for better performance and to improve donor 
confidence and trust.” 
6.4.7 Civil-Military Coordination 
As for the civil-military coordination, the National Defense Force and the Coast Guard 
worked with other government agencies. According to EO participants from the Coast Guard 
and the Military these organizations formulated a Joint Operations Centre immediately after 
the tsunami, concentrating primarily on search and rescue tasks and logistics coordination. 
They completed a preliminary assessment on the conditions of the islands within 48 hours, 
where they used coast guard vessels and assistance from private sector resources. 
Simultaneously they organized (rice, flour, sugar) and water for immediate distribution from 
the stocks of the State Trading Organization. They also formed a logistics center in the Male’ 
International Airport to handle all assistance. Additionally, they organized medical and tourist 
evacuation. At the same time, they were involved in erecting temporary tents shelters for the 
affected population.  
“Within a week we were able to establish seven forward coordinating centers that served for 
twenty one Atolls across the country. We were monitoring the assistance activities and 
forwarding the goods and supplies received to the affected and storing them properly” 
(TBEO-L). 
Foreign military forces provided much assistance to the Maldives. The Pakistani naval ship 
that was already present on the day of the tsunami assisted in relocating people to less 
affected islands and evacuated tourists and locals to Male’ and to the airport. The Indian 
Government sent three naval vessels along with two additional coast guard vessels and two 
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aircraft to assist the operations. Meanwhile the French and Bangladeshi governments 
dispatched one vessel each and the United States Navy sent two vessels with helicopters to 
assist in the search and rescue operations. The British Navy also joined the State Electric 
Company to repair  generators and powerhouses.  
6.4.8 Relief Food and Health Issues 
The United Nations World Food Program dispatched 2,000 metric tons of food that included 
rice, pulses, vegetable oil and sugar within 48 hours on 28th December 2004 followed by a 
similar shipment in January 2005. The military assisted in food distribution  with the help of 
other government agencies. While the home and gardens were destroyed in many islands, 
people also lost most of their livelihoods in tourism and fishing. There was also disruption to 
the everyday food import and distribution in the islands. Therefore, when the relief food was 
distributed, it had to be distributed to all people regardless of whether they were tsunami 
victims or not. Need assessment determined the most vulnerable.  
The tsunami also damaged the health infrastructure in the Maldives. According to the EO 
participant from the Heath Sector, medical centers and hospitals that were affected lost some 
or all of their equipment and x-ray machines. Computers, printed records and health records 
were lost. Similarly, most of the expatriate doctors from closer neighboring countries like Sri 
Lanka and India who also experienced the tsunami wanted to return to their families and those 
on leave did not return to duty. Nearly 45 medical centers had to be closed due to damage: 
“In Meemu Atoll Regional Hospital all equipment, including scanning, x-ray, operation 
theater and laboratory were totally washed away. The second hospital was G.A.Villingili. The 
equipment was subsequently purchased with aid from German Red Cross” (TBEO-G). 
The World Health Organization (WHO) provided basic medical supplies that were sufficient 
for three months. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) helped in training 60 
community health workers, while the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) assisted in 
caring for pregnant women, children and other vulnerable populations. The Ministry of Health 
and organizations that assisted in the health sector achieved good results in containing 
diarrhea and mumps in Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) settlements. Similarly, they 
also started routine health services to ensure early recovery of the health system and to protect 
vulnerable populations from diseases. 
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6.5 Long-Term Recovery and Resolution (1-5 years) 
6.5.1 Long-Term Recovery Planning 
Long-term recovery is the fifth stage in the DIRE Grid. This stage includes the initial 
recovery stage and the long-term challenges in the tourism and emergency organizations. The 
participants were asked: 
 What were the main challenges confronting your organization in the long-term recovery 
from the tsunami? 
 What actions were taken by your organization to address this recovery? 
 How have the actions of other agencies assisted or hindered longer-term recovery? 
As observed earlier, the National Tourism Organizations in the Maldives (MOT and MTPB) 
worked alongside the private sector tourism industry during the short, medium and long-term 
recovery phases of the industry. In February 2005, a Maldives Tourism Recovery Strategy 
was developed by an expert led by the Maldives Association for Tourism Industries (MATI) 
in consultation with the Government of Maldives. The following short (1 to 3 months), 
medium (3 to 12 months) and long (1 to 5 years) term objectives were proposed in the report 
(Maldives Tourism Recovery Strategy, 2005). The short term objective was to return to pre-
tsunami levels of bed occupancy within three months, the medium term was to achieve 
positive growth in all markets with a market share of more than one percent and, the long 
term objective was to protect the reputation of the Maldives as a relaxation, recreation and 
rejuvenation destination. Meanwhile, the Maldives Government Tsunami Impact and 
Recovery Report (Joint Needs Assessment World Bank-Asian Development Bank, and 
United Nations System, Annex 8-Tourism) in February 8, 2005 again formulated short and 
long-term strategies for tourism industry recovery. These documents served as a guideline for 
the government and the private sector to follow during the recovery as well as a reference 
point in determining a budget for the marketing and public relations initiatives: 
“As I have said before, immediately after the tsunami, our occupancy dropped drastically. 
Then the government gave a very big budget for marketing. The Tourism Promotion Board 
and everybody was involved and put a big effort for promotional works and they did a lot of 
consultations with the industry participants and I would say that it was their hard work that 
paid off and we came back very soon within one year” (TBEO-C). 
Tourist arrivals to the Maldives have increased an average of 8% per year from 2000 to 2005. 
The decline in arrivals in 2005 was due to the tsunami as many resorts temporarily closed 
   
 122 
their operations. However, by December 2005 tourist arrivals began to rise and by mid-2006, 
arrivals had reached pre-tsunami levels (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Tourist Arrivals by Month, 2001-2006 (Source: Department of Immigration 
and Emigration 2005, 2006) 
The average annual occupancy rate of the Maldives was mostly above 60% during 2000-
2004. As seen in Figure 11, monthly occupancy rates have remained 50% except for the 
month of June which is the low season in the Maldives. The tsunami caused a dramatic 
decline in occupancy in January 2005. 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2001 50459 48987 50488 48100 29450 25593 35461 38744 31726 31209 30341 40426
2002 36211 47024 49280 42647 31529 23641 34341 41243 39760 42579 42310 54115
2003 54503 56706 56441 48742 31119 26915 38076 48431 44951 48357 51087 58265
2004 61861 59706 63855 55396 42197 33835 43527 55843 46838 52511 56656 44505
2005 18747 29391 35742 29714 25309 22590 29860 38366 33748 40543 44461 46849
2006 58332 54741 54596 55983 40961 33037 42776 49968 44593 54721 53594 58621
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Figure 11: Tourist Arrivals and Bed capacity (Source: Ministry of Tourism, Statistical 
Section) 
Tourist bed nights and occupancy rate have been steadily increasing since 2001. As seen in 
Figure 12 below, the decline in bed nights and occupancy rate in 2005 is due to the tsunami 
which affected the whole region. 
 
Figure 12: Bed Occupancy (Source: Ministry of Tourism, Statistical Section) 
As for other EOs some of them reported that they improved and upgraded their systems and 
infrastructure.  One participant reported: 
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“We were mostly in the information providing part and we were collaborating with 
international agencies. We worked and established a good network so that we could give 
future warnings. We collaborated with WMO and through their assistance we upgraded our 
telecommunications infrastructure to global telecommunications system. We have US Radar 
service and now we are able to upgrade that” (TBEO-J). The participant further added;  
“We started public awareness programs on weather, earthquakes and tsunamis in 2005. 
UNDP and NDMC were working on the DDR. We continued this till 2008 and we faced 
budgetary difficulties following the economic crisis. Therefore, we conducted many programs 
through foreign aid” (TBEO-J). 
6.5.2 Disaster Management Plan for the Tourism Sector 
It was obvious that there were many remaining challenges and more needed to be done to 
regain market confidence. The Ministry of Tourism initiated a review in May 2005 in tandem 
with the Maldives Tourism Promotion Board (MTPB), the private sector Maldives 
Association of Tourism Industry (MATI), and the World Tourism Organization (WTO). The 
purpose of the meetings was to review the whole disaster in light of the challenges and actions 
taken. Its primary goal was to raise awareness about the need to develop a Disaster 
Management Plan for the tourism industry. Based on the results of the areas highlighted by 
150 participants from the tourism industry and the stakeholders, MOT was able to develop a 
Disaster Management Plan for the Tourism Sector with the help of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP Recovery Support Programme for the Maldives, 2005).  
The Disaster Management Plan for the Tourism Sector suggested a results-based framework 
for disaster management planning that was based on strategic objectives, results and tasks that 
considered the unique geography, tourism industry environment and its significance to the 
economy of the country. In the development of the procedures and actions to be followed 
before, during and after a strike from a dangerous event, it also considers: vulnerability 
arising from the unique geography and fragile physical form, low elevation, increasingly 
unpredictable global weather patterns, monsoon weather, and long distance tropical storm 
impacts, and the possibility of earthquakes and tsunamis.  
Participants from NTOs indicated that the government assisted greatly in the rebuilding 
efforts even though repair, renovation and reconstruction were private sector led. As 
discussed earlier, some financial concessions were provided to affected resorts and the 
industry in order to ease the financial burden to the companies due to loss of income during 
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the first six months. The government also helped within the process to raise finance for 
renovation and reconstruction.  
“We did so, and we received financial assistance from some foreign organizations, and that 
was distributed to the industry, distributed in the sense that they had to apply with the plan. 
We received aid, (not like a loan which needs to be repaid) and there was another as loan 
assistance with small interest that needed to be repaid in the long term” (TBEO-C). 
Participants from NTOs also stated that one of the challenges was the realization that even 
man-made disasters need to be included in the Disaster Management Plan and that it was a 
main concern for the recovery of the industry in improving tourism safety and crisis 
management capacities. According to one participant  
“Actually the challenge for them is to be prepared for any such kind of incidents. It might not 
be a natural thing, there can be other incidents and other disasters that can occur on a tourist 
establishment, we have had accidents like dive accidents, snorkeling accidents, drowning, a 
few fire accidents, and few food-borne accidents but there were no casualties in any food-
borne incidents. But anyway it is in the best interest of the industry that they are fully 
prepared for any kind of disaster like that” (TBEO-D). 
Participants from NTOs stated that the Tourism Ministry worked very closely with the other 
agencies and assisted the ministry’s role rather than hindering it. According to another 
participant:  
“No, it did not hinder, actually it was of assistance, good co-operation we had from the whole 
industry. In fact, we call and mark the day of the tsunami as the “Day of Unity”, a day when 
everybody kept aside their differences and came to the other person’s assistance and helped 
everybody. We helped each other and we had strong unity between all the people in all the 
departments” (TBEO-B). 
6.5.3 Changes to Operating Environments of Organizations 
Resolution is the sixth stage in the DIRE grid. Resolution is a stage when routine is restored 
or an improved stage is established. The participants were asked: 
 Has the tsunami brought any permanent changes in the environment in which your 
organization operates? 
 How has your organization responded to those changes? 
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 Has the experience of the tsunami resulted in any permanent changes in your 
organization’s approach to management and planning? 
 Have there been any permanent changes in planning and organization of the destination as 
a whole? 
According to participants from NTOs, the tsunami led them to realize numerous areas of 
improvement in terms of awareness and preparedness for disaster situations. Therefore, when 
they prepared the Third Tourism Master Plan (TTMP) in 2007 they emphasized the need to 
establish a Tourism Emergency Operation Centre (TEOC) to react effectively to any tourism 
crisis/disaster that may affect the whole industry with the participation of NDMC and all other 
significant government authorities. TEOC was established for this purpose within the MOT. 
However, the Tourism Crisis Management Unit which was envisaged in the TTMP did not 
eventuate:  
“Yes after the tsunami what we actually wanted is to have a separate unit whereby people will 
be specialized, and they will be providing assistance and provide consultation to the resorts 
for making their disaster management plans and testing of their disaster management plans, 
like conducting of drills. This is one thing that we need in the tourism ministry itself. We had 
been planning to establish this unit this year but due to the budgetary difficulties we didn’t 
receive budget for that. Hopefully, we will have for the next year or the coming years; there 
would be a special unit to take care of crisis” (TBEO-C). 
According to participants from NTOs, all of the resorts have established a Disaster Response 
Team (DRT), however the efficiency and effectiveness of DRTs has not been tested. DRTs 
have not been developed in other tourism activities such as live-aboard safari vessels and 
guest houses. Regular crisis management simulation exercises are not conducted in tourist 
resorts along with other stakeholders.  During 2010 some safety incidents and security issues 
have prompted discussions with the Maldives Police Services (MPS) and Maldives National 
Defense Force (MNDF). One incident involved some unauthorized locals entering a resort 
island during early morning in a burglary attempt and confrontation with employees, which 
led to one of them drowning. The second was a diving incident where a Russian tourist died 
and two Maldivian diving instructors were hospitalized.  In this incident eight other divers 
had to be treated for carbon monoxide poisoning from their tanks provided by the live aboard 
(Safari Boat).   
The NDMC has prepared a Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) for disasters and risk 
reductions in 2011. This broad strategic action plan addressed many issues that may occur if a 
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disaster unfolds and provides details of the mitigation measures to prevent disasters. Due to 
water related accidents, during 2010-2011, MOT has developed procedures for tourist resorts 
to make lifeguards available during swimming hours, building watchtowers for observation, 
and erecting cautionary notices about swimming conditions for tourists. NTO participants 
agree that some changes have taken place since the tsunami, as noted by one participant:  
“Yes there are. As I have said earlier, before the tsunami people had not even had a plan for 
crisis or a disaster. But now we have become more aware and people want to have their 
disaster management plans and face disasters with the confidence that they will handle it 
well. So this is the kind of awareness that came with the tsunami.” (TBEO-C) 
In the national context the emergency organizations concentrated on short and long-term 
recovery processes in their respective fields. As indicated at the beginning, the institutional 
framework for disaster management was formed in 2004 with a national institution for 
disaster management. Subsequently a policy for disaster management was developed to 
address the need for an overall disaster management policy, integrated with other sector 
policies. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) was incorporated into the Seventh National 
Development Plan in 2006. In 2007 the Maldives’ government established the first National 
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) which was developed to communicate the most 
urgent and immediate adaptation needs of the Maldives to climate change in terms of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Similarly, Risk 
Reduction measures were incorporated into the Environmental Impact Assessment process. 
As indicated above, DRR measures were included under the TTMP. Subsequently, DRR 
measures have been addressed in the Health Master Plan 2006-2015. 
One of the concerns raised by the all the EOs and NTOs is the early warning alerts. The 
Meteorology Department has purchased and installed equipment for Early Warning System 
(EWS). One participant reported:  
“After the tsunami we started to develop an early warning system. Since the tsunami is not a 
common feature, we preferred to go for a multi-hazard early warning system. UNDP assisted 
us in implementing the same.” (TBEO-J). 
They have enhanced the capacities for forecasting and prediction, along with training of their 
employees in use of this new equipment. A national EWS plan has been developed which 
includes color codes for various stages of alert and warning dissemination protocols. 
However, there are challenges in implementing EWS. One is the lack of trained employees. 
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The other issue is that such a EWS requires collaboration and partnerships with all of the line 
ministries and government agencies, which is still not required by law. Subsequently, the 
Telecom Policy 2006-2010 envisaged to formulate an emergency telecommunications 
procedure, ensure existing telecommunication and broadcasting networks cover messages 
given through EWS, facilitate priority calling and national roaming in existing mobile 
networks to be used in a disaster, established a satellite based personal communication system 
to reach all inhabited islands by end of 2007 and finally established an electronic public 
warning system at an island level by end of 2009. One participant reported:  
“We have acquired a number of pieces of equipment, such as weather radar, satellite 
receiving equipment, broad band seismometers and automatic weather stations. We installed 
automatic weather stations in 23 islands and they send all data automatically. We can 
guarantee to the public that if any earthquake occurs in the world or in our region, we will be 
able to give an early warning.” (TBEO-J) 
As discussed earlier, the EOs from the Heath Sector indicated that The Health Master Plan 
2006-2015 identifies policy direction and goals for national disaster preparedness at all levels 
of the Health Sector. Similarly EOs from the education sector indicated that a policy 
framework on Safe Schools has been prepared, which includes appointment of School Safety 
Committees, minimum standards for infrastructure and reconvening of “Every Child Swims” 
program which would be extended to teachers. Similarly, their long-term activities included; 
conducting awareness campaigns, and integrating the disaster prevention in the education 
curriculum, preparing teaching materials with help from foreign organizations, and planning 
mock drills. One participant also added: 
“We learned a lot of things. We are working with one of the concerns to establish a safe 
hospital concept. But this needs money. Most of our buildings are still not safe for any kind of 
disaster including flooding. This year we have started to establish the safe hospital concept to 
prevent flooding in new buildings.” (TBEO-G) 
The Government sector has conducted research with the help of UNDP to develop a disaster 
risk profile in the Maldives. It includes a multi hazard risk index for each island. A detailed 
risk assessment of the proposed nine islands selected for population consolidation has also 
been completed. However, integrating the risk concerns into development plans of the islands 
and finding cost effective solutions for improving safety is a very big challenge, as is securing 
funds for mitigation measures for the islands.  
   
 129 
6.5.4 Strategies Implemented and Changes Made to Crisis Management 
Prevention and Planning Tools by NTOs 
In the Tourism Master Plan review for the period 2007-2011, MOT (2012) and the interview 
results reported here provide details of strategies followed by the NTOs and their progress in 
three areas: 
 
 Introduction of emergency evacuation, transport and communication infrastructure for 
resorts (Table 16). 
 Strengthen the preparedness of the tourism industry to resort-specific crisis and 
industry-wide disaster situations (Table 17). 
 Strengthen surveillance and security for the safety of all tourists (Table 18). 
 
Table 16: Actions Introduced for Emergency Evacuation, Transport and Communication 
Infrastructure for Resorts (Source: Ministry of Tourism) 
No Actions  
Status/ Completion  
Date 
1 Conduct an audit to establish the emergency 
evacuation and communication infrastructure capacity 
Completed 2007 
2 Integrate resorts into the National Disaster 
Management Centre evacuation plan 2007- 2008 
Completed 2007- 2008 
 
 
Table 17: Actions to Strengthen the Preparedness of the Tourism Industry to Resort-
Specific Crisis and Industry-Wide Disaster Situations (Source: Ministry of Tourism) 
No Actions  
Status/ Completion 
Date 
1 
Establish a Tourism Emergency Operation Centre 
(TEOC) to respond effectively to any industry-wide 
disaster, with National Disaster Management Centre 
and all other relevant authorities 
Completed 2008 
2 
Establish the Tourism Crisis Management Unit to study 
and collaboratively implement policies, procedures and 
programs required to maintain high level safety 
standards and responsiveness to crisis and emergencies 
in the sector 
Incomplete since 2008 
3 Establish Disaster Response Team (DRT) at Resorts 
and other tourism related establishments 
Completed 2008-2009 
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4 
In partnership with MNDF, Police, Health Facilities 
and other stakeholders, develop a program of regular 
crisis management simulation exercises at resorts and 
at all tourism-related establishments 
Planned for 2011, 
incomplete 
 
Table 18: Actions to Strengthen Surveillance and Security for the Safety of all Tourists 
(Source: Ministry of Tourism) 
No Actions  
Status/ Completion 
date 
1 
Conduct public awareness regarding the 
indispensability of maintaining national safety, security 
and public law and order to tourism development 
Incomplete since 2008 
2 
Create an annual forum for national security 
stakeholders and tourism industry to discuss and 
identify safety and security issues that relate to tourism 
industry 
Completed, 2007 
3 
Require hiring, on-going training and certification of 
security staff at resorts and tourism-related 
establishments 
Guideline implemented 
2008-2009 
4 Regulate safety and security audits and simulation 
exercises at all resorts and other tourist establishments 
On-going since 2008 
6.5.5 Strategies Implemented and Changes Made to Crisis Management 
Prevention and Planning Tools by EOs 
In the national context, the emergency organizations concentrated on short and long-term 
recovery processes in their respective fields. Following the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, the 
Government acted quickly and established a Ministerial Committee and Task Force. On the 
same day, the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) was formed to assist response 
and coordination. The Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning 
and Development directed relief efforts and the emergency response in collaboration with 
other government ministries and departments, various United Nations agencies and other 
development partners in and out of the Maldives. Throughout the tsunami response, relief and 
recovery activities, NDMC remained the primary driver. The group was divided into two 
departments: 
 National Disaster Relief Coordination Unit which was responsible for temporary shelter, 
repair of damaged homes, provision of relief assistance, logistical support, reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of social infrastructure; and 
 National Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Programme, which was responsible for 
the planning and coordinating the redevelopment programme to revitalize those islands 
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most affected. It was also charged with developing programmes and projects to revive the 
overall economy. This was carried out by two units – the National Economic Recovery 
Unit and Transport and Logistics Unit. 
 
Much emphasis has been given to developing broader disaster management competence in the 
Maldives. Survey participants from the governmental agencies have highlighted the following 
disaster response and preparedness planning and mitigation activities: 
 
Early Warning Systems 
 Developed systems to integrate national warning systems at Department of 
Meteorology with regional systems  
Emergency Response 
 Established emergency operations centre and developed standard operating procedures 
in emergencies at island level 
Preparedness Planning 
 Developed vulnerability and risk assessment at island levels 
 Identified possible evacuation sites, emergency shelters-cum-community building on 
raised ground 
 List of vulnerable persons prepared 
 Developed plans for safeguarding lifeline facilities, storage of critical supplies 
 Developed an inventory of skills and persons available as volunteers 
Emergency Response 
 Established emergency operations centre and developed standard operating procedures 
in emergencies at island level 
Capacity Building 
 Government officials directly linked to reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts were 
trained 
 Capacity building and training was implemented for fisher associations, women 
committees and youth groups, and also the development of community-level volunteer 
Disaster Preparedness and Response Teams to disseminate early warning alerts and 
organize the first response. 
 
The telecommunications network in the Maldives faced a devastating impact. In the aftermath 
of the tsunami however, mitigation measures were taken to minimize such an impact. One 
participant reported: 
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“Today we are much more prepared to overcome or to restore the network than we were at 
2004. One simple example is that any new building that we fabricate today for 
telecommunication infrastructure is designed in such a way that there is enough space in the 
lower area for water to flow so that minimal damage will incur. I do not mean that we can 
100% prevent.” (TBEO-N) 
 
“I would say we are more prepared for an event like 2004. We didn’t have the satellite 
communication restoration telephones and we have our competitors now. Our network is 
more diversified now. All these things are in place now. In 2004, we didn’t have such back up 
plans.” (TBEO-N) 
 
6.5.6 Safe Island Programme 
Another important program identified by the survey respondents is the Safe Island 
Programme (SIP) which was launched by Ministry of Planning and National Development in 
January 2005, soon after the tsunami, which concentrated on regional development and 
population consolidation. Participants indicated that the tsunami created a need for enhanced 
environmental mitigation measures and adaptation interventions in some of the islands 
evacuated. One of the objectives of SIP was to redesign the physical development features of 
islands, including wider environmental protection zones, creating elevated areas for vertical 
evacuation in the event of floods and facilitate easy access in emergencies. 
 
Another reason was to consolidate the population to larger islands which are protected from 
natural disasters and more economic in terms of public investments in utilities, infrastructure, 
housing, and services. Similarly these islands have quicker access to air, coastal protection, 
and sufficient space for subsequent population growth, potential for expansion, proximity to 
other islands, a viable economy and access to social services. Seven islands were chosen for 
development on the basis of selected criteria which included island size, potential for 
reclamation or connection, strategic location and size of the population. These islands act as 
host islands for isolated communities living in islands within closer proximity with  less 
developmental potential.  
 
Brown (2005) reported that due to strong island identities, it had previously proven difficult to 
consolidate population in the Maldives. However, since the tsunami displaced entire 
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communities and destroyed infrastructure on many islands, people agreed to relocate. Brown 
(2005) noted that however even those who moved willingly had to make huge adjustments in 
order to adapt to their new home. This was in addition to the trauma they had experienced 
during the original disaster. According to MPND (2005) the resettlement and relocation of 
populations was planned to be totally demand-driven and voluntary.  
6.5.7 United Nations Development Program 
As per the respondents’ reports, the United Nations and United Nations Development 
Program have actively helped in strengthening the public sector capacities with a variety of 
assessments and training exercises through many competent organizations such as: 
 The assessment of the early warning systems of the Maldives - Asian Disaster 
Reduction Centre (ADRC) - Japan  
 Disaster and risk vulnerability profile of the Maldives-Risk Management Solutions - 
India  
Another significant finding was that during the recovery period several disaster management 
training workshops were held for senior government officials in 2005 with the funding 
received through UNDP. Besides these, ten senior government officials were sent for a study 
visit to India and Bangladesh in 2005 to learn about disaster management policy development, 
institutional mechanisms and disaster management capacity development which proved to be 
useful for strengthening national governmental capacities during the recovery period. There is 
also evidence in the research that the UNDP assisted government organizations through their 
Disaster Risk Management Programme (See Table 19: Key Projects under Disaster Risk 
Reduction by UNDP in Maldives) with the objective of enabling communities to manage 
adverse effects of natural disasters through strengthening their institutional and technical 
capacity at all levels. 
Table 19: Key Projects Under Disaster Risk Reduction by UNDP in Maldives (Source: 
UNDP, Maldives) 
UNDP Disaster Risk Reduction Projects  Details 
Detailed Island Risk Assessment in the 
Maldives, 2007- 2010 
This is an offshoot of the findings of 
“Developing a Disaster Risk Profile for the 
Maldives (2006)” which provided the 
vulnerability ranking of over 1,000 islands in 
the Maldives.  
The project aims to provide an in-depth 
disaster risk assessment for  the most 10 
vulnerable islands identified by the Profile 
(2006) 
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Cost Benefit Study of Risk Mitigation 
Measures in 3 Islands, 2009 
This  is an offshoot of the preliminary 
findings of “Detailed Island Risk Assessment 
in the Maldives”. The study aims to provide 
the cost performances of 3 types of risk 
mitigation measures in 3 islands for policy 
makers.  
Strengthening National and Local Capacities 
for Effective  Early Warning Dissemination 
and Response, 2008-2010 
This project aims to strengthen end-to-end 
early warning system for tsunami and other 
hazards. Key deliverables will be early 
warning Standard Operation Procedures 
(SOPs) for government stakeholders and 
early warning response plans at targeted 
islands 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster 
Management in  Schools, 2009-2010 
This project aims to support the government 
in integrating DRR into the school 
curriculum and co-curricular activities. 
Expected key outputs will include a 
Maldivian Guide for School Emergency 
Operation Plan (SEOP), and a text books for 
grade 1-9 students 
Disaster Management and Environment for 
Sustainable Development, 2009-2010  
The objective of this project is to support the 
government in integrating DRR in the 
National Building Code and Compliance 
Documents. Expected outputs will be 2nd 
edition of Maldivian National Building Code, 
Compliance Documents and roadmap to 
strengthen the implementation of National 
Building Code and Compliance Documents.  
Construction of Multi-Purpose Safe Shelter 
Building in Mali, 2008-2009 
The project aims to provide the island 
community with vertical evacuation for 
around 1,000 residents at the time of natural 
disasters such as tsunamis and flooding. This 
multi-purpose building will also be used for 
community and commercial activities during 
normal times 
Establishing Life Cycle Management (LCM) 
System of  Vessel Safe Shelters in the 
Maldives, 2010-2012 
The project aims to achieve both safe and 
economical harbors to protect vessels, and 
people’s livelihood, from storms and sea 
swells. The project will produce two key 
outputs; LCM guideline for harbors and a 
management database.  
 
Besides UNDP, the current study found that the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 
the Maldives assisted in recovery efforts. The IFRC led the process of forming a national 
Maldivian Red Crescent Society in association with the Maldivian Government and various 
members from civil society. The Maldivian Red Crescent Society would become an important 
local partner in relation to enhancing capacities and reducing vulnerabilities before, during 
and after disasters. However, this study does not focus on the NGO role in recovery efforts. 
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6.5.8 Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 
The research results also indicated that the government Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 
Programme was incorporated into the Seventh National Development Plan in 2006. The 
following year, the Maldives developed the first National Adaptation Programme of Action 
(NAPA) which was developed to communicate the most urgent and immediate adaptation 
needs of the Maldives to climate change in terms of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Similarly, Risk Reduction measures where 
incorporated in the Environmental Impact Assessment process, while DRR measures were 
included under the Third Tourism Master plan and Health Master Plan 2006-2015.  
 
Table 20 summarizes the extent to which the government sector has performed in relation to 
the Maldives tsunami against the DIRE Grid. All the line ministries worked closely in co-
ordination with each other during the various phases of the disaster, within the framework 
created by the government soon after the tsunami. Ministry of Tourism in particular worked 
with MTPB very closely during response, short and long-term recovery activities. It was 
found that the government sector started developing prevention and planning tools such as; 
sector specific disaster management plans and SOPs together with disaster risk reduction 
measures such as, early warning and effective communication systems. 
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Table 20: Summary Evaluation of the Extent to which the Government Sector has Performed in Relation to the Maldives Tsunami Against the DIRE 
Organization Pre-event 
 
Prodromal Emergency 
 
Intermediate Long-term 
(Recovery) 
Resolution 
 
 
Strategic actions 
and 
implementation by 
National Tourism 
Organizations and 
Emergency 
Organizations 
 
 Develop, 
document and 
communicate 
Disaster 
Management 
plans  
 Assessment of 
disasters and 
probability of 
occurring 
 Develop disaster 
contingency 
plans 
 
 Warning systems  
 Activate 
communication 
mechanisms 
 Communicate 
objectives of 
contingency 
plans 
 
 
 Rescue/evacuation 
procedures 
 Control over crisis 
communication 
 Appointing a 
spokesperson 
 Collaboration with 
internal/external 
stakeholders 
 Action taken to 
minimize impacts 
 
 Restoration 
 Media 
communication 
strategy  
 Changes to the 
organizational 
structure/personnel 
 Collaboration 
stakeholders 
 Resource 
Management ( e.g. 
, changes in 
leadership styles , 
financial, employee 
empowerment 
 
 Actions taken for 
recovery and 
challenges 
 De-briefing with 
employees 
 Restoration of 
business and 
consumer 
confidence 
 Collaborating 
with relevant 
stakeholders 
 
 Changes to 
operating 
environment 
 Effectiveness of 
strategies and 
response 
 Changes brought 
to Crisis/ 
disaster 
prevention and 
planning tools 
Ministry of Tourism 
and Civil Aviation 
No plans and not 
prepared for a natural 
disaster 
No warning systems 
has been in place to 
be activated 
Emergency response 
initiated 
Short-term restoration Attempt to return to 
pre-disaster 
Tourism Disaster 
Management Plan 
developed 
Ministry Planning, 
Environment and 
National 
Development 
Not prepared for a 
natural disaster 
Not prepared Co-ordination of the 
ministerial committee  
Co-ordination and 
short-term disaster 
management 
Co-ordination and 
long-term disaster 
recovery 
Disaster 
preparedness and 
disaster risk 
reduction in policies  
 
Maldives Tourism 
Promotion Board 
 
Not prepared for a 
natural disaster 
Not prepared Co-ordinated with 
MOT for response 
Co-ordinated with 
MOT for short-term 
restoration of the 
industry 
Co-ordinated with 
Ministry in 
formulation of long-
term destination 
recovery plans  
 
Crisis Management 
Plans developed  
 
Ministry of Health 
 
Not prepared  for a 
 
Not prepared 
 
Co-ordinated with the 
 
Co-ordinated with local 
 
Co-ordinated with 
 
Tsunami response 
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Organization Pre-event 
 
Prodromal Emergency 
 
Intermediate Long-term 
(Recovery) 
Resolution 
 
 natural disaster authorities and island 
communities 
and foreign agencies for 
assessments, relief and 
minimizing outbreak of 
any disease 
NDMC and other 
ministries throughout 
the recovery on 
health facilities 
plans for Health 
Sector. Strategic plan 
for health sector on 
emergencies 
Immigration 
Department 
 Not prepared for a 
natural disaster 
 
Not prepared 
 
Worked in co-
ordination with the 
Airports Authority 
,Foreign Ministry and 
Airline Sector 
 
Assisted with local and 
foreign agencies to send 
in the affected tourists 
back through the 
charters  
 
Attempt to return to 
pre-disaster 
 
Airport Emergency 
Plans reviewed and 
SOPs followed 
 
Airports Authority 
 Not prepared for a 
natural disaster 
 
No warning systems 
 
Worked with all airport 
services in emergency 
response 
 
Co-ordinated the airport 
restorations activity and 
achieved within 24 
hours 
 
Brought the airport 
back to operation as 
usual with all the 
services to pre-
disaster status 
 
Airport Emergency 
Plans reviewed and 
SOPs followed 
 
 
Department of 
Meteorology 
 
Not prepared for a 
tsunami  
 
No warning systems 
established to alert on 
earth quakes greater 
than 7.0 
 
Worked with the 
authorities in providing 
emergency information 
after the tsunami  
 
Assisted with local and 
foreign agencies to send 
information   
 
Meteorological, 
oceanographic and 
seismic hazard 
monitoring networks 
established 
 
 
Doppler Weather 
Radar installed. 
Multi-Hazard Early 
Warning System is 
operational, advisory 
and timely warnings 
are issued for 
extreme events and 
disseminate to focal 
points via mobile 
network and to 
citizens through 
media 
 
Ministry of Fisheries 
, Agriculture and 
Marine Research 
 
Not prepared for a 
tsunami 
 
No warning systems 
 
Co-ordinated with the 
authorities and island 
communities 
 
Co-ordinated with local 
and foreign agencies for 
damage assessments, 
relief to farmers and 
fisherman 
 
Attempt to return to 
pre-disaster level 
through help of 
agencies through 
providence of basic 
planting materials, 
 
The Ministry, in co-
ordination with UN, 
UNEP, FAO, 
focused on facilities 
and programs for 
building  farmers and 
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Organization Pre-event 
 
Prodromal Emergency 
 
Intermediate Long-term 
(Recovery) 
Resolution 
 
working equipment,  
and pesticides to 
revive farming 
activities 
agencies in effective 
disaster relief 
 
Ministry of Defense 
/ Coast Guard , 
Search and Rescue 
 
 
Not prepared for a 
tsunami 
 
No warning systems 
were there 
 
Co-ordinated with 
Government and island 
communities in 
response  
 
Co-ordinated the whole 
restoration effort with 
the government and 
provided relief to 
affected island  
communities, 
evacuation of civilians 
and tourists to close by 
islands, airport and to 
capital island 
 
Worked and co-
ordinated the whole 
NDMC operation , 
maintenance of 
records of Internally 
Displaced People and 
the programs, 
records, co-ordinated 
with all government 
ministries  and 
foreign partners 
 
Developed a Draft 
National Plan for 
Disaster  
Management, and  
Mitigation, Draft 
Disaster 
Management Bill , 
development of 
competence in search 
and rescue and 
salvage operations, 
assistance to civil 
authorities during 
crisis situations  
 
Ministry of 
Education 
 
Not prepared for a 
tsunami or a natural 
disaster 
 
No warning systems 
developed 
 
Co-ordinated with 
Government and island 
communities in 
response 
 
Co-ordinated with 
government and foreign 
agencies  for short-term 
restoration of the 
affected schools and 
educational facilities  
 
Co-ordinated with 
NDMC and  
Government 
authorities 
throughout the 
recovery on 
educational facilities 
 
MOE worked with 
UNESCO and local 
agencies to prepare a 
disaster preparedness 
policy for the schools 
, Guide for “School 
Emergency 
Operations Plan, 
Maldives” (First 
Edition), Standard 
Operational 
Procedures on Flu 
Pandemics and 
Standard Operational 
Procedures for Early 
Warning 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter summarized results that were obtained from interviews of representatives from 
12 government agencies. The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth. The Disaster 
Incident Response Evaluation Grid (DIRE) developed by Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) was 
the basis for the interview structure and topics that were discussed in the chapter. This grid 
provides a framework for the respondent’s recollection of the sequence of events during the 
disaster, and their reactions to these events (Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001). Table 20 summarizes 
the extent to which government sector has performed in relation to the Maldives tsunami 
against the DIRE Grid. It was found that only some considerations in this framework were 
implemented. The next chapter outlines the research findings from the interviews from Private 
Sector Tourism Industry in the Maldives. 
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Chapter 7                                                                                                  
RESULTS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results from interviews of 23 private-sector operators. The 
interviews were semi-structured and in-depth. As explained in Chapter 5, the Disaster 
Incident Response Evaluation Grid (DIRE) developed by Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) was 
the basis for the interview structure and topics. This grid provides a framework for each 
respondent’s recollection of the sequence of events during the disaster, and their reactions to 
these events (Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001). 
The questions asked were examined in relation to the conceptual framework for tourism crisis 
and disaster management which was developed using a documentary method based on the 
constructs and dimensions derived from the theory. Similar to the government sector, the 
coded interview results are presented in the order of the grid’s main components; pre-event 
and prodromal under one section, emergency and intermediate in one section and long-term 
recovery and resolution in another section. These components and the disaster recovery 
stages; short-term/restoration and long-term/reconstruction have been explained in section 
6.1. Below I provide the background to the impact of the tsunami on the private sector of the 
tourism industry.  
7.2 Impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 on the Private 
Sector of the Tourism Industry  
The impact from the tsunami was significant for the tourism sector. Three tourists died and 
some were seriously injured. Twenty one out of 87 resorts were significantly damaged and 
had to be closed. Most of the 21 resorts were able to resume operations within a year after 
minor or major renovations although a few resorts took two or more years to totally rebuild.  
The resort islands and the inhabited islands suffered similar physical damage from the sheer 
force of the tsunami. The loss of lives was much higher on inhabited islands (82 died). On the 
26th of December 2004, there were 170000 tourists, along with17000 staff members, on 
resorts islands, but surprisingly, only three fatalities occurred on these islands. Had the 
tsunami waves struck the Maldives during the night or early morning on the 24th December 
2004, many tourists would have been trapped in their rooms. The low tides in December and 
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the fact that it coincided with breakfast time in most resorts prevented a greater disaster. The 
island resorts which received the greatest damage were located either on the eastern side of 
the respective atolls, had very small reefs to protect them or were closer to the deep waters 
which exposed them to the destructive force of the tsunami.  
Those resorts renovated after the tsunami were totally flooded, leading to massive damage to 
the infrastructure supporting services and power generation. The Maldives’ tourist resort 
approach and strategy is based on a one-island-one resort concept which requires the resorts 
to generate their own electricity through diesel generated power houses and produce their own 
water through desalination plants. The resorts are mostly surrounded by other inhabited 
islands from where most of the local staff are recruited from. 
Totally reconstructed island resorts suffered infrastructure loss and also damage to all of the 
stored food supplies, water stocks, furnishings and accommodation structures. At 9.15am on 
26th December 2004, most of the 17,000 tourists in the Maldives were having breakfast after a 
festive night. Very few tourists were in their rooms, with tourists engaged in sailing 
excursions, diving, fishing or other off-resort activities, like island-hopping.  
For the purpose of this research, the damaged resorts were organized into three categories: 
resorts/hotels where slight damage occurred and which were restored (Appendix A); those 
which received some reconstruction (Appendix B); and, those which were totally 
reconstructed (Appendix C). The details of damage to the selected resorts (for interviews) are 
also provided in appendices A, B, and C. The number of resorts selected for survey from each 
of the three categories are; four from the resorts/hotels which received slight damage, three 
from those which undertook some reconstruction and three of those that were totally 
reconstructed. Figure 13 shows the locations of the private sector participants. 
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Figure 13: Location of Private Sector Participants 
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Appendix A describes those resorts which required some renovation and reconstruction. 
Seven resorts, out of an overall 21 resorts that were closed down soon after the tsunami, were 
quickly renovated and repaired. These resorts were made operational after repairs to their 
basic utilities and services, before the end of February 2005. Officials from the Ministry of 
Tourism visited to observe the extent of the damage and the suitability of the facilities that 
were restored for immediate reopening. . 
Appendix B describes the damage sustained by the resorts that were closed soon after the 
tsunami for major renovation activities and some reconstruction. Nine of the 21 resorts 
remained closed for a period of between four months and one year. The three resorts where 
interviews were conducted had sustained major damage to the beach front guest rooms, 
jetties, walk-ways and water bungalows.  Pipelines for major utilities were also affected to the 
extent that they needed full replacement. 
Appendix C outlines the damage sustained by resorts closed due to severe damage to 
infrastructure and which could not be renovated or restored quickly. Five of the 21 closed 
resorts remained closed for a period of approximately one and a half years. The damage to 
these three resorts (selected for interviews) was so severe that they had to be closed for total 
reconstruction.   
Table 21 shows the list of businesses consulted for interviews, in order to understand the 
impact of the tsunami on tourism businesses and the private sector tourism industry, in the 
Maldives. Similar to the previous interviews with tourism organizations and emergency 
organizations, the DIRE grid developed by Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) was the basis for the 
interview structure and topics for the private sector establishments in the tourism industry. 
Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) used the DIRE grid to study impacts of the disaster on tourism 
activities and responses within the tourism sector in 1998 Australia Day flood at Katherine. 
Similarly, the researcher’s aim was to validate the composite record of events, conduct a post-
mortem of the event and identify the ways in which the flood triggered changes in tourism 
management and marketing in the area, and fulfills the objectives of this research as explained 
in sections 1.3 and 5.5.1. 
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Table 21: List of Private Sector Participants Interviewed 
Private Sector (Maldivian Tourism Industry) No: of participants 
Maldives Association of Tourism Industry (MATI) 1 
Accommodation providers   
Tourist Resorts and Marinas (89 in 2004 ) – 21 resorts damaged 10 
Safari Vessels (116) 2 
Activities    
Dive Centers and Schools (from resort) 1 
Souvenir Shops (independent from resort) 1 
Water Sports Centers (from resort) 1 
Tourist Services   
Tour Operators and Travel Agents (local and foreign) 2 
Transport   
Air Transport Services  (seaplane services) 2 
Sea Transport Services (travel agency, independent) 1 
Insurance  
Insurance Companies 2 
Total 23 
7.3 Pre-Event and Prodromal Stage 
7.3.1 Preparedness for Disasters 
The private sector tourism industry participants were asked questions about the pre-event 
context to establish work that had been done to prevent or mitigate the effects of potential 
disasters.  The questions asked were: 
 Before the tsunami, had your company considered what crisis management strategies 
would be required in the event of such a disaster?  
 Could you elaborate on any disaster/emergency planning your company had in place to 
deal with the tsunami? 
 Had your company conducted any environmental scanning, scenario planning or risk 
analysis assessments in case of a crisis?  
 Did you then develop any strategic plans from your scanning and risk analysis?  
 
The interviews indicated that the private sector tourism industry did not receive any early 
warnings and neither did they have any disaster management plans. There was no destination-
wide plan as well. Therefore, the tourism sector operators were not able to cope with the 
situation effectively. However, headcounts were taken, tourists were looked after and every 
   
 145 
effort was made to make ensure tourists did not panic about the situation. Expect for one 
foreign owned resort business receiving information from their management through satellite 
phone, none of the other businesses received any instructions immediately after the tsunami 
hit. Except for the resorts badly affected, the businesses interviewed did not request any tour 
operators to take the tourists. 
In general, the tourist resorts and other private sector participants interviewed had different 
individual experiences, however none of the participants interviewed indicated any prior 
warning, and therefore none of the resorts had any time to prepare for an eventuality such as a 
tsunami disaster. According to one participant: 
“We never had any warning, in fact that was a Sunday and we were having our morning 
briefing here in the meeting room. And one of our staff members was working in the beach 
with catamarans and saw that the water level was rising. He did not know what it was, that 
time in December as a Maldivian he knew that water level will not come up. So realized that 
something unusual was happening. So he quickly came on the island and informed the 
people”. (PS-R1) 
The interviews indicate that the private sector had no  plans to cope with such a disaster, or 
any guidelines for crisis management within their businesses and therefore were vulnerable. 
As a result of excessive media reporting the resorts experienced a significant downturn in 
international tourist arrivals. Emergency response plans were only for fires as per the Tourism 
Ministry’s safety requirements of having fire equipment in tourist resort buildings and safari 
vessels and annual monitoring of the same through the Fire Services Division of Maldives 
National Defense Force. According to one participant: 
“Even before tsunami we did have an emergency response plan for fire, because fires were 
occurring every now and then, we had a complete procedure to follow in case we have a 
fire.” (PS-R3) 
7.3.2 Pro-Active Planning Measures 
Participants were asked about proactive or direct measures taken to prevent or mitigate effects 
of potential disasters by their businesses operations. The questions asked were: 
 Before the tsunami hit the country, had your company received any warning?  
 What did you do to prepare for the event?  
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 Do you have a documented crisis/risk management plan for your business that covers 
major risks/hazards? 
 Were you acting in response to the advice of any other division; your head office or 
government authorities?  
All private sector participants from the tourism industry indicated that they were not aware of 
any emergency response plans for the sector at the national level. Similarly they did not have 
any plans for severe weather or storm surges. However, one participant noted the 
environmental risk associated with beach erosion:   
“Beach erosion is a common issue we are having and we have our own yearly plan to do that. 
And we continue working on the beach erosion issues and we control and minimize it. 
Otherwise we don’t have any other plan, because we don’t have any disasters here in the 
Maldives, we didn’t experience anything like that.” (PS-R1) 
In the absence of formal/written emergency response plans, private sector establishments 
reacted to the disaster in very different ways. As one of the participants: 
“We went around the island and we informed everyone that we want to make a headcount, so 
we asked all the guests to gather near the specialty restaurant and that’s where we counted 
that everyone was here because we also had diving trips out and when they came back we 
also collected everyone and the manager that time tried to keep the situation at an ease, not 
that anyone panics”. (PS-R5): 
However, all interviewees indicated that most of the tourists booked during that period left the 
country due to panic, even from the islands that operated normally. This was due primarily to 
their respective governments instructing them to leave through travel advisories. All 
participants agreed that tourists started panicking after  TV services resumed, when they 
realized what had happened. Even though the Maldives was not greatly affected  the media 
coverage was focused  on casualties in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka and of course the 
devastation in Indonesia and Thailand. One participant stated: 
“That’s when it started to become hard for us because until then as I said no one knew 
anything and no one knew exactly what had happened and the guests were very calm. But for 
strange reason the moment when they realized what happened and the moment when they 
realized there were flights coming to Maldives to take out guests they got very aggressive.” 
(PS-R5) 
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As discussed above, power houses were flooded and some of the resorts could not access their 
computer systems to generate any guest lists to make even a head count. The resorts badly 
affected needed to evacuate as soon as they could, even if they had food stocks and water that 
could last for a few days. They were not able to produce any water through the desalination 
plants and the guests had to wash in  the sea. All resorts were able to make contact with the 
Ministry of Tourism the day after the tsunami.  
Tourist evacuations from the severely affected resorts were carried out using the resorts’ own 
dhonis (Maldivian name for motorized boats), the Coast Guard vessels and the Pakistani 
Naval Ship, which was visiting Maldives during that time. The British Tour Operators were 
the first ones to evacuate their clients in charter flights, followed by the German and Austrian 
tour operators who reacted more slowly. However, after observing the situation on 29th 
December 2004, they also started to send their charter flights to the Maldives to remove them. 
The resorts did not force any of their tour operators to evacuate the clients. One participant  
stated: 
“But it was up to them. It was their decision whether they wanted to stay or whether they 
wanted to go. So the tour operator didn’t force them where as the English Tour Operators 
they did take their guests out. They didn’t want any guests to stay here.” (PS-R3) 
The tour operators and the resorts could not properly communicate with the airport during the 
first few days after the tsunami which led to delays in booking seats for passengers on these 
charter flights. As indicated above, the resorts which received less damage did try to inform 
customers of the situation, by explaining the circumstances, however most wanted to leave. In 
severely affected resorts, the guests had to be kept in the reception area, and the kitchens were 
in such a bad state local islanders cooked for their guests. Resorts  concentrated on taking the 
injured, and people in need first to the airport. One resort chartered a flight to transport 
customers. In some cases, resorts were unable to even communicate with their respective tour 
operators, media sources and the concerned families of their clients who were worried about 
their loved ones. One participant  indicated:  
“We had to deal with the media in all our major markets. We were not in a position to issue 
reassuring messages because we lacked information and the phone system was completely 
down for the first two days, no real information was available. In some cases it took as long 
as four days to restore the telephone services.” (PS-T1) 
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7.3.3 Environmental Scanning, Risk Analysis and Disaster Contingency Plans 
Gurtner (2007) argues that tourism related crisis or risk management requires considerable 
investment of resources from tourism businesses. Using crisis management case studies from 
Bali and Phuket he  explains that the effects of the tsunami in Thailand could have been 
reduced through enhanced stakeholder awareness, competent knowledge of appropriate 
preparation and responses. Similar to the Maldives, Southern Thailand also had no regional or 
destination level crisis management plan in place. As highlighted earlier, companies need to 
invest in time and money and other resources to create contingency plans. Even if the resorts 
in the Maldives could bear the cost of preparing these plans, there was no legal requirement to 
have them prior to the tsunami. As highlighted by the respondents from the NTOs, MOT has 
not been able to go ahead with recommendations provided in the sector disaster management 
plan and tourism master plans due to budgetary constraints.  
 
Having risk management and business resilience plans has not been a legal requirement, even 
after the tsunami. The MOT published disaster management plan guidelines for tourism 
vessels, tourist guest houses/ hotels and tourist resorts in their website on 5th December 2013. 
In December 2013, local media reported response and recovery training for one resort through 
NDMC assistance, who called upon other tourism enterprises to participate in the future. 
Resort safety and environment management plans developed prior to resort development for 
legal requirements do not include risk management frameworks and disaster management 
components. One participant  noted that: 
 
“Honestly speaking, I would say that people working in the tourism operations aren’t trained 
and prepared. They do not conduct any drills as well.” (PS-S1) 
For small tourism businesses in the Maldives, developing contingency plans will be difficult 
since they lack  capital. Even though none of the businesses interviewed highlighted this fact, 
they stressed on lack of skills and trained people in this area and without such resources it is 
unlikely that they will  have the competency to develop crisis management planning. In his 
article about crisis management models and their applicability to small scale businesses, 
Cushnahan (2004) examined the small island of Gili Air in Indonesia. He found  that all 43 
small businesses had no crisis management plans or trained personnel and therefore the 
responses to the crisis was ad hoc and unsystematic. Tourism business owners and managers 
did not assemble crisis management teams and overall they had no access to funds or credit 
facilities, and had to deal the crisis in a piecemeal fashion (Cushnahan, 2004). Most of the 
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tourism destinations in the developing world affected by the Boxing Day tsunami, including 
the Maldives, had similar stories.  
7.4 Emergency and Intermediate-Phase  
7.4.1 Crisis Reponse and Communication Strategies Implemented 
The third stage of the DIRE Grid includes the direct response used  by the operators during 
the disaster. The questions asked were: 
 What were the main impacts of the tsunami at this stage?  
 Who was at risk and what property damage had occurred? 
 What actions were taken by you and your organization? 
 What action was taken by other organizations and relevant agencies and how did affect 
your actions? 
As indicated in section 7.2, four of the resorts/hotels which received minimum damage, three 
of those which received some reconstruction and three of those totally reconstructed were 
selected for interviews. One participant from a less damaged operation  reported: 
“At that moment I was at the reception at the front desk and the water came into the reception 
and furniture started floating. We had rattan furniture at that time and it was floating and the 
lights went off, we had disconnection of electricity. We had damage in a way that can be 
restored very easily. We had some damages to the buildings which were located above the 
water such as the Moodhu Bar and the Water Villas. Not so much of the land Villas. There 
were few land villas in the eastern side that were damaged, the glass doors were broken and 
of course water came inside and with the salt water we had quite some damage afterwards. I 
think compared to other islands we were not hit as bad.” (PS-R9) 
Another participant from the same category of damage added: 
“We were very fortunate; the damage that happened to this island compared to what 
happened to the Maldives, we believe was not significant damage at all. However, our jetty 
floated and drifted away. Of course we didn’t let it go, we held it back, we tied it back and 
later we put it back on the jetty and fixed it. There weren’t any damages to the guest rooms. 
There was a bit of water in the courtyard of villas, and a bit of damage happened to the plants 
only, no structural damages occurred.” (PS-R8) 
A participant from a totally reconstructed resort operation  reported: 
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“When the tsunami came, we had about 210 guests and near about 180 employees in-house. I 
was in my room in the staff quarters when someone came and informed me to leave 
immediately. I tried to open the door but couldn’t do it so I broke the glass window, injuring 
my hand in the process while the door next to me burst in with the force of the waves that was 
about 5 feet high that flooded the island for about 5 minutes. If I stayed in I would have 
drowned.” (PS-R10) 
“The ground was muddled with coral that came from the sea. Towards the eastern side of the 
island the beach shrubs and the trees were turned backward onto the island. Near to about 15 
meters of sand was stripped off from the beach. A beach berm of near to about 1 meter was 
present on the same side of the island with broken corals burying the roots of shrubs and 
trees that were nearly 5 meters inland from the ocean. Extensive damages occurred to the 
property and infrastructure damaging almost all the guest rooms, equipment and jetty.” (PS-
R10) 
On the day of the tsunami, air transport services were severely disrupted and Male’ 
International Airport was extensively damaged. Several pieces of navigational equipment and 
back-up systems were damaged due to the tsunami. According to all participants the airport 
was in chaos and confusion. Waves of heights up to 2.5 to 3 meters washed across the runway 
and entered the main terminal buildings. The terminal was bursting with passengers, as it was 
one of the busiest days of the season. Some large commercial aircraft had already landed and 
one small aircraft was about to land when the waves rushed in. Another three sea planes 
landed on the oncoming waves and received extensive damage to their aircrafts. Soon after 
the tsunami waves subsided, the air transport services agreed to open the runway by clearing 
stretches of coral and debris. They were able to open after 10 hours to welcome streams of 
tourists who were evacuated from the resorts.  
The biggest issue was communication, as the country’s mobile telecommunication system 
collapsed. Resorts that had satellite phones could not establish any contact with any 
responsible authority. The resort boats equipped with two-way radios were used to 
communicate between resorts and islands; however they could not reach anyone at the Coast 
Guard of the Maldives National Defense Force or  emergency services at the airport. Some of 
the resorts operated by international chains had satellite phones and  were able to receive 
instructions and advice through their overseas offices. As one participant  indicated: 
“The first day was a disaster in terms of telephone communication. One or two calls could be 
made when you try for an hour or two. If you are lucky you get a line and you talk for few 
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minutes and then it’s gone. The first day and the following night was a disaster. But the 
second day 27th December, we were able to communicate normally on the mobile phones 
within Male’ Atoll and to Male’, but still we weren’t able to contact to other local islands 
which were far away to Male’. But the tourism area was covered. And we were able to 
communicate on the telephone and were able to send some emails.” (PS-R1) 
According to all participants interviewed in private sector, another significant challenge was 
the collapse of communication systems. No communication took place between them and 
NTOs and EOs, and tour operators who were sending the tourists to the airport. As discussed 
earlier, the airport did not have the capacity to handle thousands of tourists in shock  who 
required special care. The airport could not even provide blankets for the tourists and they had 
to sleep on bare ground. When the airport resumed services,  confusion ensued when the 
airlines  had to allocate seats for the passengers. Some tourists were taken to guest-house 
accommodation in Male’. One participant representing the private sector  noted: 
“At the early stages we were trying to help the resorts and people in general with their 
immediate needs. We dispatched fresh water, food and clothing. The main problem was 
water. The water table was affected by salt water and likely polluted. We supplied medicines 
and we were lucky we prevented  disease. In general we helped in repatriation of the tourists 
and in providing immediate relief operations in the airport such as food, shelter and clothing 
to the people who have lost everything.” (PS-N1) 
Another participant  noted: 
“We had four resorts. We hadn’t received damage to the infrastructure since the water came 
to an extent and didn’t damage the property. But some areas around one of the island were 
eroded badly. Most panicking thing was there was no communication. One of our resorts was 
in R. Atoll and it was so much of a concern for us. There was no satellite phones to 
communicate until one of the other resorts shared their phone with us the following day. We 
then contacted the resort to learn they were alright.” (PS-R7) 
Little damage was sustained by water transport operators who ferry visitors between the 
airport and Male’ and between the airport and the island resorts. Although the two seaplane 
operators based at the international airport suffered the loss of some ground level 
maintenance/operational equipment, terminal building furnishings and mooring pontoon 
decking, their aircraft fleets suffered limited damage. One air transport operator for example, 
had three aircraft of out of  thirteen out of service for two weeks. However, both the sea plane 
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operators were almost immediately running a continual series of relief flights to the inhabited 
and resort islands. While the air transport operators and airport services restored the 
operations, they had to deal with the charter flights that came to pick up the traumatized 
tourists. This was followed by the cancellation of charter flights and other regular scheduled 
flights, following the reduced arrivals. Despite the chaos and the confusion, three air transport 
operators in the country mobilized all of their resources and time in assisting the government 
and private sector establishments to evacuate the injured and  affected tourists and locals. The 
breakdown in communication gave way to negative speculation and inflated rumors about 
access to the country. 
7.4.2 Crisis Control Mechanisms Implemeted 
The intermediate stage is the fourth component of DIRE Grid and includes the recovery phase 
and short-term restoration activities. The questions asked of  the participants were:  
 What were the main challenges in restoring operations to normal conditions? 
 What action did you and your business take to restore normal services? 
 How did the actions of other firms and relevant agencies  assist or hinder the return to 
normality? 
The resorts did not have specific assembly points identified for emergencies, nor procedures 
for them. The only procedure they followed was for fire emergencies. It was a challenge as 
the Maldives did not have high grounds where guests could go for safety and such assembly 
points should be well marked and equipped with all relief food, water, medical items, 
communication systems and life-jackets. Another major challenge was restoring utilities and 
ensuring generators were positioned on high ground. Communicating with the media and the 
tour operators was another key challenge for the resorts as they lacked trained media 
personnel and they had to ensure a correct picture of the events were given in an area already 
under a lot of media attention and speculation. One participant  noted:  
“It took seven days for the communication to be restored properly to the region. There was 
the disconnection of the whole telecommunication system.” (PS-R7) 
Another participant reported: 
“The whole country was in panic. The country wasn’t prepared. We did our best. We had 
many challenges. There were lots of issues. While we were travelling by sea, so many logs 
floating around made the travel very dangerous and difficult. In fact one of our boats got hit 
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by a floating log in the middle of the night and broke down.” (PS-R8) 
At the time of the tsunami, there was no Red Cross/Red Crescent Society or any international 
organizations that could help in the relief. United Nations agencies at that time had no focus 
on disasters. Few Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were listed and community 
based associations that operated, lacked capacity and skills in disaster management. Despite 
these circumstances, the tourism industry worked very closely with the island communities in 
the absence of any disaster preparedness at a local level. There were instances when the 
islanders prepared food for the clients. Similarly, the resorts also helped the island 
communities, as  one participant noted: 
“We helped two islands with food supplies, which are rice, wheat flour and water. Every day 
I remember they came with boats and water tanks to fill drinking water into it because they 
didn’t have anything.” (PS-R6) 
Another participant  mentioned that: 
 
“Yes, because we were prepared for New Year around 280 people in-house so at that time I 
think we had roughly 200 people here and we had really enough of supplies and we were also 
able to generate our own drinking water. We even supplied local islands with drinking water, 
as they didn’t have them anymore.” (PS-R4) 
Resort management and the other tourism industry businesses mobilized all of their 
employees in relief operations and preliminary damage assessments. The management 
committees worked tirelessly to ensure the safety and well-being of the tourists and the 
employees at resorts. There was panic during the first few hours after the tsunami. However, 
all participants noted that tourists responded well at first because they were not sure of what 
had happened. Most tourists did observe the water drawing back and the waves hitting the 
islands and the subsequent emptiness of the reef for a short time.  
Tourists were asked to stay out of the water and arrangements were made for them to stay in 
the reception area. Employees in less damaged businesses worked in teams in relief 
operations and cleaning up  guest rooms, staff quarters and restaurants. One participant  
mentioned: 
“Electrical engineers were trying to stabilize the situation back with the generators,  
housekeeping team was cleaning the guest areas, Food and Beverage team was cleaning all 
the internal areas, and here in the Front Office we were trying to distribute the information 
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and keep the information flow and make sure the information is given to the guests 
appropriately.” (PS-R6) 
7.4.3 Short-Term Challenges to the Organization 
For the tour operators, the greatest challenge during the tsunami was the breakdown of the 
communication systems. All participants indicated that they were not able to communicate 
with the resorts to check on the well-being of their tourists. They had no information to 
provide to  families and friends of the tourists. They could not activate their crisis 
communication plans and give reassuring messages in the absence of proper information. The 
media sources from the respective tourist generating markets were constantly contacting them 
throughout the 2-4 days of communication breakdown. No information was available during 
this period until telecommunications were restored. As one participant stated:  
“Collapse of the national telecommunications system was the main issue we faced during the 
tsunami. We weren’t able to contact the resorts to find out about the condition of our clients. 
We had a lot of pressure from families and relatives of the clients to know about the safety of 
their loved ones and we simply had no information.” (PS-T2) 
All participants indicated that they worked supportively and gave assistance to the authorities 
and the businesses in a situation when there was much panic among  tourists and employees. 
While those resorts which were closer to the Male’ International Airport evacuated their 
guests, the airport itself was not prepared to handle a major catastrophe. There were no relief 
arrangements for the evacuated clients and many had to sleep and rest on the floor, even 
without a blanket. Resorts in distant areas faced transportation issues in the absence of 
appropriate transport. Dhonis, essentially used for off-resort guest activities, such as 
excursions and island-hopping, had to be used for evacuation, even though they  were not 
suitable for an evacuation in uncertain weather conditions. Available modes of transport such 
as speedboats, usually able to carry 15 passengers, were damaged in most resorts. Most 
tourists left the resorts and the safari boats, and headed towards the airport. While these were 
the on-ground realities for tour operators, they faced numerous other challenges. One 
participant  reported: 
“The biggest challenge was logistics since the islands were scattered and to get ferries with 
appropriate numbers. Our largest resort had 430 guests who wanted to leave. We had our 
own fleet of speed boats and we couldn’t get any from the country as all were occupied. We 
even helped defense force to reach that atoll.” (PS-R7) 
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“The local MP came to the resort and we set-up a connection with the authorities. We had a 
satellite radio and we were able to communicate through  helping them. We provided our 
boats to take people. We didn’t have first aid services developed to that extent however, we 
sent food and water.” (PS-R7) 
As discussed in section 7.2, different businesses reacted in different ways depending on the 
severity of the damage and the circumstances during the emergency and the intermediate 
phase. Resorts, in particular, had to wait for a long time to get mobile phone coverage and had 
to travel to nearby inhabited islands to get a signal to communicate with their Head Offices in 
Male’ and other places abroad. Those resorts which received severe damage were evacuated 
by the Coast Guard, with the help of air transport providers, while a Pakistani Naval Vessel 
assisted in evacuating guests from  severely affected resorts. 
Soon after the tsunami, 26 incoming charter flights were cancelled. Most of the guests 
panicked and almost everyone went home. All participants from the resorts, travel agencies 
and safari boats interviewed stated that almost 50% of their arriving guests cancelled their 
reservations, resulting in a 50% decrease in revenue for the period. All participants from the 
tourism industry indicated that the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) and the Maldivian Tourism 
Promotion Board (MTPB) worked closely with them during the response and recovery stages. 
They disseminated information on the status of the tourists, employees, and  resorts to all their 
respective stakeholders.  
The MOT and MTPB updated the respective governments of source markets and  travel 
agents on the situation. Businesses focused on facilitating a smooth departure for all tourists 
who wished to leave their resorts and safari vessels. Information was disseminated to all 
concerned by the MOT and the MTPB that even though the Maldives was hit  by the tsunami, 
Maldives’ tourist industry  was open for ‘business as usual’, but with a reduced bed capacity.  
According to all of the participants,  the authorities’ actions assisted in returning to normalcy. 
By the end of the 1st week of January, the travel trade at large was convinced that the 
Maldives tourism industry was in operation. However, consumer perception of the Maldives 
was greatly ‘tarnished’ by the continuous negative media coverage of the disaster. In 
coordination with the private sector, the Ministry of Tourism and the MTPB encouraged 
foreign governments who had initially imposed ‘travel bans’ to the Maldives to relax the 
bans. As a result, from 29th December 2004, travel bans were slowly lifted  by the respective 
foreign offices of major markets. However, the continuous media coverage of  the ‘Indian 
Ocean’ tsunami, which unfortunately did not exclude the Maldives, appeared to have 
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confused tourists at large. For tourists to come back to the Maldives, a sustained ‘special 
promotional campaign’ was needed.  
All participants from the private sector agreed that the government and  industry stakeholders 
collaborated  in the recovery program, instituted  by the MOT and the MTPB, along with the 
industry association: Maldives Association for Tourism Industries (MATI). The private sector 
collaborated and provided assistance to the government sector. Participant  noted that: 
“We had numerous meetings with MTPB and MOT to understand the immediate, medium and 
long-term needs following the tsunami. We identified things that we could do to assist the 
recovery. We assisted the government in terms of their marketing needs.” (PS-N1) 
Another participant  reported:  
“The resort came back to normal operations within two weeks with no huge business loss. 
Basically we didn’t receive much damage. The decline in arrivals picked up within two 
months. Our biggest markets were British, French and Italian. We recovered because of these 
markets that didn’t stop sending their tourists. Media has played a part. Government efforts 
to change the perception helped.”(PS-R8) 
MATI, representing the private sector tourism industry, worked along with the MOT, MTPB 
and other regional tourism associations like PATA. According to the MATI, they assessed the 
situation in the tourism industry soon after establishment of telephone communication on the 
27th December 2004. Officially MATI used information from the MTPB website for press 
releases to concerned industry stakeholders. MATI communicated with PATA Headquarters, 
assuring stakeholders that while some Maldivian resorts were not operational at the time, 
most of them were back to normal and looking forward to hosting New Year vacations. 
Similarly, MATI went on international media channels, such as the BBC, and invited their 
media teams to visit the Maldives to see for themselves. At the same time, PATA press 
releases promoted island tourism in the Maldives; the environment profile of islands, floods 
and negligibility of risks such as electrical accidents, water contamination, diseases and 
epidemics unlike other destinations. As one participant  explained: 
“We worked very closely with the tour operators and airlines to seek ways to reviving the 
industry. We worked with international media and the local media and through internet as 
well, putting on a lot of pictures showing the daily lives of the tourists in the resorts.” (PS-
N1) 
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Considerable work was done by the MATI. During the week after the tsunami, MATI 
organized a visit for a 29 member Italian Press delegation followed by meetings with key 
airlines operating to Maldives. At the same time, they consulted with the MOT and the MTPB 
to discuss the necessary steps  to revive the Asian markets to the Maldives and highlighted the 
importance of providing accurate information needed by tour operators, water safety, food 
safety, utilities and other environmental damage due to the tsunami. According to one 
interviewee, MATI assisted in  media visits which were intended to assess and report the 
situation to their countries: the Maldives  secured support from airlines to provide seats for 
media personnel  and resorts to provide complimentary tours. Similarly, MATI coordinated 
various crisis marketing proposals that emphasized increasing visitation, public awareness, 
brand identification and revenue.  Likewise, MATI  succeeded in lobbying  the government to 
revert to the Maldives signature slogan “Maldives; The Sunny Side of Life” and support to 
revive Asian markets. 
According to the MATI respondent, as part of the Tourism Recovery Project, launched by 
MATI following the tsunami, the organization hired marketing consultant Professor Jack 
Carlsen to assess the impact of the tsunami on the Maldives tourism industry with a view to 
securing funding for an intensive marketing campaign to revive the industry. The final report 
was a tourism market recovery strategy for the Maldives, which integrated short, medium and 
long-term marketing strategies.  
7.5 Long-Term Recovery and Resolution (1-5 years) 
7.5.1 Co-Ordination with External Stakeholders for Long-Term Recovery 
Long-term recovery is the fifth stage in the DIRE Grid and includes the initial recovery stage 
and the long-term challenges faced by the  private sector tourism industry operators. The 
participants were asked: 
 What were the main challenges confronting your business in the long-term recovery from 
the tsunami? 
 What actions were taken by your business to address this recovery? 
 How have the actions of other agencies assisted or hindered longer-term recovery? 
The recovery of Maldives tourism following the 2004 Tsunami is an example of crisis 
management in action. Economic recovery of the Maldives depended on the recovery of the 
tourism industry. The government responded by giving immediate relief to the industry by 
deferring the lease rent for all tourist resorts from the first quarter of year 2005 for nine 
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months, waiving the lease rent for the period required for the repair work, giving an import 
duty exemption for this period and extension of 12 months for the resorts that were closed for 
renovation. The government gave US$1.5 million to MTPB for initiatives to stop 
cancellations and joint marketing and promotions through a special market recovery 
campaign. The outcome of these marketing actions during 2005 will be discussed later.  
International aid organizations and donor agencies also responded positively during the 
recovery stage resulting in recovery of the country and also the tourism industry. Professor 
Jack Carlsen’s Maldives Tourism Recovery Strategy, was implemented. Grants for the 
tsunami emergency assistance program in 2005 included US$21.8 million from the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). Similarly, a US$50 million loan was given by the European 
Investment Bank to develop tourism and support infrastructure in the Maldives. One 
participant  reported:  
“We helped the resorts to rebuild. Not only rebuilding the market confidence but also in terms 
of physical infrastructure and rebuilding of the resorts. We sought aid and assistance from 
overseas such as from European Investment Bank, we brought them here and opened credit 
lines for the resorts. We brought in International Monetary Fund who assisted in terms of the 
resorts’ understanding the concept of insurance.” (PS-N1) 
Another Participant further highlighted: 
“Most resorts were not adequately covered; some were not insured at all. International 
Monetary Fund helped us by sending experts and run forums for the tourism industry 
operators to understand the concept of insurance and how we have to be prepared for loss of 
property and loss of business in the context of a natural disaster.” (PS-N1) 
“In general the main actions we took were; providing assistance in seeking finance for 
reconstruction of resorts, building of markets and market confidence, working with tour 
operators to win and revive the businesses back and better protection of the industry assets 
from a natural disaster.” (PS-N1) 
In association with a team of scientists from Marine Science Group, University of Bologna, 
Italy, MATI conducted the first scientific survey to determine damage to coral reefs. This 
survey found that Northern Male’ Atoll reefs received less damage, whereas the Southern 
Male’ Atoll showed considerable damage. The Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) further assisted in investigating the effects of the tsunami on coral 
reefs and bait fish populations in the Maldives. A team of experts from various research 
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institutions across Australia concluded that the islands, beaches and coral reef flats received 
minimal damage. The government focus was on cleaning the inhabited and uninhabited 
islands which were close to the resorts to prevent pollution due to waste created by the 
tsunami damaging the coral reefs and beaches that attract the tourists. As one participant 
reported: 
“One of the biggest fears was the damage to the coral reefs. We did a survey through hiring a 
team from a university in Italy and conducted a survey on some of the reef spots. The results 
were shared with the government and also published. Most of the reefs were intact and the 
marine life was not disturbed much.” (PS-N1) 
Most activities in resort operations focused on repair and restoration. The main focus was 
providing  important life support services and facilities to a minimum standard of operation 
and safety. Tourism businesses placed less emphasis on developing emergency preparedness 
plans at this stage. However, all the participants interviewed from tourism businesses did 
mention purchasing satellite telecommunication systems and adequate life-jackets for the 
islands. During this period, the Maldives Meteorological Service was linked with the US 
Geological Service to ensure early warnings and alerts were noted and passed onto  radio and 
television networks for early dissemination.  
Though these activities were implemented, chaos followed when new earthquakes occurred 
on the coast of Sumatra on the 28th March 2005. The telecommunication system collapsed 
once again and the public and even tourism businesses received very slow instructions from 
the authorities. Fortunately, it was  a false alert. The Maldives National Defense Force/Coast 
Guard initiated some training programs targeted at the resorts, as it would be impossible to 
assist any individual resort during a nationwide emergency. This was seen as the most 
practical and immediate preparedness measure. 
7.5.2 Challenges for Long-Term Recovery 
Many challenges remained for the long term recovery. As indicated above, the 
communications hardware with backup systems were installed both in the resorts and their 
respective Male’ offices in the capital. In addition, satellite phones, mobile phones and radio 
systems were installed. There was also the need to fix  devices on higher ground with spare 
batteries and train  employees in how to use them. Tourism businesses communicated their 
press statements and situation reports through their websites and through email. Overseas 
brands with Corporate PR and Communication Departments sent specialists to handle the 
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situation in the Maldives. The information and messages sent to stakeholders were closely 
checked against information released by the MTPB and the MOT.  
Restoring visitor confidence was another significant task for which they worked alongside 
resorts and  regulatory authorities. Based on their recommendations, the government took 
several actions. The tourism industry promoted itself through various media channels with the 
message that the islands were still a safe place to visit. The national telecommunications 
company installed satellite communication systems at  key areas within the country as back-
up communication systems. The Ministry of Defense and National Security came up with a 
preliminary disaster management plan to activate in the case of another major disaster. As a 
reactive measure, tour operators assisted in organizing familiarization trips, road-shows and a 
television advertising campaign along with the MOT and MTPB for  journalists and travel 
agents.  
Tour operators stated that more government participation in marketing and destination 
promotion was needed. They were concerned with  establishing back-up communication 
systems in individual resorts, which would facilitate proper exchange of information from 
reliable sources or focal points during the crisis. They also advocated creating safe areas and 
evacuation plans in resorts along with training staff members, in airports, resorts and safari 
boats, to handle emergencies. Tour operators suggested upgrading the airport services and 
facilities while improving means of transport during evacuations. They also suggested that 
regulatory authorities establish with crisis/disaster management plans for each resort and 
formulate maritime safety regulations.  
There were many challenges for the long-term recovery of the air transport services. All 
participants highlighted the need to keep the airport functioning well during a disaster. 
Another challenge was the need to keep the run-way protected and other navigational 
equipment on higher ground. The airport needed to have back-up communication systems, 
emergency relief items, food, water, medicine, blankets and first-aid supplies along with a 
good emergency management plan. Similarly, the development of these services in domestic 
airports, together with an efficient ferry transportation system among the islands, can be very 
helpful during an emergency. One of the reasons for the chaos and confusion in the airport 
was the lack of an emergency response plan which should be well integrated with the national 
disaster management plan and tourism disaster management plan.  Such a plan should involve 
scenario exercises and the training of relevant staff. 
Travel agents in the Maldives usually represent foreign tour operators and safari boat 
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operators. All of the participants indicated that communication breakdown was the greatest 
challenge during the short-term recovery. Caught between the foreign tour operators and the 
resorts, they were liable for thousands of clients in the resorts, safari boats and guesthouses 
they represent. Being in the Maldives they were unable to communicate with any of their 
clients and update families on their well-being. As indicated earlier, the chaos occurred when 
the resorts and safari boats moved their clients to the airport and relief centers in Male’ and to 
other islands. They completely lost track of their clients and where they had been sent.  
Another challenge was the inadequate number of airline seats to allocate to those evacuated to 
the airport. When communication was established, their clients were brought to relief centers 
in schools and guest houses until they could be sent home. During this period, some clients 
were overcharged for temporary accommodation and this tarnished the image of the travel 
agents. The Immigration Department and Ministry of Tourism assisted the tourists who lost 
their passports in flying back quickly and in keeping proper records and passport copies. 
However, communication breakdown and poor response resulted in negative travel advisories 
from many countries.  
Travel agents operating safari boats were not affected to the same extent as the resorts. Some 
participants interviewed did not even notice the swells. However, their clients were also asked 
to leave as most of the countries issued travel advisories warning against traveling to the 
Maldives. Another major challenge for the travel agents was dealing with the influx of 
communication and arguments between the tour operators, resorts and other tourism 
businesses regarding the catastrophic cover in travel insurance policies. Similar to the tour 
operators, they expected more government support and fiscal measures to help them speed up 
the tourism flow to the country. They also wanted government assistance in educating them 
on the insurance industry and developing regulatory and safety standards for safari boats. 
While most resorts were busy restoring their operations to normal conditions, one of the 
resorts interviewed took a very positive initiative to help the community recover in a totally 
damaged island, which had lost all its support facilities, utilities and services. According to 
one participant  
“We had our Head Office in Singapore and also in Bangkok and both the offices were calling 
and giving instruction to us. The main instruction was to check the sort of damages we had 
here and they found out that we didn’t have any damage compared to other parts of the 
country and the instruction was to go and help other people. We adopted one island in 
Meemu Atoll and we did everything from A to Z together with United Nations Development 
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Program (UNDP).” (PS-R3) 
This project included the rebuild and repair of 77 houses on Naalaafushi Island, in association 
with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in their Adopt-an-Island program. 
This partnership program and donor assistance attracted potential donors and even private 
sector to support specific recovery projects such as rebuilding homes, harbors or restoring 
livelihoods or damaged water and sanitation systems in the islands. The resort helped 
financially and also by sending their staff and skilled project management team, while the 
UNDP supplied the construction materials. The resort further helped in giving a teaching 
scholarship as a sustainable support to the island and employing people from the island to 
help them regain their lives. Similarly, the resort also provided desalination plants to Meedhu 
Island and assisted women to regain their lives through micro enterprise grants which enabled 
them to start make and sell crafts and other trades. Participant added: 
“Of course when the occupancy has gone down we had a lot of employees who did not have 
much work to do on the island. Therefore, our company president instructed us to utilize all 
the employees to assist the community in the Maldives. He emphasized that no employee 
should be terminated, all employees need to be paid and to use them to assist the community 
in the Maldives and all the employees assisted us.” (PS-R3) 
“Yes, we had people from the corporate office coming here. But their concentration was not 
on the property; their concentration was on the nation. And they joined the management team 
and assisted the local island to build all the houses; they were not involved in the resort as 
there wasn’t such damage.” (PS-R3) 
Another resort which was totally devastated took the initiative to help its employees. 
Employees from this resort showed strong resilience during the relief and emergency phase. It 
was a very emotional time for the employees. Many of them had families in the islands that 
were hugely damaged and families displaced either permanently or temporarily. Since it 
would take a substantial period of time to rebuild the resort, nearly 200 employees were sent 
aboard for training, which not only gave them exposure and training in another country but 
also provided a stable income during the period of wage loss. Each of them returned with new 
personal and professional experience gained from working in hotels and resorts in locations 
ranging from Dallas, Pam Beach, Washington D.C., Provence, Hampshire, Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, Tokyo and Singapore. 
One participant noted that: 
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“A lot of uncertainty in the region particularly in India and Sri Lanka, prompted the staff 
from these countries to go back to check on their families. Local staff wanted to leave as well 
temporarily. It was difficult to encourage them to stay. We gave one month leave to foreign 
and local staff who wished to see their family.” (PS-R7) 
Another participant added: 
“Actually it was arranged in a way that staff who wanted stayed back on the island, to help 
reconstruction and those that wanted to leave went for an extended annual leave. For those 
who stayed back we paid a 125% of their salary and for those who left we paid 75%.” (PS-
R4) 
Thus, post-tsunami, there were some issues related to temporary unemployment, but most 
businesses retained their staff up to the re-opening of their businesses, after their repairs and 
reconstructions had been completed. 
7.5.3 Lessons Learned 
Resolution is the sixth stage in the DIRE Grid. Resolution is the stage when routine is 
restored or an improved stage is established. The participants were asked: 
 Has the tsunami brought any permanent changes in the environment in which your 
business operated? 
 How has your organization responded to those changes? 
 Has the experience of the tsunami resulted in any permanent changes in your company’s 
approach to management and planning? 
 What would you say about readiness of your business for a potential disaster (tropical 
storm, fire, flood, power failure)? 
Except for one, all of the participants from the private sector tourism industry indicated that 
the tsunami was an ‘eye opener,’ creating awareness of the devastation and extent of the 
impact of a natural disaster, which was new to the Maldives. The private sector tourism 
industry learned many lessons from the tsunami disaster - the most important being 
systematically following restoration and recovery practices and developing preparedness to 
face large scale tourism crisis/disasters. One participant noted: 
“We had only a basic fire plan before the tsunami. Emergency preparedness plans were not 
there at all that time. But after the tsunami we developed the preparedness plans. We attended 
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many seminars and we got a lot of ideas to develop our own disaster management plans”. 
“We raised our water bungalows structures to two feet when we constructed them again. We 
didn’t raise or change the designs of power houses, desalination plants, sewerage plants and 
other utilities.” (PS-R7) 
Another participant observed: 
“We are more prepared for a disaster than before. Now we have disaster assembly points, 
satellite phones and we do conduct drills in every three months.” (PS-R6) 
One participant disagreed: 
“There is no disaster plan as far as I understand. Yesterday there was a gust of wind 47 miles 
and in few seconds many boats collided and this alone shows how ready we are. If a tsunami 
comes it would be much more ferocious. The safari operators have not conducted any risk 
assessment/ management plans in case of a disaster.” (PS-W2) 
An interview with one of the biggest insurance companies in the Maldives showed that the 
issue of insurance has been highlighted in the aftermath of the tsunami. Participants stated that 
their insurance policies covered for physical structural, furnishings, fittings and equipment 
damage. Larger international brand resorts associated with stronger local companies were 
covered for both physical damage and business interruption losses. Conversely, smaller local 
companies operating just one or two businesses discovered that their policies were inadequate. 
As one participant noted: 
“Some of the local resort operators considered business interruption insurance as excessive 
and unnecessary as it was available for only six months period. Longer periods were more 
expensive and less usual. After the tsunami and consequently with the seminars and education 
of the operators they started exploring their insurance cover.” (PS-I1) 
The resort operators reported that they conducted damage inventories themselves and were 
checked by international auditing firms operating in the country. One participant stated: 
“We had to write down in detail what was destroyed to the insurance. I remember we claimed 
the mattresses being soaked in salt water and everything, where the insurance said that for 
100, they will replace 50 pieces and all that. Not that they were completely new but they were 
4 years old. I remember that we had to do a big inventory of what was here, which room was 
damaged, and we had to take pictures of the damage and yes we had to report that in detail to 
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the insurance.” (PS-R3) 
Evidence from the resort operators and the insurance companies showed that the insurance 
companies appraised all of the claims sent to them. Given the unusual circumstances of the 
tsunami, the insurance companies were reasonably flexible with their assessments and claims 
were settled in time to assist the rebuilding that followed, and deal with cash flow issues. 
Most of the 21 resorts that were closed were operated by major international and the local 
groups who already possessed the financial and operational strength to rebuild from their own 
resources and insurance cover. The five resorts that opened before February 2005 and were 
the least damaged were smaller resort operators who were more financially vulnerable. The 
resorts that took longer to rebuild were international brands that had their own capacity to 
rebuild and resume their operations. 
Another important finding was the private sector in the tourism industry developing their 
associations during the year 2006. These included the Diving Association of Maldives 
(DAM), a NGO developed to serve the interests of diving businesses, and the Maldives 
Association of Travel Agents and Tour Operators (MATATO) representing more than 50 
travel agents and tour operators in the Maldives. MATATO is a NGO formed with the 
mission to enable travel and tourism industry of the Maldives to work together using unity, 
empowerment and co-operation. 
Similar to the findings in Chapter 6, Table 22 summarizes the extent to which the private 
sector has performed in relation to the Maldives tsunami against the DIRE Grid. It was found 
that among the private sector tourism industry participants, MATI and the tourism resort 
operators responded well to the disaster despite the lack of a crisis management plans and a 
tourism disaster management plan. The operators ensured the safety of the tourists and the 
employees and supported the government sector. Similarly, as the representative tourism 
industry association, MATI took reactive measures and coordinated with the government 
during the emergency and intermediate stages. During the intermediate stage they assisted 
with the short-term tourism industry restoration and marketing activities, while in long-term 
they supported the government in formulating tourism market recovery strategies and seeking 
support from the tourism industry. 
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Table 22: Summarizes the Extent to which Private Sector has Performed in Relation to the Maldives Tsunami against the DIRE Grid 
Organization 1.Pre-event 
 
2. Prodromal 3. Emergency 
 
4.Intermediate 5.Long-term 
(Recovery) 
6.Resolution 
 
 
Strategic Actions 
and 
Implementation by 
Private Sector 
Tourism Industry 
 
 Develop, 
document and 
communicate 
Disaster 
Management 
plans  
 Assessment of 
disasters and 
probability of 
occurring 
 Develop disaster 
contingency 
plans 
 
 
 
 Warning 
systems  
 Activate 
communication 
mechanisms 
 Communicate 
objectives of 
contingency 
plans 
 
 
 Rescue/evacuat
ion procedures 
 Control over 
crisis 
communication 
 Appointing a 
spokesperson 
 Collaboration 
with internal/ 
external 
stakeholders 
 Action taken to 
minimize 
impacts 
 
 Restoration 
 Media communication 
strategy  
 Changes to the 
organizational 
structure/personnel 
 Collaboration 
stakeholders 
 Resource 
Management (e.g. , 
changes in leadership 
styles, financial, 
employee 
empowerment 
 
 
 Actions taken for 
recovery and 
challenges 
 De-briefing with 
employees 
 Restoration of 
business and 
consumer 
confidence 
 Collaborating with 
relevant 
stakeholders 
 
 
 Changes to 
operating 
environment 
 Effectiveness of 
strategies and 
response 
 Changes 
brought to 
Crisis/ disaster 
prevention and 
planning tools 
 
Maldives 
Association of 
Tourism Industry      
(MATI) 
 
 
No plans and not 
prepared for a natural 
disaster 
 
No warning systems 
has been in place to 
be activated so that 
industry partners can 
be informed 
 
Emergency 
response initiated in 
co-ordination with 
MNDF/ Coast 
Guard and 
Ministerial 
Committee  
 
Short-term industry 
restoration and marketing 
activities were done in co-
ordination with  Maldives 
Tourism Promotion Board 
(MTPB) ,Ministry of 
Tourism (MOT) and 
regional tourism 
association - PATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attempt to return to 
pre-disaster tourist 
levels through 
implementation of 
Tourism Recovery Plan 
developed by 
consultant hired by 
MATI ( Maldives 
Association for 
Tourism Industry) 
 
Followed the 
Maldives Tourism 
Market Recovery 
Strategy  
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Organization 1.Pre-event 
 
2. Prodromal 3. Emergency 
 
4.Intermediate 5.Long-term 
(Recovery) 
6.Resolution 
 
 
 
Tourist Resorts / 10 
resorts damaged  
None of the resorts 
was prepared for a 
natural disaster/ 
tsunami 
 
 
None of the resorts 
had any warning 
systems, 
contingency plans 
for a natural disaster 
 
 
 
 
 
Emergency 
response initiated,  
head counts were 
taken in all resorts, 
they established 
communication and  
provided up to date 
information to 
MOT and local/ 
foreign tour 
operators upon 
availability of 
communications 
 
 
All resorts co-ordinated 
with MOT, MATI and  , 
Maldives National 
Defence Force and the 
Coast Guard for relief and 
evacuation where needed 
 
Carried out short-term 
restoration of facilities 
where ever possible 
 
 
All resorts assisted in 
the  long-term disaster 
recovery in association 
with MATI , MOT and 
Maldives Tourism 
Promotion Board and 
supported the Market 
Recovery Strategy 
developed for the 
industry 
 
 
All resorts reopened 
and developed 
individual Crisis./ 
Disaster 
Management Plans, 
more safety and 
emergency response 
trainings were 
provide d to staff  
 
Insurance companies 
/ 2 
Insurance policies 
covered for physical 
structural, 
furnishings, fittings 
and equipment 
damage / Not 
prepared for a 
tsunami business 
interruption cover. 
Flood cover was 
there. 
No warning systems Co-ordinated with 
the authorities and 
resort operators/ 
businesses (MATI) 
Worked in co-ordination 
with the MOT and the 
resort operators/businesses 
Worked along with 
World Bank/IFC, MOT 
and tourism businesses 
(MATI). All operators 
financial value of 
claims were  appraised, 
settlements were made 
to assist the rebuild and 
cash flow difficulties 
Created awareness, 
informed and 
assisted companies 
with their insurance 
options 
 
Safari Vessels / 2 
 
Not prepared for a 
natural disaster 
 
No warning systems 
has been in place 
 
Co-ordinated with 
MOT for response 
 
Worked with MOT for 
short-term restoration of 
the safari vessel 
 
Co-ordinated with 
Ministry in formulation 
of long-term plans  
 
 
Crisis/Safety 
Management Plans 
developed  
 
Dive Centers and 
Schools (from 
resort) - 1 
 
Not prepared  for a 
natural disaster 
 
No warning systems 
 
Co-ordinated with 
the authorities and 
resort community 
 
Assisted  MOT and the 
resort for short-term 
restoration of the dive 
school/business 
 
Co-ordinated with 
resort managements 
and others  throughout 
the recovery of  
business to pre-tsunami 
 
Crisis/ Safety 
Management Plans 
developed 
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Organization 1.Pre-event 
 
2. Prodromal 3. Emergency 
 
4.Intermediate 5.Long-term 
(Recovery) 
6.Resolution 
 
levels 
 
Souvenir Shops 
(independent from 
resort) 1 
Not prepared for a 
natural disaster 
 
 
No warning systems 
 
 
Co-ordinated with 
MOT for response 
 
Worked in co-ordination 
with the MOT and the 
resorts  
 
Attempt to return to 
pre-disaster level of 
business 
 
Emergency Plans 
developed 
 
Water Sports 
Centers (from resort) 
1 
Not prepared  for a 
natural disaster 
 
 
 
No warning systems 
 
Co-ordinated with 
the authorities and 
resort community 
 
Assisted  MOT and the 
resort for short-term 
restoration of the dive 
school/business 
 
Co-ordinated with 
resort management and 
others  throughout the 
recovery of the 
business to pre-tsunami 
levels 
 
Crisis/ Safety 
Management Plans 
developed 
Tour operators and 
travel agents (1 local 
and 1 foreign) 
Not prepared for a 
tsunami  
 
No warning systems 
established  
 
Co-ordinated with 
MOT for response  
 
Worked with the 
authorities and businesses 
for providing emergency 
information, attempted to 
provide the same to 
affected families. While 
assisting in short-term 
destination marketing 
efforts and bringing in the 
media and tourists in. 
 
Worked with MOT, 
MTPB and MATI for 
long-term market 
recovery efforts and 
developing confidence 
in the destination.   
 
 
Crisis Management 
Plans reviewed and 
updated. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the results that were obtained from interviews of representatives from 
private-sector tourism establishments. The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth. The 
Disaster Incident Response Evaluation Grid (DIRE) developed by Faulkner and Vikulov 
(2001) was the basis for the interview structure and topics that were discussed. This grid 
provides a framework for the respondent’s recollection of the sequence of events during the 
disaster, and their reactions to these events (Faulkner and Vikulov, 2001). The next chapter 
presents a detailed discussion of the results of these research findings provided in Chapters 6 
and 7. 
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Chapter 8 
DISCUSSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research findings from Chapters 6 and 7 in relation to the 
framework (Figure 5) that has been proposed for this study (Chapter 3) which is modified and 
built on the Tourism Disaster Management Framework (TDMF) of Faulkner and Vikulov 
(2001). The key components of the framework are the links between the proactive approach 
and reactive approach. The proactive approach includes steps taken for prevention and 
awareness. Reactive strategies integrate four components: crisis communication, management 
of resources, collaboration with stakeholders and resolution. 
The proposed framework has been tested in the case of the Maldives, a Small Island 
Developing State in the Indian Ocean, which was hit by the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004.  
In the two empirical Chapters, 6 and 7, the researcher interviewed representatives from the 
government and the tourism sectors in order to identify, consistent with the framework, what 
they did in terms of proactive planning prior to the tsunami, how they responded to the 
tsunami (consistent or not with that planning) and what they have implemented for future 
disasters.  
This chapter discusses each specific component of the framework and findings in relation to 
these from the case study destination, examining both the government and tourism industry 
separately. Finally, the chapter compares the case study findings with the conceptual 
framework and concludes with a discussion on potential alterations to improve it. Ultimately 
the robustness of the framework is evaluated via this discussion. 
8.2 Government Context 
8.2.1 Proactive Approach - Prevention and Proactive Planning 
The first part of the proposed framework for tourism disaster planning and management 
suggested prevention and proactive planning steps. This is based on the pre-event phase 
outlined by Faulkner and Vikulov (2001)’s Tourism Disaster Management Framework. The 
pre-event phase suggests actions that can be taken to prevent or mitigate effects of potential 
disasters. 
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Interview findings from the National Tourism Organizations (NTOs) and Emergency 
Organizations (EOs) indicated that there were no institutional structures in the Maldives 
government sector for crisis and disaster management, early warning systems or even trained 
personnel to handle a crisis or a disaster of the scale encountered. As highlighted, this was due 
to the moderate risk scenario in the Maldives and the greater focus on sea-level rise and 
climate change phenomena than effective crisis and disaster management planning generally.  
Research findings show that NTOs and EOs had no procedure for crisis or disaster 
management, or even a documented crisis/disaster management plan prior to the tsunami. 
This is also evident in some related studies that investigated the level of crisis/disaster 
preparedness of tourism related institutions elsewhere (de Sausmarez, 2005; Faulkner & 
Vikulov, 2001; Miller & Ritchie, 2003; Prideaux, 2004). According to interviewees, the chaos 
outlined in the results arose due to a lack of awareness of the potential risks and prevention 
and proactive strategies prior to the tsunami and indicates therefore that the government sector 
should have had disaster management policies and an appropriate regulatory framework in 
place. 
The empirical findings indicate that the TOs and EOs have considered developing crisis 
management plans and risk assessments in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. 
Specifically, NTOs have developed crisis management plans while the EOs have come up 
with an overall disaster management plan and sector specific disaster management plans.  
Prior to the tsunami, the Maldives had no specific disaster management policy, however the 
tsunami changed the perspectives of the nation towards disaster management policies. For 
example, a disaster management framework for the tourism industry and school emergency 
preparedness guidelines were developed to establish a system of precaution, which included 
safety measures as well as relief in case of disaster. The policies were designed to provide 
institutional framework that including polices, contingency plans and response plans. 
These were also evident when Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) applied their Tourism Disaster 
Management Framework to the Katherine Floods case (1998). The Maldives case study 
provides evidence to support the inclusion of this step in an integrated framework for tourism 
disaster planning and management. 
8.2.2 Reactive Approach – Communication 
Post-disaster activities related to response and recovery are termed reactive approaches. The 
communication step in the integrated framework focuses on the short-term crisis 
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communication strategy for the media and the internet, communication leadership and 
developing a public relations plan. This is partly based on the prodromal stage in Faulkner 
and Vikulov (2001)’s Tourism Disaster Management Framework. The prodromal stage is 
when it is apparent that a crisis/disaster is about to happen.  
From all the interviews, it was found that early warning of an impending disaster were not 
provided to any NTOs in the case study destination prior to the tsunami. The problem was 
further aggravated by the communication breakdown and it took several hours to establish 
contact with affected inhabited islands, tourist resorts and businesses. Participants from EOs 
noted that equipment for an Early Warning System has now been procured and installed in the 
Department of Meteorology and staff have been trained in the use of the equipment. A 
national Early Warning System has been developed to issue warnings and create awareness 
about earthquakes/tsunami and other extreme weather events. From the interviews it was 
found that the Maldives has established systems to particularly monitor seismic events and 
resulting tsunamis since the 2004 devastation. Two seismometers have been installed in two 
regions of the Maldives apart from the tide gates which monitor the sea level and all systems 
are connected to global and regional networks. In addition, the Department of Meteorology is 
connected to the Tsunami Warning Centres established in the region by the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Committee. 
One of the post tsunami government initiatives in the Maldives was the Telecommunications 
Policy of 2006-2010. The initiatives followed under this policy included: the formulation of 
an emergency telecommunications plan; enhancing existing telecommunication and 
broadcasting networks to carry early warning messages; facilitation of priority calling and 
national roaming in the existing mobile networks to be used in the event of disasters or 
national emergencies; establishing a satellite based personal communication system to reach 
all inhabited islands by the end of 2007 and implementing electronic public warning systems 
at island level by 2009 (Maldives Telecommunications Policy, 2006 2010). The results 
support the integrated framework for tourism disaster planning and management, where one 
of the roles for the government during the emergency situation is to establish and monitor 
communication systems. 
All participants emphasized the importance of communication and the need to take control of 
communications through media management. The case study found a need for a 
communication strategy (for the media and the internet) which incorporated public relations 
activities and several interviewees highlighted the importance of communication leadership 
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through a spokesperson or a centralized communication command center for delivering 
consistent updated messages.  
8.2.3 Reactive Approach – Management of Resources  
The emergency stage is when the effect of the disaster is felt and action is necessary to protect 
people and property. During times of acute emergency, short-term recovery certain tasks such 
as rehabilitation, repatriation, and redevelopment of physical and human assets are crucial 
(Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001). Therefore, in the proposed framework, this step has been 
included as resource management with a focus on financial, human and marketing resource 
elements.  
The first step in the resource management component focuses on financial resources. It 
includes: conducting damage audits, establishing monitoring systems, cleaning up and 
restoration, and minimizing of expenses. The case study provides strong evidence to support 
the inclusion of this step in the proposed framework, as it identifies the need to redeploy and 
generate financial resources to assist in response and recovery. Though reactive, there is 
evidence in the research that the government made a swift and coordinated response with a 
relief and rehabilitation operation in tandem with the support of UN agencies, NGOs and 
other development and military institutions. Decisions to evacuate more severely affected 
islands and tourist resorts were based on preliminary assessments with the aim to control the 
impact of the crisis on tourists and citizens generally. This was followed up by establishing 
monitoring systems, sector focused damage audits, clean up and restoration operations that 
were implemented with the help of financial institutions and donors.  
As seen in the Maldives case, needs assessments were carried out by international partners 
and donors who determined their own response and financing needs focusing on the entire 
tsunami affected region. They also assisted the government to come up with the Tsunami 
Impact and Recovery Report, which was a joint needs assessment conducted with the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank and the UN system. The document detailed the physical 
damage, human suffering caused by the tsunami, the recovery strategy, and financing needs 
with detailed annexes discussing the impact of the tsunami on all economic sectors in the 
country (World Bank, 2005). Similarly, early recovery needs assessments were developed by 
the United Nations by the request of the Government of Samoa following the tsunami of 
September 2009 (MOF, 2009). This reaffirms the need for this step in the framework. 
Case study findings indicate that monitoring and coordinating systems were strengthened for 
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greater accountability and transparency soon after the tsunami. The Maldivian government 
established the Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Fund (TRRF) with a monitoring board that 
would expend funds for relief, recovery, and reconstruction work to address objectives 
developed by the Government and donors. This fund was administered by the Government 
Accounting Bureau of the Ministry of Finance and Treasury, as per international accounting 
standards with proper internal and external audits and controls. The financial management 
systems and processes were established in line with the requirements of the International 
Financial Institutions.  
The second step in the resource management component of the framework includes: human 
resource management issues such as employee empowerment, payroll cost reduction, unpaid 
leave, staff education, and job sharing. There is evidence from the research showing greater 
flexibility and coordination between NTOs, EOs and the private sector, which can be seen as 
a step away from the regular Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the government. 
Results also indicate that officials in the NTOs were more empowered. There was no need for 
payroll cost reduction or job sharing in the government sector. Many volunteers filled the 
labor shortages, while many international development partners provided human resources to 
fill the knowledge gap.  
Inadequate human resources and a lack of capacity in the government sector and in local 
organizations led to many challenges in the redevelopment and reconstruction process. A lack 
of vigilant decision makers at a strategic level meant a failure to identify gaps and critical 
needs of the people during the initial damage assessments. Likewise, a lack of technical 
expertise in local organizations meant that they were unable to assist international donors, 
agencies and governments in disaster relief and reconstruction. Developing capacity in the 
government sector, local organizations and communities is therefore an important need for 
effective disaster management. Therefore, a human resource management component is 
suggested in the framework. 
The third step in the resource management component of the framework focuses on market 
recovery.  This includes: crisis recovery marketing campaign, perception change campaign, 
diversifying of markets, value added packages, and providing discounts and incentives. This 
component is in line with the intermediate stage in the TDMF, where the short-term needs of 
people have been addressed and the main focus of activity is restoring utilities/services and 
the community to normal operations (Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001). Recovery involves an 
efficient media communication strategy, alongside restoration of basic services and 
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monitoring and damage audits/assessments previously discussed.  
Hall (2002) argues that the media plays a central role in rebuilding the image and restoring 
confidence in a destination or organization. They  have the ability to effect public opinion and 
can help speed up the recovery process (Ritchie, 2004, p. 676). Media communication 
strategies are therefore crucial for curbing negative images. The case study found that tourist 
arrivals to the Maldives decreased after the tsunami by - 70.3% in January 2005, with an 
occupancy rate of 32.6% of the existing bed capacity. However, government efforts to recover 
the situation resulted in a 73.7% rise in occupancy and 83,880 tourists visiting the country by 
March 2005 (Development, 2005). The NTOs in the Maldives worked very closely with the 
international media to change negative perceptions. This case study and other literature has 
shown that the government sector worked with international universities and regional tourism 
organizations to formulate the Maldives Tourism Recovery Strategy (implemented in 
February 2005).  
Evidence from the case study (Chapter 6) demonstrates that overall the tourism industry in the 
Maldives conducted an effective recovery marketing campaign. Stakeholders used various 
communication tools to aid the recovery of the industry and destination. The case study 
therefore provides evidence to support the inclusion of a market recovery strategy as an 
integral component in the framework. 
8.2.4 Reactive Approach – Collaboration with Stakeholders 
Working with internal and external stakeholders is vital in a tourism disaster. Due to the 
fragmented nature of the tourism industry, a diverse range of stakeholders are involved in a 
tourism disaster situation. Ritchie (2004) argues that the relationship between internal 
stakeholders (business units, staff, managers and shareholders) and external stakeholders 
(other agencies and organizations, general public, media, tourists) is critical due to their inter 
relationships, dependence upon one another in developing strategies to deal with crises and 
disasters and the fact that these plans are usually integrated. Cooperation and partnerships are 
required between public and private sector organizations, departments, emergency units, 
media interests and other relevant stakeholders.  
There is evidence in the results (Chapter 6, section 6.4) that NTOs in the Maldives took 
stakeholder collaboration seriously. This collaboration has facilitated industry discussions 
which helped to develop preliminary post-tsunami marketing campaign guidelines and 
activities before they received international and regional assistance to follow best practices in 
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tourism recovery strategies. Similarly, after damage assessments were completed and the 
travel advisories were lifted, the government was able to concentrate on marketing strategies 
and recovery with the insights and advice they received from industry stakeholders.  
The World Bank (2005) for example, provided short and long term recommendations for the 
principal economic sectors including tourism. They decided to ease the financial burden on 
tourism establishments through waiving lease rent payments during the off operation times 
(for repair and construction), and instituting import duty exemptions on construction 
materials. Its most significant move was its decision was to  defer lease rent from the first 
quarter (these were to be paid in the next three quarters). Collaboration enabled rebuilding 
efforts and provided a much need cash flow during a time of shortfall. Evidence from Chapter 
6 indicates that the government helped resorts to raise finance for renovation and 
reconstruction through international donors and lending organizations.  
The integrated framework also suggests that the government sector provided relief to the 
industry in the form of tax cuts, temporary assistance and other incentives and financial 
support that would facilitate long-term rebuilding. The integrated framework has a component 
for stakeholder collaboration that highlights the important role of internal and external 
stakeholders and the need for them to engage with one another in order to effectively resolve 
crises and disasters.  
Furthermore, the case study provides evidence (see Chapter 6, section 6.4) of stakeholder 
consultations that occurred, the efforts put into communication with stakeholders, and the 
importance of empowering stakeholders through consultation and collaboration. New 
partnerships were also established (with universities) and old ones were strengthened (MOT, 
MTPB and MATI). The case study provides evidence to support the inclusion of stakeholder 
collaboration as an integral part of the framework. 
8.2.5 Reactive Approach – Resolution and Feedback 
The resolution and feedback step in the proposed framework includes the resolution and 
restoration of the destination or organizations to the pre-crisis situation, reinvestment 
strategies, resourcing and the concept of crises and disasters as agents of change. A crisis 
provides an opportunity for further planning, analyzing what went wrong and taking further 
action. Therefore, while the recovery takes place, it is also the time to assess what happened, 
or what is commonly called a period of “self-analysis” (Santana, 2004). The case study 
supports the inclusion of this step in the framework. The swift action from NTOs in 
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determining the nature and extent of damage, communicating with the media and facilitating 
assistance to restart tourism business operations aided destination recovery. Aiding resorts to 
carry on with their renovations or reconstructions through industry support and finance 
greatly helped the recovery process. From the results it is clear that NTOs in the Maldives 
recognized areas for improvement in terms of awareness and preparedness for disaster 
situations. The Third Tourism Master Plan (TTMP) 2007 emphasized the need to establish a 
Tourism Emergency Operation Centre (TEOC) to react effectively to any tourism 
crisis/disaster along with other EOs. TEOC was then established for this purpose within the 
MOT.  
Sadly, the Tourism Crisis Management Unit which was envisaged in the TTMP did not 
materialize due to budgetary difficulties, even at the time of the interviews. Individual resorts 
have established varying levels of action plans should a disaster occur. This was due to the 
MOT emphasizing the needs for such. It was found that prior to the tsunami, the emergency 
procedures developed for safety and security measures were mainly focused on fire incidents 
as they were required to be in place before the MOT issues an operating license. Moreover 
many key government strategies envisaged in the TTMP (see Chapter 6, section 6.5.4), have 
not been completed, raising the question of whether there has been any learning at all. 
In the absence of a monitoring system in the MOT, there is no way of determining  the 
effectiveness of disaster/crisis plans implemented by the tourism sector. Results (see Chapter 
6, section 6.5.4) indicated that regular crisis management simulation exercises were not 
conducted in tourist establishments. According to MOT (2011) technical assistance required 
for carrying out such activities needs to be sourced in association with the Maldives National 
Defense Force (MNDF), the Maldives Police Service (MPS) and health service experts and 
providers. Another observation from the results is that the MOT is taking a reactive approach 
to crisis incidents rather than a proactive approach. This may be due to the absence of a 
specific crisis management unit as envisaged in the TTMP. 
In the EO context, an institutional structure was first established for relief and response 
operations under the NDMC post tsunami. This could be considered as learning in the 
government context. Results show the relief and recovery operations were reasonably relevant 
and effective, considering the logistical and technical difficulties. NDMC is now serving as 
the national platform for coordinating multi sectorial disaster risk reduction activities. 
Furthermore, as envisaged in the Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Climate Change Adaptation 2010-2020, the NDMC is now responsible for formulating 
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and implementing awareness raising programs on DRR for Climate Change Adaptation. 
A lack of experience and capacity in the line ministries was supplemented by bringing in 
competent individual from abroad and through systematic strengthening of public sector 
capacities. Results (see Chapter 6, section 6.5.7) identified many projects conducted under the 
disaster risk reduction program by the UNDP between 2007-2012, which focused on 
managing adverse impacts and developing institutional capacities to fill the knowledge gaps 
in the public and developmental sectors. Through the National Recovery and Reconstruction 
Plan (2005), the government sector set objectives and priorities for recovery and 
reconstruction with a focus on investment programs. This helped the government to 
streamline aid received from donors and to identify funding gaps.  
The case study provides evidence (see Chapter 6, sections 6.5.3, 6.5.4 and 6.5.5) of the 
disaster as an agent of change. The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 resulted in opportunities for 
rebuilding and changes to the way things were done. The tsunami created the need for 
developing enhanced environmental mitigation measures and adaptation interventions in some 
of the islands evacuated. The government initiated a Safe Island Program (SIP) aimed at 
population consolidation and regional development. The SIP helped to redesign the physical 
development features of islands, including wider environmental protection zones, creating 
elevated areas for vertical evacuation in the event of floods and facilitating easy access in 
emergencies. In this context, the Safe Islands will provide the necessary infrastructure to 
adapt to climate change and be better prepared for natural disasters through stronger coastal 
protection measures, emergency supplies, an appropriate harbor and more reliable 
communication systems. The Safe Islands would also be able to assist neighboring islands in 
an event of a disaster. The government was able to reconstruct two Safe Islands with the 
assistance of international donors, though their target was to complete seven such projects. A 
number of regulatory changes were introduced to environmental resource management in the 
years that followed the tsunami, though not immediately after the disaster. 
Scenario planning and risk analysis was carried out in the Detailed Island Risk Assessments 
(DIRAM) done for 10 islands during 2008. Based on this work, a cost benefit study of risk 
mitigation measures in three islands was conducted in 2009 with the aim of understanding the 
cost performance of three types of risk mitigation measures for policy makers. This can be 
considered as a form of learning. In this study a detailed review of the SIP was conducted and 
three significant principles emerged: (a) widespread consultation and participation in 
decision-making must be undertaken, with special emphasis upon improving the engagement 
   
 179 
of stakeholders at island level; (b) human activities that damage the natural environment must 
be minimised and (c) the SIP must be integral to all development policy and planning and not 
an optional extra (UNDP, 2009).  Further principles highlighted (UNDP, 2009) were:  
1. A multi-hazard approach should be adopted, as this will be best suited to reduce 
disaster and climate risk.  
2. Decentralized responsibility and budgets for adaptation and DRR should be used to 
help respond to specific local needs and bolster local participation.  
3. Ensure that the most vulnerable groups are targeted, with particular attention to gender 
impacts and the provision of appropriate adaptation measures that build the resilience 
of both men and women.  
4. Capacity building should be a central strategy, with a particular focus on key 
stakeholders at both national and island level.  
5. Public private partnerships for risk reduction should be sought.  
6. Reduce existing vulnerabilities to current climate events as an entry point regarding 
adaptation to climate change and ensure that building climate resilience in the 
Maldives is not completely dominated by tackling sea level rise alone.  
 
The research also proposed development of a SIP Framework.  It was proposed that three 
steps were required to develop the SIP framework into national policy, and these are 
described in greater detail in turn:  (a) develop a national level SIP strategy/ policy; (b) 
develop a short List of potential safe Islands; and (c) select safe islands and develop island-
specific SIP strategies and implementation plans (UNDP, 2009). There is no research 
published to indicate whether these steps were followed. 
8.3  The Private Sector Tourism Context 
This section discusses the research findings in Chapter 7 in light of the integrated framework 
for tourism planning and management. 
8.3.1 Proactive Approach - Prevention and Proactive Planning 
Similar to NTOs and EOs, the private sector tourism industry in the Maldives received no 
warnings prior to the tsunami. Tourism businesses themselves had no preparedness plans or 
guidelines on crisis management. Severely affected businesses went into temporary “chaos,” 
as stated by Fink (1986). Due the absence of preparedness plans, contingency plans and a lack 
of effective communication, there was much confusion. Tourism businesses therefore, must 
constantly examine threats in the internal and external environments; identifying risks in the 
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environment. They should develop disaster management plans and the disaster management 
toolkit should always be reviewed and revised after each crisis.  
After the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand the government 
strengthened the crisis management capability in organizations through educating businesses 
on effective crisis management, risk management, business continuity and resilience concepts. 
A separate website has been developed to help educate businesses 
(http://www.resilientbusiness.co.nz). The website is equipped with tools that businesses can 
use to adopt effective resilience strategies. In 2013, after much research, the Queensland state 
government in Australia also developed a guide to assist tourism businesses to prepare, 
respond and recover from a crisis. These prevention and proactive planning tools can be used 
effectively by small and large tourism businesses in any country.  
In the Maldives, the tsunami highlighted insurance problems within the tourism industry. In 
particular, businesses were not aware of what their policies covered. The government 
intervened to provide technical assistance in relation to insurance policies and worked with 
insurance companies to educate businesses. They also helped to streamline the responses to 
specific insurance issues. For these reasons, developing capability to deal proactively with 
disasters is an important step in the proposed model. Evidence in the case study affirms the 
need for this step in the framework. 
8.3.2 Reactive Approach – Communication 
The importance of crisis communication, crisis leadership and public relations has been 
discussed earlier in relation to the government. Results from the case study indicate that due 
to communication system breakdown, tourism businesses could not contact authorities, 
concerned tour operators, travel agents and families. Tourist evacuations from severely 
affected resorts were carried out soon after communication was established with government 
authorities and other stakeholders. Chaos created by travel advisories and the frightening 
media reports led to many tourists leaving in panic.  
The participants from tourism businesses all emphasized that every effort was made to 
communicate details of the disaster to NTOs and EOs and to their respective head offices in 
the Maldives and abroad. MATI, from the industry side, took a very proactive role in 
collecting updates from all tourism businesses and sending them to NTOs which ensured a 
consistency of information. Tourism businesses used the same circulars and media information 
sheets provided by the NOTs. This control process (Ritchie, 2004) assisted in providing 
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consistent and correct information. 
Research indicates that tourism businesses have now installed satellite phones and are 
connected with the early warning messaging system established in the country. One tourist 
business reported that they are connected to two international companies for early warning 
messaging on weather, tsunamis, airport emergencies and political instability. These case 
study findings establish the need to have early warning systems, crisis communication and 
control strategies in tourism businesses. These findings  provide evidence to include this step 
in the framework.  
8.3.3 Reactive Approach – Management of Resources  
In exploring how resources were managed during response and recovery stages of the 
disaster, the various reactive actions taken by the stakeholders (private sector) during short-
term (response) and long-term (reconstruction) were examined. In short-term recovery, the 
researcher focused on how quickly the tourism businesses restored their vital life support 
services and facilities to a minimum required standard of operation and safety. Tourism 
businesses reactively responded to ensure safety of tourists, employees and other members of the 
community. The results also indicated that management took steps to restore facilities that could 
be brought to operation to ensure speedy recovery from the disaster (Chapter 7, section 7.4.2 and 
7.4.3). Tourism businesses worked closely with NTOs to ensure tourists received consistent 
messages in the media and assisted in their recovery marketing campaigns. Another step taken by 
businesses was the initiation of the insurance claims process by making preliminary damage 
assessments and accounting for the losses.  
As discussed earlier, tourism businesses also received support from the government sector to deal 
with the sudden cancellation and reduced revenue through a deferral of lease payments for all 
tourist resorts for the first quarter of 2005 closed for nine months. This was extended for another 
12 months for resorts closed for renovation. An additional US$2 million was also provided for a 
special market recovery campaign.  Results  demonstrate that much of what has been suggested 
by Faulkner (2001) for the intermediate stage was implemented by tourism businesses 
(Chapter 7, section 7.4.2). Faulkner (2001) suggests the key areas are: securing facilities in 
order to minimize visitor and employee hardship, the protection of property; provision of 
emergency accommodation and food supplies for visitors and staff; rescue and evacuation 
procedures for visitors and staff; provision of medical assistance and informing and 
communicating with relevant elements of the tourism sector as the main tasks during this 
stage. In line with this, the conceptual framework proposed reactive actions under the 
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resource management component and when applied to the case it complies with them.  
The most important resource for the tourism businesses are their employees. Employees have 
families in other local islands that were likely to have been affected by the disaster. This research 
demonstrates that the short-term needs of the tourists were met through organized employee 
teams. In all of these resorts, employees set aside their fears and came to the aid of all tourists. 
The reservations and front office teams assisted management teams in disseminating 
information to customers and other relevant authorities, food and beverage teams 
concentrated on making sure all customers were fed, housekeeping teams on restoring 
accommodation for the customers, while the employees from utilities and services 
departments concentrated on restoring and repairing resorts’ power, telephone, water, sewers 
and other utilities.  
Findings indicates that the managers in the resorts and other tourism businesses provided 
guidance and empowerment to their employees and they were given the option to either stay on 
the payroll to help with the recovery or to take time off to deal with their immediate family needs 
(Chapter 7, section 7.4.3). As discussed earlier, one lesser impacted resort sent most of its 
employees to assist in community recovery. Similarly, one severely impacted resort sent their 
employees abroad for training while the resort was rebuilt. These findings support the need to 
have the human resource management component in the conceptual framework, outlining the 
required reactive strategies at intermediate and recovery stages. 
Market recovery has been identified as an important component of the framework. Recovery of 
the tourism industry is a key factor for economic recovery in tourism dependent economies. From 
the interviews it was found that the tourism businesses (mainly represented by MATI) worked 
closely with the MOT and the MTPB, both during the response and recovery stages. In the 
absence of crisis management plans, the tourism businesses interviewed did little on their own 
for marketing and promotion except for heavy discounting. This is also evident in the results 
of previous research studies (Hystad & Keller, 2008) where businesses have assumed that it 
was the responsibility of the DMOs to undertake marketing or promotion activities after a 
disaster. All tourism businesses interviewed facilitated trips made by the MOT, media 
representatives and the travel trade. The head offices of the respective tourism businesses in 
the capital island also participated in industry discussions which resulted in preliminary post-
tsunami marketing campaign guidelines and activities. Similarly, they all attended meetings 
held for countering the negative travel advisories and other short-term recovery initiatives.  
Tourist resorts operated by international brands used their PR departments to implement crisis 
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management and market recovery strategies. Some locally owned tourism businesses 
interviewed offered heavy discounts to tour operators and guests for their room rates or value 
additions such as free upgrades and extra nights until their occupancy rates picked up. The 
case study shows evidence that overall the tourism businesses followed market recovery 
strategies in the reactive scenario. Therefore the case study provides evidence to support the 
inclusion of market recovery strategy as an integral component in the framework (Chapter 7, 
section 7.4.3). 
8.3.4 Reactive Approach – Collaboration with Various Stakeholders  
Working with internal and external stakeholders is necessary to resolve crises and disasters in 
tourism. According to Beirman (2003) a vital element in any successful tourism recovery 
campaign is the formation and implementation of a recovery alliance between the major 
tourism stakeholders. As discussed earlier (Chapter 2, section 2.6), the need and the 
importance of such an alliance became more obvious with the sudden drop in occupancy and 
the cancellations of room bookings soon after the emergency and during the intermediate 
stages. Therefore, the conceptual framework suggests collaboration between various 
stakeholders as an important component in the reactive approach. Previous sections (Chapter 
7, sections 7.4.2, 7.4.3) examined some of those stakeholders that tourism businesses 
collaborated with during the short-term recovery stage in the Maldives. A diverse range of 
stakeholders were involved in the destination response and recovery efforts which included: 
guests, staff and their families, travel agents, tour operators, NTOs, EOs and head offices of 
foreign owned businesses.  
One of the most important steps taken by all the businesses interviewed was the provision of 
special care to tourists. This was done as the businesses had to regain the trust and confidence 
of tourists so that they would  continue to support the destination. Research indicates that 
travel assistance was provided to tourists who were trying to leave the destination as soon as 
possible after the tsunami (Chapter 7, section 7.4.). In doing so they continued to provide 
timely information on transport and travel arrangements, thus to giving the message to the 
tourists that they were safe, cared for and respected. Similarly, businesses reported that no 
employees were made redundant as a direct result of the tsunami from these businesses. 
Employees were given the option to take leave or to work in other resorts or businesses that 
belonged to the same company to prevent a period of wage loss.  
From the research findings it was established that consultations with both internal and 
external stakeholders continued throughout the long-term recovery process as well. There is 
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evidence of ongoing dialogue and co-operation between the private sector and the government 
sector (Chapter 7, section 7.5 - 7.5.1). The suggested integrated framework therefore 
recommends the private sector proactively liaise and support the government sector in 
implementing their policies and regulations in this area. Further, the framework suggests joint 
strategic rebuilding processes. Hence, as the framework suggests, any actions or strategies for 
disaster management in tourism must integrate private and public sector efforts. 
8.3.5 Reactive Approach – Resolution and Feedback 
Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) and Ritchie (2004) define resolution as a stage where routine is 
restored and a new or improved state is established. Many researchers highlight the need for 
proactive steps prior to a crisis/disaster and include the role of learning in crisis preparedness 
(de Sausmarez, 2007; Gurtner, 2007; Miller & Ritchie, 2003; Prideaux & Laws, 2007; 
Ritchie, 2004; Santana, 2004) arguing that the end result of a crisis should be learning.  
Learning is thus  an integral component in this framework.   
The private sector tourism businesses interviewed reported that disaster management plans 
have been prepared by themselves based on the guidelines provided by MOT. However, there 
was no evidence of reviewing those plans by any technical parties apart from MOT. As noted 
earlier, there was also no evidence of business recovery risk assessment plans developed for 
tourism businesses. Although business managers did not report on insurance, due to the work 
being mainly handled by their head offices, it was evident from the interviews with insurance 
companies that some changes have been made to their policies. Research shows that 
replacement values stated in insurance policies were undervalued, with insurance caps, limits 
and other clauses that limited the amount of payment received by them. At the same time, 
business interruption only covered losses when the business was not in operation and there 
were no provisions for cash flow losses due to market conditions and decline in visitor 
arrivals. There is evidence that insurance policies were reviewed to address these issues. 
Besides these, NTOs report systematic safety and security audits and simulation exercises at all 
tourist establishments since 2008. 
Long-term recovery provides unique opportunities for the adoption and implementation of 
important disaster mitigation activities, including structural measures. However, there is no 
evidence in the research that shows any changes being made in the tourism law, particularly 
in regards to facilities location, disaster resilient construction or building contents. Equally 
there is no evidence of a review of building codes and land use regulations, examining tourist 
resorts or the development of safe islands for tourists. However, numerous changes have been 
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made in the Environmental Impact Assessment guidelines and other environmental protection 
regulations since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. 
Knowledge about disasters can be gained only by de-briefing to update and change the current 
strategies (Evans & Elphick, 2005; Hystad & Keller, 2008). Therefore, tourism businesses 
need to develop crisis management strategies so that they will be competent to review and 
change as they learn by experience. In particular, executives and managers must drive policy 
development and regularly review the veracity of such plans (Pforr & Hosie, 2008). None of 
the tourism businesses interviewed had an official crisis/risk management unit at a local or 
corporate level. At the time of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 however, the majority of 
businesses interviewed only had a contingency plan developed for fire since the tourism 
legislation required one.  
Even though each crisis is different, the impact on the tourism industry are predictable and 
can be learned, as observed by Prideaux et al. (2008) “one way to build a learning frame that 
can be used to educate managers who have to respond to crises is to record the responses to 
crisis situations as case studies.” Individual disaster management plans developed on the 
instruction of the MOT should be ‘living’ documents. Roles must be clearly defined and 
responsibilities described in detail. In the absence of strategies it is also suggested that de-
briefings be held between all staff members during all stages of the disaster and that records 
be kept for staff to review the strategies and decisions made. Experience and knowledge alone 
cannot be considered a reliable indicator, as it cannot be relied on because of staff turnover. It 
is therefore necessary to keep some form of formal records for future staff members to refer to 
and learn from. 
According to Pforr and Hosie (2008) effective preparation to monitor, manage and respond to 
crises can be seen in  the emerging trend to utilize appropriate learning technology. Such 
trends include videoconferencing, learning content management systems, the use of digital 
storage technologies and online learning (Pforr & Hosie, 2008). These kinds of training 
resources can be utilized to build human resources to improve individual, group and 
organizational effectiveness. Crisis management needs to be integrated into the strategic 
planning process of businesses. It is surprising that the businesses interviewed do not include 
crisis planning as an integral component of their business plan, despite the fact that crises can 
threaten the very foundations of any given businesses. 
Based on the discussion of findings in this chapter it is clear that the framework used for 
analysis has the potential for further refinement. In the following section the lessons learned 
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here and more recent literature are used as the context for undertaking this reconsideration. 
8.4 Revisiting the Framework  
This section compares the case study findings in relation to the conceptual framework. It 
outlines the main constructs in the redeveloped framework that includes; prevention and 
proactive planning, emergency and immediate response, crisis and disaster communication, 
resource management, business recovery, collaboration with various stakeholders and 
resolution. It explains the changes and additions required for a refined framework which 
involve mainly: the prevention and planning component, emergency and immediate response 
component, business recovery component and the review component.  
Overall, the post-disaster tourism crisis recovery case study supports the components in the 
conceptual framework. Simultaneously, the case study contributed new insights needing 
incorporation into the redeveloped framework. Table 23 summarizes the case study findings 
and the lessons learned in relation to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 4.  
Table 23: Case Study Findings and Lessons Learned 
Crisis stages Case Study Findings Lessons Learned 
Pre-Event 
- Assessment of potential 
disasters and probability of 
occurring  
- Proactive planning and 
environmental scanning  
 
 
- No proactive planning and risk 
assessments 
- No master plan for destination 
disaster management or for tourism 
industry 
- No separate agency fully 
responsible for overall management 
- No SOP’s to manage disasters 
- There should be an overall disaster 
management plan and a tourism 
industry disaster management plan 
 
Prodromal 
- Warning systems  
- Activate communication 
tree  
- Articulate the objectives of 
contingency plans  
- Strategy evaluation and 
strategic control  
 
- No early warning system was 
there  
- No knowledge of a tsunami and 
no procedures for response 
- No crisis communication plans 
- No planning for tourism response 
and recovery teams, only 
emergency procedures for fire and 
other health and safety issues 
- Dependence on government 
emergency organizations for relief  
- Need for the early warning system and 
the crisis communication procedures 
- Policy priority for disaster 
management and policy development 
- Need to have clear procedures and  
crisis management teams to act during 
the relief and response phase 
Emergency 
- Implementation of crisis 
communication and control 
strategies  
- Appointment of a 
spokesman  
- Control over crisis 
communication  
- Collaborating with 
stakeholders (internal and 
external)  
- Action taken to minimise 
- Chaos and confused decision 
making  
- Lack of proper coordination 
between the government sector, 
private sector and the communities 
- No NGO networks to help  
- No communication and media 
management plans 
- Could not take advantage of lead-time, 
casualties and fatalities could have been 
reduced  
- Media should be disseminating 
information on time with a crisis PR 
plan and leadership (spokesperson) 
- Coordination between the emergency 
organizations and the tourism sector is 
essential 
- Line of authority should be clear in 
emergency situation 
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impacts  
 
Intermediate 
- Restoration  
- Media communication 
strategy  
- Changes in organisation 
structure/personnel  
- Collaboration with 
stakeholders  
- Resource management 
(e.g. -changes in leadership 
styles, financial, employee 
empowerment)  
 
- Problems associated with 
logistics, and telecommunications 
- No immediate recovery marketing 
plan was available 
- Roles of government sector 
organizations during each phase of 
the disaster  were confused  
- No procedure for damage 
assessments and deploying disaster 
relief funds  
- Lack of capacity and inadequate 
human resources 
- Employee empowerment seen 
from government sector  
- Emergency Organizations need to 
respond in a coordinated manner 
- Importance and formulation of crisis 
and disaster management plans in all 
sectors 
- Need for capacity building in the 
public and private sectors and the 
communities 
- Importance of identifying demand and 
supply for relief items and a system for 
distribution 
- Importance of developing responsive 
human resource strategies to address the 
issues after a disaster 
Long-Term (Recovery) 
- Action taken to address 
recovery and challenges  
- De-briefing with staff  
- Restoration of business 
and consumer confidence  
 
- Swift action by the government to 
identify and collaborate with 
internal and external stakeholders 
for recovery 
- Empowerment of stakeholders 
through consultation and 
collaboration 
- Government sector help for the 
businesses for rebuilding and cash 
flow short falls 
 
- Need to identify the stakeholders and 
review and discuss crisis/disaster 
management requirements and sector 
needs 
- Need to keep the important 
stakeholders on board, understand and 
collaborate during the times of crisis 
- Establishment of new partnerships 
(universities) and strengthening of the 
existing relationships between key 
(tourism) stakeholders  
Resolution 
- Resolution and restoration 
of destination and 
businesses to pre-crisis 
situation  
- Organizations and 
destination evaluate 
effectiveness of strategies 
and responses 
- Level of learning for 
prevention of future 
disasters 
 
- Restoration of the facilities and 
quickly opening up of the tourism 
businesses (after renovation and 
reconstruction) and the support 
infrastructure speeded up recovery 
of the destination 
- Recognition of areas for 
improvement and incorporating it in 
to planning regime in NTOs 
- Institutional structure changed in 
EOs 
- Development of Safe island 
concept though it did not 
materialize except in two islands 
- Need for an overall disaster 
management plan that covers common 
types of natural and man-made disasters 
- Need for enhanced environmental 
mitigation measures and adaptation 
interventions  
- Need for scenario planning and risk 
analysis 
- Need for having effective disaster 
management institutions for 
implementing integrated approaches 
- Importance of crisis /disaster 
management units, business recovery 
plans, crisis plans integrated to strategic 
planning process,  learning through case 
studies and technologies  
 
The table above summarizes key findings from the field based empirical evaluation of the 
proposed framework. The findings of the case study outlined above demonstrate that prior to 
the tsunami, at the pre-event stage of the crisis, there were no proactive measures (i.e., overall 
disaster management plans or even sector specific disaster management plans). Similarly, 
there were no early warning systems in place and therefore the businesses and the island 
communities were not in a state of preparedness during the prodromal stage. During the 
emergency stage the situation became chaotic in the absence of crisis control strategies such 
as early information for saving lives, crisis PR plan, and crisis leadership. Poor coordination 
between the government and the private sector also contributed to the confusion.  
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The findings also demonstrate that during the intermediate stage there were issues related to 
logistics, telecommunications, recovery marketing and a lack of skilled human resources and 
skills. During long-term recovery the government sector collaborated  and empowered 
stakeholders through dialogue and the provision of financial assistance. Likewise, during the 
resolution stage of the crisis the restoration of facilities enabled businesses to start operating 
again. However, the main lessons learned concerned the need to have effective disaster 
management plans and institutions, and the need to have crisis management integrated to the 
strategic planning process in businesses. Table 24 outlines the lessons learnt together with the 
actual steps taken to implement new plans/approaches. 
Table 24 : Lessons Learnt Together with the Actual Steps Taken to Implement New Plans 
or Approaches 
Post-Tsunami Lessons Learned  Steps Taken to Implement New 
Plans/Approaches During Post-Tsunami Stage 
- There should be an overall disaster 
management plan and a tourism industry 
disaster management plan  
 
- Setting up of NDMC soon after the tsunami 
- Formulation of disaster management policy and 
sector disaster management plans and SOPs. (e.g., 
Page 109-110, table 13) 
 
- Need for the early warning system and the 
crisis communication procedures 
- Policy priority for disaster management 
and policy development 
- Need to have clear procedures and  crisis 
management teams to act during the relief 
and response phase  
-Equipment for EWS procured and installed and 
Department of Meteorology trained to use the 
equipment 
- A national EWS plan developed and integrated 
with regional systems  
- Colour codes for various stages of alert and 
warning dissemination protocols developed 
- Crisis communication will be initiated by 
Department of Meteorology where they will issue 
warnings to the general public to make them aware 
- Under the 3rd Tourism Master Plan established  
TEOC, disaster response teams in tourist resorts 
and establishments and developed Disaster Plans 
and conducted regular drills 
- Could not take advantage of lead-time, 
casualties and fatalities could have been 
reduced  
- Media should be disseminating information 
on time with a crisis PR plan and leadership 
(spokesperson) 
- Coordination between the emergency 
organizations and the tourism sector is 
essential 
- Line of authority should be clear in 
emergency situation  
 
- NDMC acts as a coordinating and technical 
agency in all disaster and relief activities and their 
structure helped to ensure transparency and 
accountability 
- Coordination between the government sector, 
private sector and the communities in case of the an 
early warning to evacuate people to safe buildings 
- UNDP, Maldives Red Crescent and other NGOs 
working together 
 
- Emergency organizations need to respond 
in a coordinated manner 
- Importance and formulation of crisis and 
disaster management plans in all sectors 
- Need for capacity building in the public 
and private sectors and the communities 
- Importance of identifying demand and 
supply for relief items and a system for 
- NDMC as focal point brings together the different 
ministries and non-governmental institutions and is 
responsible for implementation and coordination of 
activities among the various actors 
- Formulation of disaster management policy and 
sector disaster management plans and SOPs. (e.g., 
Page 109-110, table 13). 
- Sectoral initiatives include; the policy direction 
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distribution 
- Importance of developing responsive 
human resource strategies to address the 
issues after a disaster 
  
for national disaster preparedness at all levels of 
the Health Master Plan for 2006-2015, the 
inclusion of Disaster Mitigation in the Tourism 
Master Plan, the development of a Disaster 
Management Plan for Tourism, the policy 
guidelines of the Education sector on safety for 
children, and the Telecommunications Emergency 
Communications Plan of the Government 
- Lack of experience and capacity in the line 
ministries supplemented by competencies from 
abroad and through systematic strengthening of 
public sector capacities  and human resource 
development 
- Vulnerability and risk assessment at island level  
and detailed  island risks assessments done for 10 
islands  
- Community preparedness plans developed in 
islands and disaster management task forces 
instituted with training on basic emergency 
response 
 
- Need to identify the stakeholders and 
review and discuss crisis/disaster 
management requirements and sector needs 
- Need to keep the important stakeholders on 
board, understand and collaborate during the 
times of crisis 
- Establishment of new partnerships 
(universities) and strengthening of the 
existing relationships between key (tourism) 
stakeholders 
 
 - Government’s quick action to identify and 
collaborate with internal and external stakeholders 
for recovery includes; initial marketing plan 
development and consultations carried out in 
January 2005 and those outlined in table 15, page 
119-120 
- Empowerment of stakeholders through 
consultation and collaboration  on Post-Tsunami 
Review Workshops and Seminar in May 2005 
where all stakeholders were consulted 
- Government sector help for the businesses for 
rebuilding and cash flow short falls that includes; 
help in sourcing finance for rebuilding, temporary 
tax cuts, waiving of lease rent during off operation 
times and import duty exemption on construction 
materials 
 
- Need for an overall disaster management 
plan that covers common types of natural 
and man-made disasters 
- Need for enhanced environmental 
mitigation measures and adaptation 
interventions  
- Need for scenario planning and risk 
analysis 
- Need for having effective disaster 
management institutions for implementing 
integrated approaches 
- Importance of crisis /disaster management 
units, business recovery plans, crisis plans 
integrated to strategic planning process,  
learning through case studies and 
technologies 
 
 - Restoration of the facilities and quickly opening 
up of the tourism businesses (after renovation and 
reconstruction) and the support infrastructure 
speeded up recovery of the destination 
- Recognition of areas for improvement and 
incorporating it in to planning regime in NTOs 
- Institutional structure changed in Eos 
- Introduction of emergency evacuation, transport 
and communication infrastructure for resorts (Table 
16, page 135-136) 
-Strengthen the preparedness of the tourism 
industry to resort-specific crisis and industry-wide 
disaster situations (Table 17, page 135-136) 
-Strengthen surveillance and security for the safety 
of all tourists (Table 18, page 135-136) 
- Development of Safe island concept did not 
materialize except in two islands 
 
Table 25 outlines the changes and revisions made to the conceptual framework. These 
changes are discussed in more detail in the following sections:  prevention and planning 
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component (section 8.4.1), emergency and immediate response component (section 8.4.2), 
business recovery component (section 8.4.5) and in the review component (8.4.7). 
Table 25: Changes and revisions to the conceptual framework 
TDMF Key Components Thesis Framework Key Components Revised Key Components 
Pre-Event 
 
 
Prevention - The prevention component has been 
further developed and revised as 
prevention and proactive planning.   
- Under proactive planning a tourism 
industry crisis and disaster management 
plan needs to be formulated and 
implemented based on risk analysis, 
scenario analysis and contingency 
analysis.  
-The tourism industry needs to focus on 
an ‘all hazards approach’. 
 
Prodromal 
 
Communication - 
Emergency 
 
Resource Management - Emergency actions component has 
been further developed and revised as 
emergency and immediate response. -
- TEOC needs to be activated. NTOs, 
EOs and the private sector tourism 
industry with the community need to 
work in defined roles to minimize the 
damage to the industry. 
 
Intermediate 
 
 - Business recovery component has 
been added - Businesses in SIDS need 
to introduce business continuity 
programs and emergency preparedness, 
provide financial assistance, training 
seminars and workshops. 
 
Long-Term (Recovery) 
 
Stakeholders and Partnerships 
 
 
Resolution 
 
Resolution and feedback 
 
-Resolution and feedback component 
has been further developed and revised 
as review in the redeveloped 
framework. 
- Systematic analysis of previous 
disasters and crises is required for 
developing a comprehensive scenario 
based crisis management plans in SIDS, 
they need to review policies and make 
crisis management part of their strategic 
plans. 
 
  
 
Based on the comparison between the conceptual framework and the case study findings, the 
integrated framework for tourism disaster planning and management have been redeveloped 
(Figure 14). The new framework integrates several components from Faulkner and Vikulov’s 
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(2001) Tourism Disaster Management Framework (TDMF). The framework also provides 
details on required emergency actions from the government sector and private sector as 
provided in Faulkner and Vikulov’s (2001) TDMF, but it basically focuses on tourism 
industry responsibilities. The new framework focuses on strategies that the NTOs and other 
tourism organizations should be pursuing in a proactive approach to manage disasters that can 
affect tourism. 
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Figure 14: Integrated Framework for Tourism Disaster Planning and Management
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One similarity between the revised new framework, the conceptual framework used in the 
thesis and Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) TDMF is the use of the anatomy of a crisis and 
disaster cycle. The case study has focused on the stages to make distinctions between the 
activities and the strategies followed in preparing for, responding to and recovering from a 
crisis and disaster. The focus of this case study is on post-disaster recovery that includes short 
and long term actions. These are the same stages identified in the intermediate response, long-
term recovery and resolution in the disaster cycle.  
8.4.1 Prevention and Proactive Planning 
Important components suggested in the revised framework for the proactive approach are 
prevention and proactive planning steps. The proactive approach involves identification of the 
risk and grounding on the risk identified through activities of mitigation, preparedness and 
partial response in the phases of prediction and warning. This requires formulation and 
implementation of a tourism industry crisis and disaster management plan. Such a plan needs 
a risk and hazard analysis component to be undertaken and planning based on scenarios and 
contingencies. The tourism industry also needs to be focused on an ‘all hazards approach’ 
rather than just on single or specific crises and disasters. Guidelines for some specific 
disasters can also be written down with  how they will be activated along with clear lines of 
communication. The importance of such an approach has been highlighted in several 
resources (e.g., Tourism Risk Management, An Authoritative Guide to Managing Crises in 
Tourism, 2006 and more recently, Crisis Essentials Guide for tourism businesses and Crisis 
Communications Handbook for Regional and Local Tourism Organizations developed by 
Tourism Victoria, 2013).  
In addition to the disaster management plan, NTOs in tourism destinations should establish an 
emergency coordinating committee or a Tourism Emergency Operations Center (TEOC) (as 
envisaged in the Disaster Management Plan for Tourism Sector (2005) of the Maldives), 
which will serve as the government’s focal point for the industry in the event of a crisis. Such 
a committee should comprise a panel of policy makers from all allied agencies and should 
reflect an all industry approach so that all of them can contribute in the event of a crises or a 
disaster. Such a committee should not duplicate the functions of the main agency for disaster 
management in a destination but  complement and shall be tourism sector specific. The TEOC 
shall also collaborate with other agencies to undertake systematic training for crisis/disaster 
management, through seminars, courses simulations and role-play. The technical support 
program conducted by NDMC to enhance disaster preparedness in Maldives tourism sector is 
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an example of an integrated program (see for example Enhancing Disaster Management in the 
Tourism Sector of Maldives, 2014).   
Integration of tourism and emergency management is very important. The process of 
developing an integrative approach to tourism and emergency services starts with a bilateral 
assessment of how emergency management services can assist the tourism industry and how 
tourism businesses can assist and enhance emergency management capability (Beirman, 
2011). According to Becken and Hughey (2013), creating such a link is important in places 
that rely heavily on tourism and are prone to natural disasters. Based on a case study of 
Northland region in New Zealand, Becken and Hughey (2013), proposed a template for 
integrating tourism into disaster management. SIDS such as the Maldives, could use this as an 
example to enhance systematic disaster management. 
8.4.2 Emergency and Immediate Response 
Based on the experience derived from the case study of the Maldives, the framework has been 
further developed with the addition of an emergency and immediate response component. If a 
crisis or a disaster takes place, how to minimize damage to industry must be the most 
immediate issue for both NTOs and the private sector tourism industry. The preliminary 
actions which are conducted in the immediate aftermath of a crisis or a disaster should be on 
controlling the damage to the lives and property.  
The TOEC should  be activated by the government as quickly  as possible. It should be then 
followed by the mobilization of all available resources at the national level to rescue and 
evacuate people. This would involve the deployment of rescue and emergency teams, 
including  defense forces and getting assistance from local communities, to evacuate tourists, 
staff and local residents from the affected places to safe spaces. The tourists will be provided 
relief and subsequently they will leave the destination through the systematic actions of the 
stakeholders. Local residents and the employees can be transferred to live in temporary 
accommodations and relief centers. 
During this stage, NTOs need to implement an open and transparent communication strategy. 
NTOs need to use media sources, such as the national television, radio channels and a 
centralized website which is linked to the TEOC and tourism sector crisis and disaster 
management plan. By timely releasing and updating  information, potential visitors can cancel 
their visits to affected areas and suspend their activities at the tourist destination to avoid more 
unwanted causalities. Similarly, through these mechanisms local communities can get instant 
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updates on what actions need to be taken or what is being done to assist victims so that more 
voluntary and organized rescue efforts could be carried out. The Government of Maldives 
decision to adopt the Japanese system of terrestrial digital broadcasting (ISDB-T) in 2014 is 
an example, since it has resilience against disasters by means of an in-built emergency 
warning broadcast system (Haveeru Online, 2014).   
8.4.3 Crises/ Disaster Communication 
A crisis communication plan could be incorporated into the overall tourism disaster 
management plan and the disaster management plans of businesses. A scenario-based crisis 
communication plan is likely to address common issues that could happen in a crisis situation 
and would be beneficial for both NTOs and the private sector tourism businesses in quick 
reaction and implementation. Such a plan could consider the short and long term strategies for 
crisis communication. However, creating a realistic scenario requires input from hazard 
scientists. Such a study has been conducted by Robinson, Wilson, Davies, Orchiston, and 
Thompson (2014) for Te Ripahapa Alpine Fault Scenario for a Civil Defence exercise in New 
Zealand. This is a good example for design and development of such an exercise scenario.  
Beirman (2003) recommended series of steps that should be considered by destinations 
recovering from a tsunami. Carlsen (2006) adapted these steps after consultation with key 
tourism industry (MATI members) and government officials. Table 26 lists the short, medium 
and long-term strategies outlined by Carlsen (2006). 
Table 26: Tourism Recovery Strategies Identified by Carlsen (2005) 
Objectives   Tourism recovery strategies 
- Short-term(ST) – To achieve positive 
growth rates in month on month arrivals 
between March and  May 2006  
 
ST1: Stop cancellations due to tsunami 
ST2: Assess market sentiments in major markets 
ST3: Establish media monitoring services in major 
markets  
ST4: Develop primary and solidarity messages 
ST5: Reduce risk and uncertainty  
ST6: Implement value-adding strategies 
ST7: Begin summer promotions in Europe, Asian 
and Oceania markets and surfing segment  
ST8: Obtain funding for Recovery Marketing 
Strategy Implementation  
ST9: Analyse Market Response and trends 
- Medium term(MT) – To achieve positive 
growth in all major  markets 
 
MT1: Monitor market trends – source markets and 
market sentiments/intentions and devise a 
marketing communications plan.  
MT2: Consider re-branding the Maldives  
MT3: Reinvigorate marketing efforts for MICE 
tourism and large group Bookings 
MT4: Revise Maldives marketing strategies for 
2006 
MT5: Consolidate new partnerships and alliances 
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MT6: Develop destination audit and yield 
management capabilities 
MT7: Create image enhancement through strategic 
public relations 
MT8: Develop crisis management capabilities 
MT9: Plan for commemorative occasions, 
dedications, memorials and acknowledgements 
MT10: Review, revise and reflect – learn the 
lessons  
- Long term (LT)– To protect the reputation 
of Maldives as a relaxation, recreation and 
rejuvenation destination through integrated 
research, planning, training and education 
 
 
LT1: Develop and formalise more inclusive 
private-public sector partnerships and alliances 
LT2: Review existing markets and target new 
markets as well as market segments.  
LT3: Focus on yield, not numbers 
LT4: Implement systems at MATI for monitoring 
the state of the tourism industry through annual 
destination and market audits.  
LT5: Develop systems of communication and co 
operation between stakeholders  
LT6: Implement improved education and training 
Source: Carlsen (2005) 
Carlsen (2006) recommendations for the Maldives Tourism Recovery Strategy (2005) on 
short-term actions for establishing media monitoring services and developing primary and 
solidarity messages are good models  for other destinations. Such strategies will counter  
negative and inaccurate messages about the destination and provide clear instructions on 
media management, which is critical during a crises or a disaster. Similarly a single 
spokesperson should be appointed to the TEOC to manage all communications with the media 
and the stakeholders. Consistent internet communication through the centralized website 
(linked with the TEOC) and emails are necessary. Furthermore, recovery marketing strategies 
and image enhancements in the medium to long-term can be strengthened by using a strategic 
public relations plan.  
Downs (1972) argues that one of the most significant concepts in understanding the 
relationships between the media and how important certain issues are to consumers is the 
concept of the ‘issue attention cycle’. Hall (2002) and Petersen (2009) find that the stages of 
the issue attention cycle well describe travel safety policies and the public opinion of travel 
safety measures, particularly with respect to security issues and government response to crisis 
in the wake of September 11, 2001. The issue attention cycle is divided in to five stages: the 
pre-problem stage; alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm; realizing the cost of 
significant progress; gradual decline of intense public interest and the post-problem stage 
(Hall, 2002). These stages can be discussed in relation to the event of Indian Ocean Tsunami 
of 2004 and its impact to the Maldives tourism industry. 
At the pre-problem stage tsunami was not an issue to South Asian region therefore public 
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consciousness about tsunamis was low in Maldives.  In the alarmed discovery and euphoric 
enthusiasm stage, there was the need to stop cancellations, and the need for management 
plans and strategies to regain confidence. In the next stage, realizing the cost of significant 
progress, industry stakeholders worked hard to recover the industry through direct contact 
with the travel trade and through media representatives. During the stage of gradual decline of 
intense public interest, the original problem lost its novelty. The businesses and public also 
realized the challenges, costs and the investments required for recovery. Finally in the post-
problem stage, the problem was managed in an orderly way. 
Scott et al. (2008) proposed three sub phases to be added to the long-term  recovery period of 
the disaster framework proposed by Faulkner (2001). These phases are: 5A – recovery of 
damaged infrastructure, 5B – marketing responses and 5C, adaptations to the new system after 
a disaster. Orchiston and Higham (2014) studied the Christchurch earthquakes using  Scott et 
al. (2008) modified long-term recovery framework (Phase 5) and found that the three phases 
of tourism recovery were highly relevant  in the Christchurch experience.  
8.4.4 Resource Management 
The management of resources is one of the most significant tasks in response and recovery. 
As a key participant of tourism recovery, the government must fully participate by taking a 
leading role during the crisis or disaster recovery through policy making, tourism planning, 
financial support and even providing skilled human resources should they  be required. As 
seen in the Maldives case, effectively carrying out damage assessments to establish the level 
and nature of assistance required, taking immediate steps for market recovery and sourcing 
financial resources for the affected businesses led to industry recovery sooner than 
anticipated.   
Thomas and Zhou (2013) observe  that disasters have a major influence on the lives of 
employees; they are essential for business recovery and employers have an ethical and legal 
duty to protect their employees along with their businesses. As evident in the Maldives case, 
the employees participated in the emergency response, clean-up operations and even in the 
rebuilding of their respective businesses and some even assisted in the community 
reconstruction. These activities required extraordinary effort from the employees while they 
went along with months of stress over what was happening around them. While local 
communities received help from some NGOs and foreign relief and psychosocial support 
personnel who subsequently arrived, the employees in the tourism businesses, mainly in the 
tourist resorts, did not receive similar help.  
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In the longer term, counseling services should be made available for those who suffer and lose 
their employment, along with any organizational change programs that come along due to 
restructuring or closure of businesses. Furthermore, employees need to be recognized and 
rewarded for their contributions. Likewise proper feedback should be provided. Nilakant, 
Walker, and Rochford (2013) suggest some practical suggestions  for organizations in 
managing employee needs following a crises or a disaster such as; regularly updating contact 
lists, having well-rehearsed emergency evacuation plans, up skilling supervisors with 
interpersonal skills and experience in simulated disasters. This allows organizations to focus 
on developing employee support systems and a sustainable work environment, ensuring that  
assistance extends beyond the immediate timeframe of the disaster, and providing employees 
with practical assistance for their evolving needs (Nilakant et al., 2013). 
8.4.5 Business Recovery 
The conceptual framework used for the study does not focus on individual business recovery. 
The case study  looked at the destination recovery perspective but, recovery of the private 
sector businesses is imperative for the overall recovery of the whole destination’s economy. 
Tourism businesses interviewed were not very aware of business continuity planning and 
emergency preparedness. This is due to the sudden institutionalization of disaster and 
emergency management, being introduced for the first time when the NDMC was established. 
Much literature (Watters, 2014; Hayes, Kotwica & Correia, 2013, p.13-27; Smith, 2005; 
Williams and Fergusun, 2005; McEntire and Myers, 2004; Blake and Sinclare, 2003) has 
provided a variety of tools that can be adapted by the businesses to aid their recovery.  
One such tool that could be utilized by businesses is the Business Continuity Program (BCP) 
suggested by Hayes and Kotwica (2013, pp. 13-27) which outlines four pillars of such a 
program: assessment, preparedness, response and recovery. Assessment includes hazard 
identification and risk evaluation through a business impact analysis (BIA) and a vendor 
resiliency questionnaire. Preparedness involves ongoing training and activities that could 
simulate the events of crisis, goals of the response teams and how they are created, emergency 
operations center (EOC), and response procedures. Recovery includes keeping records of the 
business response and damage sustained, along with a corrective action plan to mitigate the 
effects of a similar crisis in the future (Hayes & Kotwica, 2013, pp. 13-27).  
Other tools can be financial assistance, training seminars and workshops. As highlighted  
tools such as these can be used by businesses to ensure business recovery and continuity (see 
for example, Tourism Risk Management, An Authoritative Guide to Managing Crises in Tourism, 
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2006 and more recently, Crisis Essentials Guide for tourism businesses and Crisis 
Communications Handbook for Regional and Local Tourism Organizations developed by 
Tourism Victoria, 2013).  
NTOs need to produce their own versions or utilize available frameworks. For instance, the 
Tourism Risk Management, An Authoritative Guide to Managing Crises in Tourism (2006) is 
prepared by Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation is an essential guide on the processes associated 
with developing a risk management strategy for tourism destination or business and how to 
implement and maintain these plans over time. It also provides a practical framework from which 
both businesses and destinations can apply crisis management strategies for prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery. This package also includes  workshop training packages 
designed to provide a platform to stimulate open information exchange and learning (Tourism 
Risk Management, An Authoritative Guide to Managing Crises in Tourism, 2006). As previously 
discussed in Section 8.3.1, the New Zealand government has also has been strengthening 
crisis/risk management and business continuity concepts through the website 
http://www.resilientbusiness.co.nz) and these tools also can be used by small and large 
tourism businesses in any country. 
8.4.6 Collaboration with Various Stakeholders 
The conceptual framework encourages  collaboration with internal and external stakeholders 
to resolve crisis and disasters. This is one of the most significant aspects which was identified 
in the case study that validates the inclusion of this component in the revised integrated 
framework for tourism disaster planning and management. Moreover, the case study extended 
the conceptual framework by identifying the broad consultation of stakeholders that occurred.  
Communication with stakeholders, the importance of empowerment of stakeholders through 
consultation and collaboration and the establishment of new partnerships and the 
strengthening of existing ones were all identified as vital components of disaster management. 
8.4.7 Resolution and Feedback 
The conceptual framework features a resolution and feedback stage which is similar to long-
term recovery and resolution stage in Faulkner’s TDMF. Though it highlights a pre-crisis 
situation it is not possible to regain that state; rather tourism investments can be redeveloped 
or reconstructed and thus an improved state can be achieved. Faulkner (2001) notes that, “out 
of adversity experienced by a community (or individual), beneficial changes often emerge 
which make the community (or individual) stronger and better able to cope with challenges 
that confront them in the longer term.” Destinations need to learn from crises and disasters by 
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evaluating their policies and plans to prevent similar problems in the future and play a 
proactive rather than reactive role.  
A systematic analysis of previous disasters and crises is required for developing a 
comprehensive scenario based crisis management plan to minimize  losses in the future. The 
outlook for tourism in SIDS is closely linked to the state of the world’s major economies. All 
adverse events which have had an impact for the tourism industry could be studied by the 
NTOs. In the case of the Maldives, NTOs could study the effects of both Gulf wars, 
September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, SARS in 2003, effects from Indian Ocean tsunami of 
2004, Bird flu in 2006 and recession of 2008/2009. These can provide useful insights into the 
nature, impact and recovery patters of adverse experiences in the past and recent past. 
Furthermore, it will help to identify  potential indicators that could be monitored to predict 
and respond to crises, as well as  improve the preparedness of the destination and the industry 
in the face of adverse events via appropriate response mechanisms. Thus, integrating lessons 
learned onto a new or an existing tourism industry crisis and disaster management plan is a 
key component in the resolution phase. 
In order to ensure tourism development is sustainable there must be qualified personnel and 
effective emergency response capacity. There must be continuous training for the employees 
according to their positions. Managers at the strategic level needs to be provided with 
sufficient resources and training in strategic management in order to ensure the best  outcome. 
Strategic leadership and adequate resources is necessary to ensure motivation is sustained 
throughout the long recovery process. 
Crises and disasters can be agents of change and provide opportunities for innovation. As 
evidence in the case study, the local response to the tsunami demonstrated a great deal of 
system resilience and strong levels of cooperation with the international media. MATI has 
taken the medium term recommendations in Maldives Tourism Recovery Strategy (2005) 
seriously and has  the opportunity to broaden its tourism base, reinvigorate its marketing 
efforts and enhance its image as a tourism destination. This is particularly noticeable in the 
Third Tourism Master Plan (TMTP), which stresses the development of more diversified 
markets and the distribution of tourism development throughout the islands, with supporting 
infrastructure development. With the help of substantial amounts of overseas aid and advice 
from overseas consultants, by 2007 the tourism industry was almost back to pre-tsunami 
levels. 
The Government of Maldives has recognized that in order to effectively manage climate 
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change risks on the tourism sector in the long-term, it is necessary to integrate climate risk 
planning and climate change adaptation into the country’s policy instruments across all 
sectors and levels of government. The major climate hazards to which the tourism resorts are 
exposed include windstorms, heavy rainfall, extreme temperatures, and draught, sea swells 
and storm surges. Of these, intensive risks associated with swell waves, heavy rainfall and 
windstorms can be destructive, due to their frequency and potential for physical damages and 
erosion of the islands. Since the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the government has initiated 
projects to enhance the resilience of the Maldives to climate change through integrating the 
tourism sector and associated communities to national adaptation.  
The Tourism Adaptation Project (TAP), “Increasing Climate Change Resilience of Maldives 
through Adaptation in the Tourism Sector”, is one such project which aims to provide the 
tourism sector with the policy environment, regulatory guidance, technical skills and 
knowledge to make sure that climate change related risks can be systematically factored into 
day-to-day operations. The project which ran from July 2011 to June 2014 aimed to  
strengthen the capacity of MOT and tourism businesses to recognize the climate risk issues in 
tourism operations and adopt appropriate measures to address them. The project also 
established at least 10 new public/private investment partnerships between the Government of 
Maldives and tourism resorts to showcase the economic and environmental benefits of 
adaptation in tourism operations and another 10 community-based adaptation projects in 
tourism associated communities to show how operators and communities can cooperate on 
joint initiatives to reduce common vulnerabilities (UNDP, 2014).  These outcomes can be 
considered as learning in the context of resolution. 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter has discussed research findings from Chapters 6 and 7. The discussion was 
presented in relation to the integrated framework for tourism disaster planning and 
management which was developed and tested for this study, including considering the six 
stages of Faulkner and Vikulov’s (2001) Tourism Disaster Management Framework (TDMF).  
Overall, the discussion has found that many elements of the integrated framework used for the 
study can be applied, although some were only minimally supported. The key lessons include 
the need to be prepared for crises/disasters in tourism and the importance of implementing 
disaster management planning in the context of proactive planning and reactive planning 
perspectives. From the experience of tsunami disaster management it was found that the lack 
of a proactive approach had caused more confusion and chaos.  
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The final chapter briefly outlines the research outcomes in relation to objectives set for the 
research. The research’s implications and limitations are discussed, as are recommendations 
and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
9.1 Introduction 
The research undertaken in this thesis was concerned with understanding the extent to which 
we can learn from past tourism crises in terms of  planning for future disasters. This chapter 
outlines how the first two research objectives were addressed before discussing the more 
detailed findings in relation to the third and fourth objectives. A discussion of this research’s 
implications and limitations is included, as are recommendations and suggestions for future 
research. 
9.2 Objectives of Research 
The purpose of this study was to examine and analyze how tourism destinations in SIDS that 
have suffered from natural disasters recover and plan for future disasters, using the Maldives 
as an exemplar. The proposition was that from understanding tourism crises and disasters and 
how destinations have responded and recovered will enable more effective planning for future 
disasters. The central research questions were: 
  What can be learnt from past tourism crises and disasters in terms of planning for 
future disasters?  
 What have the Maldives learnt following their disaster experiences and how is this 
currently being incorporated into their future preparedness plans? 
Consistent with the two research questions, the specific research objectives were:  
1.   To review previous studies on tourism disaster management and propose an integrated 
framework for tourism disaster management  
2.   To analyse the unique characteristics of disaster recovery for the tourism industry, 
including short and long-term recovery requirements using the impact of the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of 2004 (Maldives)  
3.    To explain the roles and importance of key stakeholders in disaster recovery for the 
tourism industry, and 
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4.   To examine whether the lessons learned from previous disasters have been 
incorporated into future plans within the tourism disaster management practices. 
Chapter 2 addressed the first objective to review the existing studies on tourism disaster 
management. Based on this review, a conceptual framework with an integrated approach 
which includes both proactive and reactive strategies was developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
discussed the unique challenges in SIDS and placed the challenges of the case study 
destination in context. Chapter 5 presented the research methodology adopted for this study. 
Using empirical data collected on-site, Chapters 6 and 7 addressed the second research 
objective by identifying the short and long term recovery actions implemented by the 
government and the private sector to support destination response and recovery, within the 
context of the framework developed in Chapter 3. Based on interviews and documentary data 
received, these chapters highlighted the various response and recovery issues faced by the 
stakeholders and their actions and strategies to restore services, facilities that ultimately led to 
recovery of destination.  
Chapter 8 discussed the findings in relation to the framework and concluded that the 
framework used for analysis has potential for further refinement. Lessons derived from this 
research and more recent literature establishes the context for undertaking this 
reconsideration. Thus,  a revised and improved framework resulted from the undertaking. 
9.3 Strengths and Weakness of the Thesis Framework 
The aim of crisis and disaster management frameworks and models is to deliver guidance for 
planners, policy makers and managers before, during and after a disaster or  crises. This is 
because economic and societal effects of a crises or disaster  may be substantial and so a rapid 
response and recovery from an unfortunate event is highly desirable. As noted in Chapters 2 
and 3, models proposed within the tourism crisis and disaster management theory literature 
have characteristic weaknesses, meaning that they are not appropriate for all crisis and 
disaster situations.  
The initial thesis framework used does not provide detailed prevention and proactive planning 
strategies; rather it identifies the components of scenario planning, risk analyses and 
contingency planning and suggests that these are  inappropriately placed. Literature on pre-
disaster preparedness by academics (Faulkner, 2001; Prideaux, 2003; Ritchie, 2009) affirms 
that this is an important component of tourism crisis and disaster management. It is argued 
that when destinations are in a state of readiness it can reduce the impact of a disaster when it 
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happens (Heath, 1998). Similarly, Ritchie (2009, p. 69) argues that there must be change in 
attitudes; “it probably will happen so what should we do about it.” He insists that those 
destinations who take proactive steps to prepare themselves for a crisis or a disaster will be 
better prepared. 
Prevention and proactive planning therefore has been added to the revised framework in 
Chapter 8. The revised framework consists of emergency plans, warning systems and other 
activities adopted in advance of a disaster to aid in its management. The literature also 
recommends the formation of crises management teams and agreement on activation 
protocols (Faulkner, 2001; Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001) stressing the importance of staff 
training and organizational culture (Pforr & Hosie, 2008). It also highlights the necessity of 
stakeholder awareness (Hystad & Keller, 2008). These components have thus been 
incorporated to the framework.  
Another feature of prevention foreground in contemporary tourism crises and disaster 
management models has been added into the framework under prevention and proactive 
planning. Specifically, many frameworks propose risk assessment should be undertaken and 
that on the basis of scenario planning, contingency analysis should be developed in 
accordance with the situations considered likely to occur. There are many arguments around 
the unpredictability of tourism crises and disasters which can undermine the potential 
effectiveness of contingency planning (Blackman & Ritchie, 2008; Miller & Ritchie, 2003; 
Sharpley, 2005). However, if known or predictable hazards are ignored the destination may 
face a self-inflicted crisis.   
Other recent disasters and crises reveal  similar trends. Though impacting primarily on air 
travel, Iceland’s volcanic ash cloud in April 2010 resulted in unprecedented inconveniences 
for travelers and huge repercussions for the tourism industry on a global scale. Though 
criticized, scenario planning  needs to be integrated into a contemporary tourism crisis 
management framework, so that governments, destination organizations and businesses can 
be prepared for different situations and  learn from them. Interestingly, Evans and Elphick 
(2005) note that contingency planning can lead to complacency where governments, DMOs 
and businesses may relax in the belief that they are prepared for all possible situations only to 
be taken by surprise when a crisis or a disaster that was not identified in any scenario occurs, 
resulting in ‘paralysis’ and inaction. 
The initial thesis framework did not  place the various components derived from Faulkner’s 
TDMF in specific stages or phases. Tourism crises and disaster management models in most 
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of the literature position  their frameworks as ‘life-cycle approaches’. The initial data 
collection questionnaire was based on the Disaster Incident Response Evaluation (DIRE) grid 
developed by Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) and was the basis for the interview structure and 
topics. In the revised model, Faulkner’s life-cycle stages have been integrated to further refine 
it and to place the various components (both proactive and reactive) into this context.  
Similarly, there are many arguments against including ‘life-cycle approaches’; as has been 
shown, crises and disasters often occur without warning and a destination can immediately 
enter into an ‘emergency’ phase by by-passing the ‘pre-event’ and ‘prodromal’ phase and 
many require rapid and urgent action. According to Henderson (2003, p. 281) “crises do not 
always follow the clearly delineated pattern of the theoretical models because of their 
unpredictability and the speed at which they unfold.” Many tourism crises and disaster 
management models provide detailed, rigid, step-by-step planning which when tested or 
applied have proved ineffective. However, the framework proposed places the key disaster 
management components in a linear approach with less detail, similar to Ritchie’s Tourism 
Crisis Management Framework (2004), thus allowing for more flexibility. This is done to 
assist managers and employees to follow the sequence and progress via a stage to stage 
approach and avoid confusion. 
Carlsen and Hughes (2008, p. 147) highlight the inadequacy of a ‘one size fits all’ approach: 
“Crises and disasters are variable to duration and scale. The flow-on and contagion effects 
depend very much upon the nature of the disaster (natural or man-made) and the 
corresponding change in public perception in response to media coverage and crisis 
communication.” Moreover, as Carlsen and Hughes (2008, p. 268) note “crises by their 
nature are geographically, demographically and temporally discrete, so that the boundaries 
of study are not fixed but vary dramatically”, and therefore when researching them, different 
tools will be required. Evidently, crises and disasters differ in their origins, effects, outcomes 
and the measures necessary for recovery. They also differ in the amount of time needed for 
recovery. Zeng, Carter, and De Lacy (2005) observe  how crises, such as human epidemics, 
animal epidemics, destructive weather conditions and other natural disasters, civil 
strife/violence, war or terrorism all have different effects and recovery times and necessitate 
different recovery strategies, thus limiting the usefulness of one individual crisis framework 
for all.  
The framework has therefore been proposed with the understanding that there is no one-size-
fits-all approach to tourism crises and disaster management. This study has analyzed the 
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unique characteristics of crises and disaster recovery for the tourism industry in SIDS 
including short and long-term recovery requirements by using the Indian Ocean tsunami of 
2004 as an example for testing the new model. Obviously no country can develop a plan that 
is sufficient to deal with the scale and impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. This is 
highlighted by Sharpley (2005, p. 345) who wrote: “it is unlikely that any set of guidelines or 
indeed, any established crisis management procedure could have adequately prepared a 
destination or region for the catastrophic events unleashed by the massive underwater 
earthquake off the Sumatran Coast on 26th December 2004.” 
In their research on tourism crisis and island destinations, Ghaderi, Mat Som, and Henderson 
(2012) highlight the need for closer cooperation and coordination amongst the various 
stakeholders in the tourism industry, both in public and private and well-designed and 
executed crisis management plans, under the stewardship of official agencies to minimize the 
risks and mitigate the damaging impacts. Both the initial thesis framework and the revised 
framework integrate these components. In their paper on the Thai floods of 2011 Ghaderi, 
Mat Som, and Henderson (2015) outline the core components of a tourism disaster 
management plan (crisis communication, media, stakeholder cooperation and learning) which 
basically are similar to the core components of a reactive strategy proposed in the thesis.  
9.4 Research Implications 
Tourism is the primary economic activity for many SIDS in terms of income generation, 
employment creation, and foreign exchange earnings with the potential to stimulate the 
development of other economic and social sectors. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) concluded in 2007 that a sea-level rise resulting from a global temperature 
increase of 4 degrees Celsius would completely submerge low-lying island states like Tuvalu, 
Kiribati, and the Maldives (Sem & Moore, 2009). Furthermore, the IPCC has been 
anticipating the increase of extreme weather events associated with climate change thus 
making this research relevant and important. 
Long-term recovery from natural disaster events has been identified as the least researched 
component of the disaster cycle (Chang, 2010). A review has found that most literature 
focuses on immediate relief  and disaster risk reduction with less attention on the long-term 
recovery aspects. By undertaking research on post-disaster tourism crisis recovery in a Small 
Island Developing State, this research has identified the unique characteristics of disaster 
recovery for the tourism industry in SIDS, including short and long-term recovery 
requirements. Furthermore, the research has documented the actions taken by key 
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stakeholders at a tourism destination and may help other destinations coping with crises and 
disasters. 
Research on tourism crises and disaster recovery has provided  some interesting conclusions. 
When compared to other industries, the recovery of the tourism industry from a disaster is far 
more complicated. If a disaster destroys one component of a destination’s tourism industry or 
its infrastructure, others are also affected. Another aspect is that the overall destination 
recovery in a SIDS depends on tourism recovery. When a destination becomes unavailable to 
tourists due to a disaster, they can find alternative destinations to visit and the NTOs have the 
daunting task of dealing with a sudden drop in occupancy. Tourism recovery after a disaster is 
partly dependent on the successful rebuilding of the destination’s image and  must overcome 
any adverse publicity resulting from the disaster. Thus, tourism recovery can take several 
years to rebuild and  depends on the extent of the physical damages caused by the disaster and 
the ability of the various components of the tourism industry to restore their operations.  
The integrated framework for tourism disaster planning and management is a practical 
framework that could be applied by NTOs in a SIDS to proactively prepare for  a tourism 
crisis or a disaster and to even revitalize their tourism industry following a crises or a disaster. 
The actions and strategies undertaken by the NTOs in the Maldives can be used as a reference 
when dealing with adverse events to the tourism industry. The framework has been developed 
after reference to a tsunami disaster, however when it is presented it does not explicitly refer 
to a particular disaster. Therefore, the framework could be applied to both man-made and 
natural disasters. The framework also integrates the six stages of the disaster life-cycle which 
ensures that it can be realistically applied to a variety of situations and incorporated with 
existing disaster response and emergency response activities. 
Although the tourism industries in SIDS face serious threats from crises and disasters, 
experience from recent disasters indicate that few engage in planning for effective disaster 
management. Such planning entails both proactive and reactive measures so the industry is 
able to minimize the risk and damage prior to and during the crisis or disaster event and 
eventually resume operations as efficiently and effectively as possible. Changes have been 
made to the initially proposed framework to create a more useful tool relevant to SIDS and 
the wider tourism industry resulting in a more robust final framework. The components added 
were:  
• A prevention and proactive planning component - A risk and hazard analysis 
component to be undertaken and planning based on scenarios and contingencies. The 
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tourism industry needs to focus on an ‘all hazards approach’ rather than just on single or 
specific crises and disasters. 
• An emergency and immediate response component - NTOs, EOs and the private sector 
tourism industry with the community need to work in defined roles to minimize the 
damage to the industry.  
• A business recovery component under resource management- Businesses in SIDS need 
to introduce business continuity planning and emergency preparedness, provide financial 
assistance, training seminars and workshops. 
• And finally, a review component to the new framework- Systematic analysis of previous 
disasters and crises is required for developing a comprehensive scenario based crisis 
management plans in SIDS, they need to review policies and make crisis management part 
of strategic planning. 
This research has made various contributions to this field of tourism crisis and disaster 
management. It has addressed gaps concerning the lack of comprehensive research conducted 
in crisis and disaster phenomena in tourism as identified by Faulkner (2001), Méheux and 
Parker (2006), Carlsen and Liburd (2008), Hystad and Keller (2008)and (Ritchie, 2009). 
Similarly it also addresses the lack of research into tourism crisis and disaster management in 
SIDS with tourism based economies.  
The thesis research further builds on existing studies of tourism crisis and disaster 
frameworks such as Faulkner and Vikulov (2001), Hystad and Keller (2008) and Ritchie 
(2009). It contributes an integrated approach to disaster management in tourism through a 
case study approach as suggested by Ritchie (2004, p. 681) to test the models and concepts 
surrounding crisis and disaster management in the tourism industry and  builds on existing 
frameworks. The case study has explored various disaster recovery strategies such as crisis 
communication, recovery marketing, and management of resources, stakeholder 
collaborations, and learning. The results provide valuable  real examples to the field in the 
area of SIDS.  
As highlighted earlier, the main contribution of this research is an integrated approach that 
could be used as a crisis and disaster management framework for managing tourism crises or 
disasters in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). It also responds to Carlsen and Liburd’s 
(2008) research agenda which examines research on managing recovery and restoration, 
marketing and promotion during and after the crisis, and rebuilding the destination (see 
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section 9.7). Further, the research expands Ritchie’s work (2004) on understanding 
stakeholder collaboration and planning in the tourism industry. The analytical case study of 
stakeholder strategies (short, medium and long term actions) in the recovery of the tourism 
industry in Maldives, following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, is an opportunity to test 
the conceptual framework developed for the study and is a practical outcome for the tourism 
industry in SIDS. 
As argued  in the literature review, there is a need for long-term and in-depth studies on 
tourism recovery following disasters. This research is useful for Destination Management 
Organizations (DMOs), National Tourism Organizations (NTOs) and industry associations 
who have an important role  in educating the industry and facilitating readiness, response and 
recovery actions and strategies (Ritchie, 2009). The documented findings will be useful to the 
Government and the stakeholders in the Maldives. It is hoped that it will support the 
government in designing appropriate strategies for tourism recovery following induced or 
imposed catastrophes in the future. 
9.5 Limitations  
Initially this research was planned as a multiple case with (embedded) design type 4 in Yin 
(2003)’s categorization, with the aim to achieve replication of a single type of incident in 
different settings to compare and contrast recovery of the tourism industry in both the 
Maldives and Samoa following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 and the Pacific Ocean 
Tsunami of 2009 respectively. This however, did not materialize due to lack of support from 
stakeholders as outlined in Chapter 5. Therefore, the research is based upon a single case of 
recovery, in this case, the Maldives following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. Similarly, 
the extent to which the conceptual framework can be tested and revised is limited to  this 
single case study. 
This research is focused on the destination level rather than the individual level.  It did not 
examine community level recovery activities and projects. It is also limited in terms of 
duration and constraints faced while on the two field trips. Political instability and chaos in 
the Maldives between February 2011 and February 2012, the period when the data was 
collected, has been discussed  in Chapter 5. Due to the change of political appointees after the 
first democratic elections many officials were new and were not very aware of the responses 
to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. A low response rate from the tourism businesses and a 
lack of cooperation was a serious limitation during the data collection stage. 
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The tourism industry is sensitive and susceptible to disasters and crises and has been subject 
to a variety of events, shocks and incidents over the years (Evans & Elphick, 2005, Santana, 
2003). According to Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) some destinations experience disasters that 
have a high probability of recurring. They have the dubious advantage of reviewing and 
refining their disaster management strategies after each event. However, when proposing their 
generic framework, Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) also argued that one of the challenges of 
tourism disaster management is to ensure that destinations develop a degree of preparedness 
for events that have a low probability of occurring.  
It is not possible to formulate plans for each and every type of crisis or disaster, however, as 
Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) note, being prepared for the unexpected requires a process 
where a broad spectrum of disaster scenarios are identified and contingency plans are 
developed to cope with these. Therefore, the integrated framework for tourism disaster 
planning and management is not a “one size fits all” model. It is based on tourism recovery 
after the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 in just one country. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, this empirical research is able to make a number of recommendations applicable 
to the Maldivian tourism industry and general recommendations to governments and tourism 
industries elsewhere. 
9.6 Recommendations 
9.6.1 Recommendations for Governments and Tourism Industries 
This research has outlined the need to be prepared for crisis and disaster management in the 
tourism industry. A tourism destination that has a realistic assessment of the risks and 
required disaster management strategies and disaster management planning is likely to 
respond and recover quickly should a crises or a disaster occur. Investigation of previous 
disasters and crises is required for developing comprehensive scenario based crisis or disaster 
management plans. NTOs could undertake research on adverse events which have had an 
impact upon the tourism industry in the past and base their tourism disaster management plans 
on these findings. 
In the planning process, NTOs should learn from past experiences, either local or 
international. This would help  NTOs to develop scenario plans and response strategies for 
specific issues. A review of disaster management strategies and their outcomes and lessons 
learned would provide an overview of the weaknesses of the existing plans and an opportunity 
to improve them.  
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Effective institutional arrangements are crucial for implementing the integrated approach. 
Respective governments need to ensure that there is one over all disaster management agency, 
with a clear line of authority and decision making process, particularly for emergency relief 
and response. In the tourism context,  NTOs or the relevant government departments must 
have clear policies regarding decision making authority at a national level. 
Effective collaboration and communication between stakeholders is crucial at different levels. 
There must be collaboration between government agencies and private sector organizations 
that are responsible for utilities and services. This link is very important so that the tourism 
industry establish plans within  realistic time frames for operational recovery. There must be 
strong lines of communication and collaboration between emergency operations (EOs), NGOs 
and private sector tourism industry. The EOs can assist by providing  planning strategies and  
employee training.  
There must be good relationships with the media during the crisis and disaster phase. The 
reports of the situation need to be accurate.  During the recovery phase, it is necessary to raise 
the confidence for the region, destination and for reopened businesses. Effective reactive 
disaster management strategies will incorporate a marketing plan that includes collaboration 
with  local and international media. 
The integrated framework for tourism disaster planning and management is an applied 
framework for disaster response and recovery in a tourism destination. The NTOs and the 
private sector businesses can learn from the tourism recovery strategies used  in the Maldives 
case study. Managers and team members must be competent to implement of disaster 
management plans both at national and an individual business level. This could be achieved 
through short and long-term skills and capacity development projects to increase competency 
in this area.  
EOs, NTOs and the private sector need to develop their capacity and knowledge through 
attending conferences and seminars. They should also utilize appropriate learning 
technologies and trends suggested by Pforr and Hosie (2008), discussed in Chapter 8. NTOs 
need to produce their own tourism crisis/disaster management plans or adopt other available 
regional frameworks as highlighted earlier. Tourism businesses may develop their own 
crisis/risk management and business continuity concepts as  discussed in Chapter 8, as seen in  
New Zealand’s response to the Christchurch earthquakes. 
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9.6.2 Recommendations for the Tourism Industry in the Maldives  
The tourism industry is facing increasing rates of disasters, both naturally occurring, such as 
the 2010 earthquake devastation in Haiti, the 2011 tsunami in Japan, and man-made disasters 
such as the terrorist attacks in 2008 in Mumbai, India. While many tourism dependent 
countries like the SIDS recognize that disaster planning is important, such planning is  too 
often neglected in national policies. As a result, many countries are still at a low level of 
disaster preparedness.  
The impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 for the Maldivian tourism industry was 
severe and the level of preparedness low. The timing of the tsunami coincided with the high 
tourism season in the Maldives when the resorts were full, resulting in the closure of 
businesses, cancellations and severely reduced occupancy rates and ultimately revenue. The 
Maldives had limited resources, technical competence and experience in handling a disaster of 
this magnitude. However, government sector and private sector efforts and international 
support, both in terms of aid and technical expertise, has enabled the Maldives to recover.  
The following recommendations are made after an investigation of the response and recovery 
strategies adopted by the Maldivian tourism industry after the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, 
and after reviewing the current policy regime and activities of the Maldivian tourism industry 
in the area of disaster risk reduction. They are made with due acknowledgement of the  
stakeholder efforts. 
Currently, only a few of the tourism resorts have environment and safety management plans. 
Plans were initially developed by some resorts following environmental concerns in the 
Second Tourism Master Plan of 1995 and due to the requirements of some international 
financial institutions. These plans need to be developed for all the sectors of tourism industry 
(resorts, guesthouses, picnic islands, yacht marinas and safari vessels) taking specific care to 
address climate change adaptation and disaster risk management. 
The tourism industry should work with government agencies in achieving the goals 
established  for reducing vulnerabilities in the tourism sector in the National Adaptation 
Program of Action (NAPA); which includes coastal protection and coastal zone management 
to protect tourist infrastructure, diversification of tourism products to reduce over dependency 
on the marine environment and  climate change adaptation policy and strategy for tourism. 
Similarly, all tourism stakeholders need to work together to achieve the objectives outlined in 
the Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change 
   
 214 
Adaptation 2010-2020 (SNAP). This would help ensure the long-term protection of the 
expensive tourism infrastructure in the Maldives. 
The disaster management plan for tourism sector developed soon after the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami of 2004, still appears as a draft document, though it resulted in making it mandatory 
for resorts to have individual disaster management plans, audits of communication 
infrastructures, emergency evacuation and resorts to be integrated with evacuation plan of 
National Disaster Management Centre. The plan needs to be further revised and finalized to 
integrate the strategies identified in NAPA and SNAP. 
The Tourism Emergency Operation Center has been established within the MOT but the 
Crisis Management Unit envisaged in the Third Tourism Master Plan has not been formed. It 
is therefore recommended that resources be allocated to create this institution within the MOT 
which will formalize all of the SOPs, mechanisms and guidelines for the industry.  
The current work initiated by NDMC with the Maldives National Defense Force along with 
MOT for enhancing disaster management in the tourism sector of Maldives is notable. These 
programs are tailored to include both technical training and hands on exercises to ensure that 
resort management and staff  develop an understanding and knowledge of coordinating and 
controlling chaotic emergency situations due to natural and non-natural hazards (Ministry of 
Tourism, 2014). It is recommended that these programs be made mandatory rather than 
voluntary, and that the Crisis Management Unit within the MOT take the responsibility for 
implementing them. 
The  Tourism Security Seminar held in 2011, to combat growing national security concerns, 
by the Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture with (Maldives Police Service, Maldives 
National Defense Force (MNDF), the Maldives Association of Travel Agents and Tour 
operators (MATATO) and the Maldives Association of Tourism Industry (MATI)) 
stakeholders was a positive exercise that envisaged a new national security policy. 
Furthermore, it gained commitment from the industry stakeholders to amend the Maldives 
Tourism Act to develop and implement a security system that complies with police standards 
and supports the private security teams that are hired by the resorts. The industry needs to 
follow up on these recommendations and implement the outcomes in order to make it a part of 
the tourism disaster management plan. 
As highlighted in Chapter 8, employees at all levels in the tourism industry set aside their own 
fears and concentrated on response and recovery operations during the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
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of 2004. Having an expectation that staff will handle both business tasks and these new tasks 
without necessary training is unrealistic. It is recommended that each tourist resort develop 
core response  and welfare teams, particularly for crisis and disasters, and train and certify 
them according to a national curriculum on emergency preparedness.  
A structured volunteer program needs to be introduced  in local communities so that the 
citizens will be trained to assist a resort or a tourism establishment in case of a crisis or a 
disaster they cannot handle alone. The resorts can work with Island and Atoll Councils in 
order to find  volunteers. Most of the workers are from nearby island communities and the 
survival of tourism is essential for ensuring their employment and economic recovery as a 
whole. As seen in the tsunami, where resorts received severe damage, the island communities 
assisted in providing basic relief. Equally when nearby island communities ran out of food 
and water, the resorts helped in the same way. Therefore, collaboration between both is 
essential. 
Given the exceptional circumstances, the work done by the tourism sector association, MATI 
with the EOs and NTOs during the tsunami was very important. However, the tourism 
industry needs to broaden its involvement in the Tourism Emergency Operations Center 
(TEOC) and support the government to establish the Results Based Strategic Disaster 
Management Framework envisaged in the Disaster Management Plan for Tourism Sector 
(2005). This  would  complement  the NDMC. 
The tourism industry also need to work together with the NTOs and  other authorities to 
achieve success in adaptation measures for climate change risks that are being currently 
studied under the Tourism Adaptation Project. 
9.7 Suggestions for Further Fesearch 
Future research and development of conceptual frameworks or models are required in the area 
of crisis and disaster management in the tourism industry. All components in the proposed 
Integrated Framework for Tourism Disaster Planning and Management can be further studied. 
Similarly, the whole framework could be tested using a case study of another type of crisis or 
a disaster. Another area of future research could examine the effects of disasters on 
destination image and the effectiveness of the government strategies to restore market 
confidence. More research is also required to understand disaster preparedness and 
organizational learning within the tourism industry in Small Island Developing States. 
Further research can be conducted from the  tourist perspective, to understand the crisis and 
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disaster information strategies for different tourist groups and target markets. Similarly, as 
Larsson and Enander (1997) highlight, social values and norms may have an impact on 
disaster planning, thus cross-cultural studies could be undertaken to examine these issues. 
Multidisciplinary researchers from  media, communications, education and sociology 
disciplines can work alongside tourism researchers to explore these topics.  
Carlsen and Liburd (2008)  propose a research agenda for tourism crisis management where 
they outline six research categories consisting of: (1) clarification of definitions, concepts and 
typologies, (2) risk identification and assessment, (3) managing recovery and restoration, (4) 
marketing and promotion during and after the crisis, (5) rebuilding the destination, and (6) 
sustainable tourism development from a risk management perspective. In this thesis, 
categories three, four and five suggested by Carlsen and Liburd (2008) have been explored to 
an extent. Future research areas of tourism crisis and disaster management are referred to by 
Carlsen and Liburd (2008)and Ritchie (2009). 
9.8 Conclusions 
The tourism industry is vulnerable to external shocks, whether they are induced or imposed 
crises or disasters. The readiness of the industry and its capacity to effectively respond and 
recover is of critical significance for destinations and the community in which they function. 
Descriptive and analytical case studies of crises and disasters and development of a body of 
theoretical and practical knowledge will help ensure that the government and industry 
continue to play an important role in caring for the safety and security of the tourists while 
maintaining a viable and sustainable industry for all stakeholders. The Integrated Framework 
for Tourism Disaster Planning and Management proposed and developed further in this thesis, 
and the case study examined to test the framework, is a step in  that direction. 
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Appendix A: Resorts that had Basic Services Restored and Some 
Repairs 
Resorts 
No. of 
beds 
Operation 
suspended 
on  
Operation 
started on  Details of Damage 
Restoration of Basic Services and Some Repairs 
Resort 
A 
224 27-Dec-04 Jan-05 Mostly damage to furniture and equipment, and erosion. 
The water level had risen to approximately 3 to 4 ft. during 
the tsunami. Side of the jetty had risen up due the wave 
making the supporting pillars rise out of the ground. Staff 
managed to fix it temporarily. Reception area received 
minor damages except to computer equipment and A/Cs 
which were all damaged. The staff canteen had minor 
damages. Staff quarters received less damage, was brought 
back to normal. All guest rooms on the island had suffered 
various extents of damage but some rooms were brought 
back to a normal. Some rooms had torn off doors and 
decks. No damage to equipment in the restaurant, display 
fridges and cold rooms. Some cutlery and grill was 
damaged. 
Resort 
B 
128 26-Dec-04 Jan-05 All equipment and items brought for water bungalow 
project was damaged and some carried away. Damage to 
the foundations laid for water bungalows. Carpentry, 
swimming pool, water plant damaged. Restaurant and 
kitchen badly damaged including equipment. 88 beach 
bungalows affected, furniture, equipment, doors and 
windows of the guest rooms were badly damaged and the 
foundation beams of some rooms were exposed. Damage to 
the power generators. Staff premises received extensive 
damage mainly to the furniture and equipment. 
Resort 
C 
156 26-Dec-04 Jan-05 Mostly suffered damage to furniture, glass and erosion. 
Main jetty was severely damaged. Some of the concrete 
pillars embedded into the sand which supported the jetty 
had been pulled out of the ground, making the jetty uneven. 
82 guestrooms  damaged. Damage mostly to doors, 
furniture and decks. Resort’s spa was  severely damages. 
Jetty leading to water bungalows collapsed but breaking 
many pipelines, but only 4 water bungalows were severely 
affected. Beach bar washed away, power not supplied due 
the entire island due to short-circuits, and pumps at the 
desalination plant got damaged. Decks and walk-ways in 
public areas got damaged. 
Resort 
D 
96 26-Dec-04 Jan-05 
Flood on the whole island, but managed to keep the tourists 
comfortable, provided meals and accommodation, jetty was 
damaged and was fixed quickly. 
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Appendix B: Renovation Activities Including Some Reconstruction 
 
Resorts 
No. of 
beds 
Operation 
suspended 
on  
Operation 
started on  Details of damage 
Renovation activities including some reconstruction 
Resort E 100 1-Jan-05 Apr-05 Water bungalows were severely damaged to an extent 
that cannot be occupied unless renovation is done to the 
entire room and furniture. All pipelines in the island 
were damaged. There as  some damage to few planks in 
the main jetty. While the kitchen, bar and pool area 
received some severe damage, sea water damaged the 
electrical equipment like ovens, cookers, main freezers, 
fridges. 
Resort F 94 26-Dec-04 Jun-05 Major damage to all the rooms and 40 water villas 
where all furniture, equipment, door and windows were 
damaged - major repairs to be done. Three jetties were 
also damaged. Furniture and equipment were damaged 
in staff quarters. Items in stores were damaged. All 
equipment in staff kitchen was damaged. The water 
bungalow jetty walkways and the 
supporting stills were badly damaged. All the pipelines 
for water, sewage, electricity were fully damaged. 
Resort G 250 26-Dec-04 Dec-05 Severe damage to the island, including damage to the 
furniture, fittings of newly constructed 14 beach 
bungalow units and equipment in the island. All guests 
were evacuated to nearby resorts and those guests with 
minor injuries were sent to Male. Upstairs of staff rooms 
were functional. Water in tanks, Only one generator was 
working. Immediate priority was to clean and restore 
power. 
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Appendix C: Totally Reconstructed Resorts  
Resorts 
No. of 
beds 
Operation 
suspended 
on  
Operation 
started on  Details of damage 
Total Reconstruction 
Resort 
H 
200 26-Dec-04 Sep-06 Severe damage to the equipment, furniture and fitting as 
high tides brought floods, caused beach erosion, damage 
to wooden decks of the pool. Water bungalow  jetty was 
damaged and most of the furniture broken, foundation 
beams of beach bungalows were exposed as the waves 
went from one side of the island to the other and most of 
the furniture were broken. A large area of the deck 
surrounding swimming pool was removed from the beams 
and moved to the island with the waves. All the furniture 
and equipment in the public areas and restaurants were 
damaged 
Resort 
I 
240 26-Dec-04 Jan-07 Resort had suffered severe damage to almost all structures 
on the island, including guest rooms, water bungalows, 
jetties, and staff quarters and supporting facilities. The 
island also suffered heavy erosion .The water level on the 
island had risen from 3 to 4 feet above ground during the 
tsunami. Pillars in the jetty got uneven due to the pillars 
supporting it sinking or becoming tilted. Walk-ways were 
damaged. Service jetty was completely damaged. The 
swimming pool had suffered cracks and severe erosion on 
the beach side. Items in the main store room were 
damaged beyond use. A container was lifted off its 
foundations. Main admin offices in the island received 
severe damage; there was broken glass and furniture. 
Electric sockets and equipment in them were damaged, 
floors were uneven, and doors were broken. All guest 
rooms received extensive damage, some decks lifted-off 
and torn-off, walls pulled down, and doors broken. The 
debris, fixtures, fittings, equipment were found 30-50 feet 
off the rooms. 6 water bungalows were washed away. 
Staff quarters got totally damaged. 
Resort 
J 
200 26-Dec-04 May-08 Beach front rooms in the resort were totally damaged, 
some sidewalls were lost and window units were forced in 
by the force of the waves. Air conditioning units right 
above the windows, and the lighting and electrical fixtures 
were all filled with sea water. The contents from the 
guestrooms were floating all over the island. The exterior 
doors in back and front were damaged and torn away. 
Reception areas, staff quarters and restaurants received 
extensive damage and contents washed away. A lot of 
environmental damage happened where there was a 
coastline retreat of 15 m or more in areas that were not 
protected by sea walls. Flood water higher than an average 
person       (160-180 cm) inundated the island, water from 
eastern side and the western sides met in the centre , 
resulted in significant erosion to the reclaimed beach 
making deep gullies across the beach. Coral clasts washed 
over a bern on the surface, trees were buried in corals 20 
cm that went up to 20 m into the island. 
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Appendix D: Profiles of Participants from the Emergency 
Organizations (EOs), National Tourism Organizations (NTOs) and 
Other Relevant Government Agencies Consulted for the Research 
Agency No. of 
participants 
Role/Profile 
 
Ministry of 
Tourism and 
Civil Aviation 
 
2 
The main government body that regulates tourism activities in the 
Maldives. Main functions are formulation and implementation of long-
term planning and development of tourism in Maldives, formulation and 
implementation of laws and regulations for tourism facilities and service 
standards, adoption of sound environmental principles in tourism 
development and operation. Ministry is also responsible for leasing of 
land for tourism and registration of all tourism operators and facilities 
while maintaining and compiling the statistics related to the industry and 
planning and implementation of human resource development for 
tourism industry. 
National 
Disaster 
Management 
Centre 
2 
The government established the National Disaster Management Centre 
(NDMC) soon after the tsunami to facilitate and coordinate emergency 
relief, recovery and reconstruction work. The Centre included the 
following divisions: The National Disaster Relief Coordination Unit 
(NDRCU); The National Economic Recovery and Reconstruction 
Program; The Housing and Infrastructure Redevelopment Unit (HIRU); 
The Transport and Logistics Unit (TLU) and The Tsunami Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund (TRFF). The NDMC has been very actively 
involved in the tsunami reconstruction with the mandate of 
reconstruction plan which included; immediate relief and recovery 
efforts; reconstruction and rehabilitation (including infrastructure, 
livelihoods, home, etc.); and future risk mitigation and disaster 
management. Since February 2012, NDMC has been transferred under 
the Ministry of Defence and National Security and a new mandate has 
been given since July 2012 which is based on Disaster Risk Reduction 
(DRR) system.  
Ministry of 
Housing and 
Environment 
1 
The Ministry of Housing and Environment is a pivotal agency in 
Maldives. Since 1st May 2012 the Ministry has two broad functions; 
housing and infrastructure and environment and energy. The institutions 
operating under the Ministry of Housing and Environment include; 
Maldives Meteorological Service; Environmental Protection Agency; 
and Maldives Energy Authority. The Ministry’s main mandate is to 
formulate; policies related to environment, energy, water and 
meteorology; formulating regulations and standards needed for the 
implementation of legislation; protecting the environment of the 
Maldives, and planning the sustainable development and implementation 
of all aspects of energy, water and sanitation, and meteorology; and 
carrying out major activities related to the environment, energy, water 
and sanitation, sewerage and meteorology. During the tsunami the 
Ministry of Environment and Construction then focused on assessments 
on environmental damage, waste and debris management issues in the 
islands, relocation of affected populations, providence of temporary 
shelters, implementation of building codes, and identification of safe 
locations and worked on the programs to regenerate mangroves and 
shelter belt plantation in the islands. The Ministry mainly worked with 
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UNEP/OCHA Environmental Unit and number of national and 
international organizations.  
Maldives 
Tourism 
Promotion 
Board 
1 
Maldives Tourism Promotion Board (MTPB), the marketing arm of the 
Ministry of Tourism (MOT), was created in 1998 with the task to 
conduct marketing and other promotional activities for Maldives’ 
tourism industry. MTPB was also formed to reap the benefits from the 
synergy that exist between domestic and international air transport 
access and tourism development. Since its inception MTPB led the way 
for the Maldives to be seen as top luxury brand destination with a 
successful destination slogan “Maldives…the Sunny Side of Life” until 
the restructure and corporatization of MTPB in 2010 as The Maldives 
Marketing and PR Corporation (MMPRC). Core duties and function of 
MMPRC are tourism awareness and promotion and actively promoting 
the Maldives as the world’s best holiday beach destination to the tourism 
industry and consumer target audience(s).  During the tsunami MTPB 
worked very closely with the MOT in destination recovery and 
marketing to improve the visitation. 
Ministry of 
Health 
1 
Ministry of Health (MOH) is responsible for developing and 
implementing national health policy of the country, public health 
protection, provision of health services to all the inhabited islands in the 
Maldives. Health services in the Maldives follow a 5- tier system. The 
health service delivery system comprises the central level (Indira Gandhi 
Memorial Hospital -IGMH), regional level (regional hospitals), atoll 
level (atoll hospitals), sub atoll level (atoll health centres) and island 
level (health posts and family health sections). They are structured into a 
referral system, with the hierarchy ascending from the family health 
workers at the island level to specialist medical practitioners at IGMH. 
The 5th tier includes MOH, Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital –IGMH, 
Department of Medical Services, Department of Public Health, Maldives 
Food and Drug Authority, National Thalassemia Centre (NTC), and 
Health Councils. During the tsunami the MOH was mainly on focusing 
to ensure health case was provided to the needy, assessment of health 
situation, assessment of water and sanitation situation, collecting 
epidemic and disease surveillance data. MOH was coordinating with 
many international and local organizations including mobilization of 
foreign aid. 
Department 
of 
Immigration 
and 
Emigration 
1 
The department is responsible for the immigration control throughout the 
Maldives. The main functions of the Department are; control and 
manage the border to ensure the legal entry of the people to the Republic 
of Maldives; ensure that the foreigners comply with the law and 
regulations of the country while their stay in the Maldives and provide a 
secure and trustworthy international identification for Maldivian citizens 
for their travel to other countries. During the tsunami response the 
Department liaised and coordinated with other relevant government 
authorities and foreign consulates top prepare and send the tourists from 
those countries back home. They also worked closely with the 
emergency authorities to make the airport operational. Immigration 
Department is also actively involved in Airport Emergency Plan 
development. 
Maldives 
Airports 
Company 
Limited 
(MACL) 
1 
Maldives Airports Company Limited (MACL) is a government owned 
company that came through various government departments that were 
responsible for the operation of Male’ International Airport. On 15th July 
2010, the airport was privatized following a concession agreement 
between GMR Infrastructure Group and Malaysia Airports Berhard 
(MAHB). After the agreement Air Traffic Control and Aviation security 
Command was supervised by MACL. Following the change of 
government on 22nd February 2012, the agreement with GMR-MAHB 
was cancelled and since 7th December 2012, MACL has been operating 
the airport. During the tsunami the airport was completely flooded with 
the wave and some navigational equipment and back-up systems were 
damaged. However, they worked hard to clear the runway and open the 
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airport within 10 hours for  passengers who were flooded to fly home. 
They also formulated a new Airport Emergency Plan following this.  
Department 
of 
Meteorology 
1 
The National Meteorological Centre (NMC) is the main weather centre 
for daily forecasts,  all kinds of aviation forecasts, marine forecast, 
weather warnings, earthquakes and t tsunami alerts for the Maldives. 
After the tsunami much has been done for the early warning systems 
(EWS) by NMC. This includes installation of new EW equipment, 
capacity building in the NMC for early warnings and public awareness. 
Along with these NMC also trained other coordinating government 
agencies. 
Ministry of 
Fisheries, 
Agriculture 
and Marine 
Research 
1 
The function of Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Marine Research 
is;  to formulate and implement laws, policies and procedures required 
for the sustainable development of fisheries and other marine resources, 
including those relating to reefs and lagoons; formulate and implement 
policies and strategies necessary for the sustainable development of 
fisheries, agriculture and marine resources of the Maldives; devise and 
implement strategies to improve the socio-economic conditions of 
Maldivians’ involved in fisheries, agriculture and other marine resource 
sector; and to offer training and extension services to develop the human 
resource capacity in fisheries and agriculture; and finally to protect and 
conserve the marine and terrestrial biodiversity of the nation. During the 
tsunami the Ministry focused on Livelihood Rehabilitation Programs at 
the same time worked with numerous foreign organizations and aid 
agencies such as; UNDP, FAO, ADB, IFAD, World Bank, Japan Non-
Project Grant Aid and Hotel Plan Limited (Singapore).  
Ministry of 
Defence 
1 
The Ministry of Defence is the main organization responsible for the 
national security of the Maldives. The sections under the Ministry 
include; Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF), National Disaster 
Management Centre and Aviation Command. The MNDF comprises 
Marine Corps, Special Forces, and Corps of the Engineers. Service 
Corps and the Coasts Guard. During the tsunami MNDF worked along 
with all the government agencies, particularly with Coast Guard division 
providing manpower for logistical support, facilitate distribution of relief 
items and establishing command and control centres throughout the 
nation. 
Coast Guard 
Division 
2 
The Coast Guard Division of the MNDF is assigned the vital role of 
maintaining surveillance over territorial waters and providing protection 
from foreign intruders poaching in the EEZ. They are also assigned the 
responsibility to respond to maritime distress calls, enforce maritime 
law, search and rescue and salvage operations, armed sea transport of 
troops and military equipment. They organize annual maritime pollution 
control exercises as training for such an eventuality. During the tsunami 
they provided logistical and service support during the response in areas 
of transportation, distribution of relief aid, search and rescue and debris 
removal. They also coordinated with other government agencies during 
the tsunami. 
Ministry of 
Education 
1 
The Ministry of Education (MOE) formulates and implements 
educational policies. It controls and administers all Government-aided 
primary schools, secondary schools, junior colleges and a centralized 
institute while it registers the private colleges and schools. When the 
Asian tsunami occurred all schools were closed for annual holidays 
however, due to the young population (i.e., 40 % of the population under 
18 years and a 100,000 students) and since schools play a very important 
role in small communities the government thought that schools could be 
an ideal setting for formulating and implementing disaster preparedness 
policies, dissemination of disaster preparedness information and 
establishing emergency procedures.  MOE worked with UNESCO and 
local agencies to prepare a disaster preparedness policy for schools 
which was very important as more than 40% of the total population 
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(270,101) is directly engaged in the schools on any given day. 
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Appendix E: Ethics Approval 
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Appendix F: Research Recruitment Telephone Script 
Hello! My name is <Abdulla Niyaz>. I am calling from Lincoln University. I am a post graduate student 
undertaking a study for a PhD degree.  Is this <name of potential participant>?  
 
Did you receive a letter from me giving details about my research study, <” Post-disaster tourism 
crisis recovery in SIDS: development and testing of an integrated approach>? I have indicated that I 
will contact you in two weeks’ time to see if you or any colleague would be interested in participating. 
Would you be willing to participate?”  
If yes,  
Are you interested in hearing more about the research and how it will be conducted? 
 
If yes,  
Give a brief explanation< benefit of the research and how it will help the organization> and give them 
an opportunity to ask questions.  
 
Agree on a date and time for the interview  
I will be travelling to < Maldives or Samoa > from < date to date> to conduct my research. Could we 
meet at your <location> on the <date > at <time>. 
 
 If he/she indicate as not interested,  
Thank you very much for your time. Appreciate your time < good bye >  
 
If he/she never received the letter or do not recall reading about the research; 
May I send you the documents about this research through e-mail?  
 If he/she say “Yes,” 
Thank you! Is this your correct e-mail address (read address)? If you are interested after reading the 
letter and the Research Information Sheet, please let me know and I we will call again to confirm the 
participation. 
 
 
Thank you for your time.  If you have any questions regarding this research, please contact: 
 
Name of researcher: Abdulla Niyaz 
 
Telephone number (s): 0064- 03-3430344/ 0064 -21-02209558 
 
or my supervisor  
 
Full name(s) of supervisor(s): Professor Ken Hughey 
 
Telephone number of supervisor: Phone 0064-03-325 3838 Extension 8728 
 
or my Associate Supervisor, 
Full name(s) of supervisor(s): Professor David G. Simmons  
Telephone number of supervisor: Phone +64 3 325 3820 Extension 8416 
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Appendix G: Invitation Letter  
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Appendix H: Research Information Sheet 
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Appendix I: Questions and Interview Topics for Tourism and 
Emergency Organizations 
 
Faulkner’s 
Phases in 
DIRE grid 
Framework 
Stage 
 
Questions and Interview Topics for Tourism and Emergency 
Organizations 
 
Pre-event Reduction , pro-
active approach 
 Before the tsunami, had your organization considered what crisis 
management strategies would be required in the event of such a 
disaster?  
 Could you elaborate on any disaster planning your organization had in 
place to deal with the Tsunami? 
 Had your organization conducted any environmental scanning, scenario 
planning or risk analysis assessments in case of a crisis?  
 Did you then develop any strategic plans from your scanning and risk 
analysis?  
 
Prodromal Warning phase, 
readiness, pro-
active approach 
 Before the tsunami hitting the country, had your organization received 
any warning?  
 What did you do to prepare for the event?  
 Do you have a documented crisis/risk management plan which covers 
major risks/hazards? 
 Were you acting in response to the advice or actions of other 
departments or agencies?  
 
Emergency Event phase, actions 
taken as  response, 
reactive approach 
 What were the main impacts of the tsunami at this stage? Who was at 
risk and what property damage had occurred? 
 What actions were taken by you and your organization? 
 What action was taken by other organizations and relevant agencies and 
how did affect your actions? 
 
Intermediate Event phase, actions 
taken as  response, 
reactive approach 
 What were the main challenges in restoring operations to normal 
conditions? 
 What action did you and your organization take to restore normal 
services? 
 How the action of other firms and relevant agencies did assisted or 
hindered the return to normality? 
Long-term 
recovery 
Recovery and 
resolution stage, 
reactive approach 
 What were the main challenges confronting your organization in the 
long-term recovery from the tsunami? 
 What actions were taken by your organization to address this recover? 
 How have the actions of other agencies assisted or hindered longer-term 
recovery? 
Resolution Recovery and 
resolution stage, 
reactive approach 
 Have the tsunami brought any permanent changes in the environment in 
which your organization operates? 
 How have your organization responded to those changes? 
 Have the experience of the tsunami resulted in any permanent changes 
in your organizations approach to management and planning? 
 Have there been any permanent changes in planning and organization of 
the destination as a whole? 
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Appendix J: Questions and Interview Topics for Tourism Businesses 
Faulkner’s 
Phases in 
DIRE grid 
Framework 
stage 
Questions and Interview Topics for Private Sector Tourism Industry 
Businesses 
Pre-event Reduction , pro-
active approach 
 Before the tsunami, had your company considered what crisis 
management strategies would be required in the event of such a 
disaster?  
 Could you elaborate on any disaster/emergency planning your company 
had in place to deal with the tsunami? 
 Had your company conducted any environmental scanning, scenario 
planning or risk analysis assessments in case of a crisis?  
 Did you then develop any strategic plans from your scanning and risk 
analysis?  
 
Prodromal Warning phase, 
readiness, pro-
active approach 
 Before the tsunami hitting the country, had your company received any 
warning?  
 What did you do to prepare for the event?  
 Do you have a documented crisis/risk management plan for your 
business that covers major risks/hazards? 
 Were you acting in response to the advice of any other division; your 
head office or government authorities?  
 
Emergency Event phase, actions 
taken as  response, 
reactive approach 
 What were the main impacts of the tsunami at this stage?  
 Who was at risk and what property damage had occurred? 
 What actions were taken by you and your organization? 
 What action was taken by other organizations and relevant agencies and 
how did affect your actions? 
 
Intermediate Event phase, actions 
taken as  response, 
reactive approach 
 What were the main challenges in restoring operations to normal 
conditions? 
 What action did you and your business take to restore normal services? 
 How the action of other firms and relevant agencies did assisted or 
hindered the return to normality? 
Long-term 
recovery 
Recovery and 
resolution stage, 
reactive approach 
 What were the main challenges confronting your business in the long-
term recovery from the tsunami? 
 What actions were taken by your business to address this recovery? 
 How have the actions of other agencies assisted or hindered longer-term 
recovery? 
Resolution Recovery and 
resolution stage, 
reactive approach 
 Have the tsunami brought any permanent changes in the environment in 
which your business operated? 
 How have your organization responded to those changes? 
 Have the experience of the tsunami resulted in any permanent changes 
in your company’s’ approach to management and planning? 
 What would you say about readiness of your business for a potential 
disaster (tropical storm, fire, flood, power failure?) 
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